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THE BEARING OF HISTORICAL STUDIES ON THE RELIGIOUS USE OF THE BIBLE

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The Bible is better understood by scholars today than ever before, but it seems to be at the same time less generally used and less enjoyed, and it is natural to ask whether there is a connection between the increasing knowledge of the book by specialists and the lessening familiarity with it and regard for it among the people. The problem thus suggested is not an isolated one. In regard to other books it may be asked whether the advance of learning is accompanied by a gain or a loss in the capacity to read with enjoyment and uplift; and in regard to other facts than those recorded in the Bible the question is in place whether scientific study stimulates or dulls the sense of their poetic beauty or spiritual value. Yet the problem is peculiarly pressing in regard to the Bible and the facts it records, because of the unique significance of these books and of this history for our higher life.

It has been the first duty of historical students to defend the intellectual necessity and to maintain the scientific character of their work against both the unconscious influence and the outspoken opposition of tradition and prejudice. Certainly theological preconceptions and perhaps even religious interests required to be silenced in order that facts, literary and historical, might be seen as they were, and allowed to speak for themselves. But when his freedom has been fully won, the historical student will naturally hope that his work may prove helpful to religion, at least that it will not create obstacles to faith. He will hope

that religious faith will be able to appropriate and put to its own higher uses such results of scientific study as are commonly accepted and secure, and at the same time that it will not wait for or depend upon results that must in the nature of the case remain uncertain. He will want the right understanding of the book to spread among the people, but he will not want the average man to imagine that the Bible belongs to scholars and that to the unlearned it is a closed book.

If science and religion could go each its own free way in the use of the Bible, neither interfering with the other, the problem proposed by our theme would be easily solved. In fact such independence may fairly be claimed so far at least as it is involved in the assertion that the religious spirit and the reasoning intellect are two normal factors in the higher life of man, two interests and faculties of the mind, each equally deserving our trust and requiring satisfaction. Yet the adjustment of these two faculties of our nature to each other is not quite a matter of course. A division of material between them cannot be carried through. It cannot be said that science has to do with things seen, religion with things unseen. The aim of science is knowledge, that of religion is communion with God. Whatever has reality we must seek to understand, to find its place in the one order of the universe; but at the same time all things real, though in different ways and measures, must become to us revelations of God, ways of approach to him. Religion itself may properly be an object of scientific study; science itself may inspire religious feeling. Still less than a division of material between science and religion should we undertake or permit a division among ourselves between men of science and men of religion. That one man should pursue the scientific study of the Bible and another put it to its religious uses is not the way in which the independence of science and religion in this region is to be secured. We may believe that since both the scientific and the religious interests belong to us by nature they should not interfere with each other and cannot in the end harm each other; but this does not mean that they may not unduly and dangerously limit each other's claim to the attention and energy of the individual man. It is not well for one to be only an historical

student of a literature which is fitted to stir the emotions and quicken the imagination and determine the will. The danger which we have now to fear is not that the results of scientific study will disprove and prohibit a religious view of the world, but that science will prove too absorbing a pursuit and produce in us satisfaction in understanding, as if that were our highest power, and the atrophy of our faculties of imagination and feeling. We have an eager desire for knowledge, regardless of uses and consequences. This is the characteristic higher life of our time. Below this is the still more current desire to put our new knowledge to new uses, to make it contribute to our power and enjoyment. Pleasure in knowledge and pleasure through knowledge are the higher and lower sides of that mental life which is most characteristic of our age. But, if we can trust the testimony of the greatest human spirits, there are pleasures greater than those of knowledge. Now the higher appeal of literature is of course to the imagination and the heart, not to the intellect. It is especially in literature, therefore, that scientific studies are in danger of being pursued at the expense of higher uses and enjoyments; and this danger besets the students of the Bible no less than the students of other great books.

Practically, then, the scientific study and the religious use of the Bible, dealing as they do with the same material and claiming the interest and the energy of the same minds, cannot be kept independent, but will interact upon each other. Our problem is to discover what that interaction actually is, and ought normally to be. It is at once evident that it is not the same in all parts of the book. The Bible contains a great variety of elements, differing widely in their historical character and interest, and in the kind and degree of their religious power. It may be said—not forgetting that such a classification has uneven and overlapping edges, and sometimes applies to different aspects rather than to different parts of the book—that in some parts of the Bible historical studies practically exclude the religious use; that in some parts, on the other hand, they leave the religious use quite unchanged; that in some parts, again, history yields results that are positively helpful to faith; and that in some cases religion may give aid to history, may add the needed human

meaning and value to the bare facts which history brings to light, or even supply the clew to their true explanation.

I. There are, then, in the first place the cases in which historical interpretation practically excludes the religious use of the Bible. The Song of Solomon is secular, not religious poetry, and can no longer be put to religious uses now that an allegorizing interpretation of it is no longer possible. There are in the New Testament arguments which rest on a literalistic or on an allegorical use of the Old Testament, which we can no longer follow with any other than an historical interest, even though we may sympathize with the end which the writer reaches by this to us impassable road. There are, especially in the Old Testament, ceremonial rites, moral ideals and motives, and intellectual conceptions for which we cannot make room in our view of the world,—customs, ideas, and ideals to which we feel that we have done full justice when we have traced their origin and put them in their place in the development of human thought. In such cases historical study satisfies us, and leaves us disinclined to attempt any present spiritual appropriation of what belongs so completely to the past. There will be differences of opinion as to how far and at what points the historical account has this right to take the place of any other use of Biblical conceptions. Most modern men would agree that in regard to the accounts of first things and last things, the descriptions of heaven and of sheol, of angels and of demons, we need nothing but an historical account and explanation, and by this are freed from any further responsibility. To most of us this is only a part of that emancipation which science has achieved from superstitions which have enslaved the human mind, not only in ancient times but almost until our own generation.

There are perhaps some who would answer the question suggested by our theme in no other way than this. Science, they would say, removes the quality of supernaturalness from the Bible and so makes an end of its religious use. To this it can fairly be replied that the Bible shows its remarkable quality in the slight relative degree to which its religious value has been lessened by a science which has fundamentally altered our conception of nature and the supernatural. There are sacred books

whose sacredness vanishes in the light of science. If our Bible were composed chiefly of ritual laws, or of miraculous legends, or of apocalyptic visions, the rise of historical criticism would have involved the end of its religious value. The growth of science has had much more effect upon the later doctrines of the Christian church than upon the Bible, because the Bible contains so little that is of the nature of science, and has so little concern for the communication of knowledge.

II. There are, in the second place, parts and aspects of the Bible of which it can be said that historical studies have substantially no influence upon their religious use. It is of course a superficial judgment that hastens to declare that this is everywhere the case, and that the book remains after historical criticism just what it was before. It is at once clear that this definition of the bearing of historical studies on the higher uses of the Bible applies to it so far as its qualities and effects are of the literary sort. The Book of Psalms presents the clearest instance of a Biblical book of which the religious value is little affected by historical studies. Historical problems are here, of course, in abundance; problems of time and occasion, of authorship and composition, of original and later uses and interpretations. Such problems are difficult enough to excite the zest of the historical explorer and to make the search in itself a pleasure. They are as a matter of fact the more difficult because they are the less important; for the absence of historical data is largely due to the fact that these poems are not closely connected with historical events, but move in a region that is above time and place. After historical criticism has done its utmost, the Psalms remain what they were before. The book continues to be a book of prayer and of song for all peoples; and the true appreciation of songs and prayers is reserved for those who sing and pray.

What is true of the Psalms is true of all the parts of the Bible of which the quality and effect are of the same sort; books or parts of books which are made and meant to be enjoyed rather than to give information, to inspire rather than to instruct. There are many parts of the Bible of which the greater value lies in the beauty, the passion, the uplifting power of their expression of religious faith and hope and love. In many parts of the pro-

phetical books, pre-eminently in Deutero-Isaiah, this is the case. In regard to many of the stories in the Pentateuch and the historical books it is beyond dispute that the greater value to the spirit of man lies upon the surface of the narratives, not in the obscurities of tradition below, and the still greater obscurities of historical fact. The stories as they are can be enjoyed by children, and still, in even fuller measure, by mature men and women, enjoyed in a degree determined by the reader's humanity, not by his learning. But this does not bring us by any means to the limits of the region within which such simple literary appreciation is the higher use of the Bible. We must include parts of the letters of Paul, larger parts than we should at first suppose. The writings of Paul have been so long used as books of theological science, and are now so eagerly and fruitfully searched as documents of historical science, that they have hardly been allowed to reveal, except to the unlearned, their true nature. They are books of passion more than books of reasoning; and so far as they are books of passion they remain for religious uses much the same after historical criticism as before. After the work of scholarship, Paul will still, as before, be best read and most truly appreciated by those who most nearly share his experience, those to whom the power to call God, Father, and Jesus, Lord, and the experience of divine love as an indwelling Spirit make the soul glow with gratitude and lift it up to an exultant consciousness of freedom and of essential immortality.

Of many of the stories and sayings of the gospels it is no less true that their proper character is that of poetry. By no means all that Jesus said was new and comes to us as information. Jesus had a marvellous power not only to sift the wheat from the chaff in the moral ideals and religious faiths of his people, but to give to what he approved memorable expression, and to send old truths as well as new in forms of moving beauty and convincing illustration down to the common people and forth into the world. Many of his words in the gospels have this character. Their effect does not even depend on the certainty that he uttered them. They are self-evidencing, and speak to us with the direct authority of conscience itself.

Our religious use and enjoyment of such language, whether in

the Psalms or in the letters of Paul, in Genesis or Isaiah or the gospels, does not depend altogether on the degree in which we actually share the conceptions, or even appreciate the situation of the writers. It belongs to the nature of the language of emotion that it adapts itself to varying moods and adjusts itself to new conditions, and that the power it exerts is in a measure independent of the reader's understanding of its original sense. In the Book of Psalms the Jewish church preserved and used songs of which the original meaning and the point of view reflected in them had already been left far behind. Of these outgrown meanings the Jewish readers were quite unaware. Quite unconsciously they adapted the words to their own views, yet they used them truly in accordance with their deeper character. We ourselves use the Psalms with still different ideas in our minds, involuntarily giving a poetic value to words of which the original sense is not possible to us. We do this easily in the case of the Psalms, and there can be no doubt that in the reading of Paul also we are nearer to that communion of soul in which true reading consists when we feel the heart of his emotion than when we turn upon his language the light of contemporary conceptions. It is beyond doubt one of the disadvantages of our scientific training and habit of thought that the world of facts and ideas imposes itself upon us as a thing of greater reality than the world of imagination and feeling. It is hard for us, in spite of the argument and appeal of every great literary critic from Aristotle to Coleridge and Wordsworth and Arnold, to confess that poetic truth has no less validity and much more value than historic fact; hard therefore to admit that to enjoy a book is a greater thing than to understand it, and brings into play higher faculties of the mind.

There are then important parts of the Bible in which historical study has little bearing upon religious use, in which indeed our chief anxiety should be lest it bear too hard, lest the scientific interests crowd the religious out of that first place which rightly belongs to it. These parts are all such as offer their greater worth as it were upon their surface, in their quality as books, to the sympathetic and responsive soul; such as do not hide their greater treasure beneath the surface in the region of historical fact.

III. But let us at once confess that there are parts of the Bible of which the greater value lies not on the surface but below it, to be unearthed and brought to light only by historical research. These are the parts which fall under our third division, those in which historical study helps us to a better religious use of the book. The help that the historical study of the Bible offers to religion is both negative and positive, and, if it prove to be more negative than positive, this will not mean that it is not needed and great. Historical study compels us to make, and enables us to make intelligently and with conscious purpose, certain discriminations in the book which have the effect of removing obstacles to our enjoyment of it and imparting freedom in our use of it. The fact that there are many things in the book that are not in agreement with our knowledge of nature, or with our moral ideals, or with our conceptions of God, can no longer perplex us or drive us to allegorizing, when we recognize an historical development in which the imperfect has its place, either as crude beginnings, or as evidence of a decline from higher to lower levels. Historical science points out a reasonable way in which we may make such discriminations in our religious reading of the Bible as religious people have always made, though often in a capricious and ill-considered way. Historical science has made it easier for us to follow Coleridge's counsel than it was for Coleridge himself, to find for ourselves in the Bible that which finds us, to give freely the greater value to that which finds us at the greater depths of our nature. To be sure, the bondage from which, whether we will or not, historical study sets us free has never been so great as to prevent spiritual profit and satisfaction in the reading of the book. The things in it to which the religious soul responds with joy are too many and great to be lost behind the things that offend. Yet the offence becomes greater as the scientific spirit prevails and our uneasiness or even rebellion under the yoke of bondage to the letter increases.

There are subtler distinctions also which historical studies help us make. The difference of which we have become so conscious between our own scientific and religious interests enables us to grasp with greater clearness the difference between intellectual forms of conception in the Bible itself and the sub-

stance of religious experience, between what we might call the scientific element in these writings and the religious. The facts as to the history of thought have a right to guide, even though they do not compel, our judgments as to the value of the intellectual conceptions in which religious experience has from time to time, in one mind and another, sought to find expression and explanation. We have here only an instance of the function which scholarship has to perform in preparing the way for the higher uses of great books in general. That it has such a function, even though only a preparatory one, is especially evident in the case of foreign and ancient literatures. For the appreciation of such books we need in some way to bridge the chasm that separates us from the writers and their times. Historical studies are often important in order that we may become more properly contemporary with the book we would enjoy. We must understand and sympathize with the writer's ideas, though we cannot make them our own, thinking for the time as he thought in order that we may feel as he felt; yet never forgetting that the abiding value belongs to his feelings rather than to his thoughts. To understand the ideas of the Biblical writers, so to understand them that we are free from the sense of bondage to them, is to many of us a prime condition of the discrimination between the human and temporary and the eternal and divine elements in the book; and historical studies are for us the straightest and surest path to such understanding and freedom.

But lest the historian should be exalted above measure by the evident importance of this task, it is necessary to take account of certain limitations of its value. It must be acknowledged, for one thing, that the greatest books need such intervention of learning least. They are greatest for that very reason, or at least are known to be greatest by that sign. They can be read in translations, in remote lands and new times, with undiminished delight and inspiration. Men may not find in them what their first readers found, or just what their writers meant. They may bring with them to their reading and carry over into the book itself thoughts and feelings of their own. For a book is great, as Longinus taught, not only because it so transports us and carries us away with it that we feel as if we had ourselves

produced what we read, but also because it impels us to new thoughts, such, we feel sure, as the author would himself have if he were in our place. The immortal books have this quality of perennial vitality and ready adaptability to all minds and all ages. The human element in them is greater than the national or individual, although it may be the fortunes of a nation or an individual that they describe. In the immediateness and power of its human appeal the Bible has been found to possess pre-eminently among books this quality of universality. In the form of a history of the Israelitish people and of its great men it brings to classical and satisfying expression the religious thoughts and feelings of man. We do not so much need painfully to work our way backward that we may become contemporary in our mental mood and atmosphere with this book because the book has in an extraordinary degree the power to make itself contemporary with us. Looking at it as a whole, as a book, it is certain that the man of genuine and deep humanity will find the best that is in it more surely than the man of learning.

But, still further, even in parts of the Bible where the help of learning is more necessary than it is in the book as a whole,—as indeed in other books where the need is greater than it is in this one,—it should not be overlooked that the task of scholarship is only to prepare the way. It can remove some of the obstacles that lie between our minds and the mind of the writer; but when it has brought us into his presence it must stand aside. An inner sympathy and communion of spirit with spirit remains the condition of the true reading of a book, or rather constitutes the nature of true reading. That process of making the past live again which must constitute the most religious use of a sacred literature remains essentially the work of the imagination. Historical studies perform their highest task when they enable us more easily and completely to overcome the real hindrances to sympathy which differences of language and of age and race create, when they liberate the imagination and leave one free to read the book as his own, in the light of his own experiences and for the satisfaction of his own needs. All this, then, is a negative service of historical science, and in regard to it our greater danger is that we shall forget that it is only a means to an end, and shall

fancy that we are really reading the book when we read it with constant reference to the circumstances in which it was written and with a realizing sense of the world of thought which it presupposes.

But there is a more positive side of the help which history offers to religion. What it brings to light from its search below the surface of the Biblical records is in part itself of obvious religious significance. Historical study has enabled us to recover in its great outlines the course of development of morals and religion in Israel, and the causes and processes through which Christianity came to be. It has also given us a far closer and truer view of the great personalities who in part appear to be determined by that development and represent its successive steps, in part seem rather to have determined the development, to have anticipated and fixed its later stages, and to stand themselves above it as permanent types of the higher life of man. These two discoveries can make strong claims to be of direct and great value to religious faith and life. This again is sometimes declared to be the complete answer to our question. Revelation, it is said, consists in the historical facts which are the deeds of God, not in the records which are the imperfect recollections and interpretations of men. When the historian searches out the facts before and below the records, he is simply putting the deeds of God in the place of the traditions of men. This can be only of advantage to religion.

Now it would be neither wise nor right to depreciate the real value to religion of our modern conception of the course of Israel's religious history. The disclosure of the actual relation between the legal and the prophetic movements cannot but aid the religion of the spirit in its slow triumph over the religions of authority. In the light of historical study it is easier to accept the prophetic and Christian principle that God requires not sacrifice, but righteousness and mercy and humility before him. The development of morals and religion in Israel which the modern historian traces, though it goes forward without miracle, is to our minds far more worthy of being called a divine plan and deed than is the picture which the Jewish church conceived and drew of its past, in accordance with which the Old Testament

canon was shaped. The facts which lie below the surface, which only historical study can uncover, are to our way of thinking more impressive and in our struggle for faith more helpful than the picture which appears on the surface of the books. So also it can hardly be questioned that the better knowledge of the great prophets, of the apostles, of Jesus himself, which has been gained by historical study, must prove only useful and helpful to the purity of religious faith and the reality and depth of religious experience. Here too the closer approach to facts which historical science permits is at the same time an approach to greater values. In the Old Testament it is especially the books of the pre-exilic prophets which are given a heightened human and religious worth through historical research. These books do indeed contain passages which have their virtue in themselves and make the same appeal before and after the historian's work. But as a whole such books as Amos and Hosea have become through modern study far stronger in their appeal to conscience and to faith than they were before. The figures of Isaiah and Jeremiah have been given a new power over the higher life by the separation of their own words from later additions to their books, and by a better understanding of their times and of their influence upon the great historic movement in which they stand. The same may be said of the advantage gained from a nearer and more human view of the Apostle Paul. And surely in the case of the gospels, if the critical comparison of the Fourth Gospel with the other three, and of the three with one another, has brought us nearer to the actual words and the living personality of Jesus, and if a comparison of his teachings with what preceded and with what followed has thrown light on their meaning and significance, who would undertake to deny that in this case historical study, when it leads us from the records and through the criticism of them to the facts behind, is taking us from the thing of less to the thing of greater value for religion?

Yet even here an historian cannot but acknowledge certain limitations of the religious value of his work. It is almost self-evident that religious faith will never be able to rest securely, as on its ultimate foundation, upon the results of scholarly research. These results have not the certainty and permanence which relig-

ion requires. Moreover, if historical research were the condition of a right religious use of the Bible, the book would be taken from the hands of the people, and Christianity would become either an esoteric pursuit of the learned few or a religion of submission on the part of the many to the authority of a new priesthood of scholars. This would be a radical and disastrous departure from that which scholars themselves recognize as most characteristic of the religion of Christ and of Paul, that it was a religion for the common people, and emphasized rather the dangers than the advantages of learning. It should be a chief concern of scholars to reassure religious people, and first of all their own religious natures, of their full freedom and first rights in the Bible, to quicken sympathy and liberate "that imagination which is spiritual vision," to revive joy in the book, the reverent and exultant joy which it is the greatness of a great book to inspire. Two things might contribute to this end. The historian on his part should more fully recognize that in dealing with the Bible he is dealing with a book of literary quality and power, and that in such a book facts, especially concealed facts which it requires his special skill to uncover, are usually not the things of greater value. What is true of other great books is presumably true of this one, that their eminence as well as the persistence of their power over men is due not to the facts they impart, but to the thoughts and feelings which have transfigured the facts and made them their own language and incarnation. Scholarship may fairly be called upon to assist in the recognition of this quality in the book. Such analysis of the secret of the actual power of a book is in fact the chief task of proper literary criticism. The other thing religion itself must supply. Such facts as historical science brings to our secure possession, that development of morals and religion, that action, if one prefers so to describe it, with its tragic element, and its universal human appeal, those great men, in their human reality and in their typical significance, religious faith and experience must undertake to master; to make a living factor in the present life of the spirit. But with this we have advanced to the fourth division of our treatment.

IV. There are places in the Bible in which religion helps historical science, places in which history has less to say in the

way of suggestion and guidance to the man of religion than religion has to say to the historical student. I must anticipate an instinctive dissent from the proposition that religion can direct or assist scientific research. It is easier for us to affirm that science can help religion in the weighing of values, than that religion can help science in the determination of facts. No doubt religion has often transgressed its boundaries by demanding that history reaffirm matters of fact on which faith has been accustomed to depend. Since faith finds the Biblical history at its high points unique in power, it has wished the historian to demonstrate that it is there unique also in its causes and processes. Because religion has required miracle, and science asks for rational order, religious interests have often appeared to obstruct rather than further the progress of science. It has seemed best, therefore, that scientific studies should go on their way without regard to religious feelings. Science seems to us to have a greater objectivity and to require a more unconditional assent than religious needs and hopes. It is easier for us to give science the first place and to let religion follow as it may. It is no doubt the duty of religious faith to listen to what scholars may say of the books and persons and events which it is accustomed to value. When something clear and confessed emerges out of the currents of Biblical criticism, faith should no doubt undertake to adjust itself to the new facts; or rather—and this makes an important difference—it should attempt to interpret the newly discovered facts to the spirit of man, to bring to light the spiritual significance of the facts; or perhaps—and this would make a still further difference—it should proceed to impart to the facts spiritual significance. It cannot be necessary or appropriate for our religious nature to wait in an attitude of mere submission upon the dictates of our reason. It is rather the function of religion to help science by bringing a needed supplement to its work; to help man, we should rather say, by adding to his growing knowledge spiritual meaning and human interest. Nothing could better illustrate this function of religion with reference to the results of historical study than Wordsworth's classic description of the function of poetry in relation to science. If the work of men of science, he says, should ever create any material revo-

lution in our condition and in the impressions which we habitually receive, if their discoveries should become familiar to us and the relations under which they are contemplated should be manifestly and palpably material to us as enjoying and suffering beings, then the poet will be ready to follow the steps of the man of science, and will regard his discoveries as proper objects of the poet's art. "If the time should ever come when what is now called science, thus familiarized to men, shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of flesh and blood, the Poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transformation, and will welcome the Being thus produced, as a dear and genuine inmate of the household of man." It is such a function as this that the religious spirit has now to fulfil with reference to the results of historical science in the study of the Bible. The pursuit of science here, as in other regions, lies apart from common human life; and the knowledge thus gained "is a personal and individual acquisition, slow to come to us, and by no habitual and direct sympathy connecting us with our fellow-beings." The knowledge of men of science cannot be made the common possession of men,—that is, the common people cannot be made to rejoice in it and live by it,—through mere popularizations. The results of scientific research must not only be put in untechnical language and brought down to the level of the average intelligence, they must be translated into something living and human, lifted up to the level of the universal and the spiritual; and this transformation, in the case of such a literature and history as the Bible contains, can be accomplished only by the religious spirit. Religion, therefore, has something of its own to do with the outcome of the historian's work before truth of science can become truth rejoiced in as "our visible friend and hourly companion," truth that can be sung in a song in which all human beings can join. We have efforts enough from the side of science to popularize its discoveries, but not yet efforts enough, or efforts free and creative enough, from the side of religion, to give to these discoveries spiritual significance and so common interest and value to humanity. It is no doubt true that this can be done only so far as the results of scientific study are secure and generally accepted and familiar. Perhaps therefore the task that rests

upon our generation is that of reaching assured results, and letting them be generally known, accustoming the people to the facts as fast as they are ascertained. But the search for spiritual values cannot be postponed without spiritual danger and loss. We are not doomed to an exclusively intellectual use of the Bible, nor are we justified in leaving the religious interpretation of the book to a coming generation which shall inherit the knowledge our own has gained. Religion should follow closely the steps of science, and should be ever at its side, "carrying sensation into the midst of the objects of the science itself."

It is evident enough that for his own sake, for the sake of a sound and whole human nature, the scientific student should be at the same time a man of religion. But it is not so evident that this union of religious with scientific interests is required also for the sake of science. Has our experience of religious values the right, at any point and in any measure, to influence our decisions as to matters of fact? The poets have not always followed the advance of knowledge; sometimes they have taken the lead and anticipated by the foresight of genius that which science has afterward discovered or experience confirmed. Such prophetic forecasts need not, indeed, be regarded as simply miraculous. The poet may be only more conscious than other men of the deeper movements of human development, a keener and more sensitive observer of the signs of the times. Moreover the poet's vision enters into human life as itself a reality, and works as an ideal and a motive toward its own actualization. Is there, then, anything analogous to this in the religious use of the Bible? Has the sense of religious value any proper power of its own to detect reality, any right to influence the historian's judgment as to facts?

There are those even among modern thinkers who hold to the right of religious faith to decide at some crucial point questions of historical fact. One of the most notable instances of this appeal is the well-known position of Professor Herrmann, defended in his *Communion of the Christian with God* and in other writings. The fact of Jesus of Nazareth, he argues, the historical reality of his personality or inner life, is so far a part of the present experience of one who finds God and forgiveness through

the reading of the gospels, that it can be affirmed by such a person on the ground of such an ethical and religious experience, in advance and independently of historical research. Herrmann's interest is to free religion from dependence on the uncertain results of the historical criticism of the gospels; but many who sympathize with this aim hesitate to say that at this one point only in human history a question of historical fact can be decided apart from the study of historical evidence, that here the past becomes present and can be experienced as real in a sense and by a process that has no parallel elsewhere. How far, it will at once be asked, can such inner assurance go? How many facts, and just what facts, go to make up that picture of the inner life of Jesus which religious faith can of itself affirm to be historical? Can it affirm the fact of the resurrection? Can it decide the authenticity of the words, "Come unto me all ye that labor," or, "In my Father's house are many mansions"? This event and these words have entered deeply into religious experience, yet history will certainly not in the end confess that it has no duty to weigh evidence and no right to reach a decision as to their historical character. In regard to such questions of bare fact as these,—did this thing take place as it is written, or not? were these words spoken by this man, or by another?—religious experience can hardly be allowed to take the lead and go forward alone to the end. Yet it cannot fairly be urged that the influence which religious feeling inevitably exerts in such cases is altogether out of place and ought simply to be overridden. The religious value of a record of historical persons and events is itself an historical fact. That the record has such power over us today is due to the power which the facts had over the writer. That power is something with which the historian must reckon. It is an actual historical force, a cause which is not only needed for the explanation of its effects, but requires an adequate cause for its own explanation. It may be, therefore, that in some cases the power of a story is valid evidence of the actuality of events. Besides this purely historical consideration it may be affirmed that we are not obliged as historians to renounce our assumption as theists that the good and the true belong together, that a belief of which the effect is more good than bad must have in it more truth

than error. We must, however, guard against the natural mistake of assuming that the truth which the good we experience attests is truth to fact; for it may often be rather the truth of ideals, poetic truth even if expressed in the form of an historical record, truth which the facts symbolize, rather than truth which depends upon the facts for the validity. The inference from the goodness and power of the effect of a narrative upon us to the actuality of the facts narrated is therefore one that ought not to be made upon the impulse of feeling but only after careful consideration. Not when to religion itself its experience appears to rest upon the actuality of an historical fact, but only when to a fair historical and psychological judgment the power actually exerted by a recorded fact is evidence of the reality and nature of the fact itself, does religious experience have this sort of right to help science to its decisions. The historian should receive and use the testimony of religion, but religion should not attempt to predetermine the conclusions of history.

The distinction thus suggested is one which we make with little difficulty in the case of nature and the science of nature. That it has its application to literature is clear, and though it presents peculiar difficulties in the case of the Bible, its right application there is also peculiarly important. When science has gone forward to great and secure discoveries, such as the Copernican astronomy, or the laws of gravitation and evolution, the poet and the man of faith must follow with their effort to find spiritual meaning in these new conceptions of the universe, and to give them spiritual value. But our enjoyment of a sunset does not follow after our understanding of it. It is not through the intellect that we experience this joy, and yet it is an experience through which we come into touch with a great reality, Beauty. There are two things that science can do in such a case. It can attempt a physical explanation of the sunset, and set forth the conditions of atmosphere and the laws of light that account for it. In this it goes its own way quite independently of aesthetic enjoyment, and with very little influence upon it. But science can also attempt to describe and explain our enjoyment of the sunset, and to analyze and define our sense of beauty. This is a higher thing than the other because the enjoyment is a higher

kind of reality than the objective fact; or, rather, our sense of beauty is a higher faculty than our sense of sight. Yet in this case science follows, while feeling leads the way. The task of science is of secondary importance, and if the pursuit of it dulls the feeling itself, the loss is greater than the gain.

We have already given a place to the cases in which it is the task of religion to follow science in its greater and surer achievements, and to make the new knowledge helpful to the higher life. But how are we to define the cases in which religious feeling naturally takes and rightly keeps the first place? What are those feelings experienced by the human spirit in the reading of the Bible, which remain independent of anything that historical science can do with the objects which call forth this experience, and superior to anything that psychological science can do with the experience itself? Illustrations will answer these questions better than generalizations. The Old Testament is an intensely national literature, yet in it the stories of the heroes of Israel and the fortunes of the nation are so told that they have been enjoyed by many nations through many ages. This means that men have seen in these stories a mirror of human life. The greatness of the Old Testament consists in the transformation by which in these books particular and local matters have become the symbol of the faiths and hopes of humanity. This is the region in which religion has independence and superiority.

To suggest somewhat more definite illustrations, let us look at the great action which the Bible records, and at the great characters depicted in it. The action in the presence of which we seem almost everywhere in this book to stand has God and man as its persons, a holy God and sinful man, and consists in their relations to each other. It involves two tragedies, the punishment of the sinner, which is tragic because the power of sin and the weakness of human nature make his punishment appear almost to be his destiny; and the suffering of the good, which, tragic though it is, and often an oppressive burden upon the human spirit, becomes endurable and even satisfying when it is seen to be a suffering of good for evil, vicarious and redeeming in its effect, a suffering which, as the free offering of love, may even reach the supreme height of virtue, and impress our souls

as nothing less than the suffering of the divine. This action, not of the New Testament only, but of the Old Testament as well, the historian is likely either not to see at all or to regard as a theory imposed upon the facts; and since he finds it also in other religions, he may explain the theory as ultimately a mere myth. But sinning and suffering human beings have always understood its truth; and men of humane culture and poetic sense, finding it not only in this book but in the great epics and tragedies of literature, will be more inclined to assent to it as poetic truth than to set it aside either as speculative dogma or as mythology. In such a matter as this, which is no mere question of fact, religious feeling may take the lead before historical research. Although it is not a question of mere fact, yet it does concern realities. Sin and redemption, suffering and love, are not less real because it is not by our scientific reason that we can grasp them.

In the case of the great characters of the Bible, as in the case of its great action, the greater value and the higher reality may be of a sort that escapes the understanding and imparts itself to the soul. The picture of the character may have its purpose and real significance in the ideal truth which it embodies, and this we cannot expect the pure intellect to discern. If it be objected that this looks in the direction of allegory, the reply must be that allegory has in fact borne witness, over against literalism, to the qualities in the Bible that move the heart and impart joy, and to the freedom which is our right in the reading of great books. The mistake of allegory is that it is itself too intellectual and literalistic; that it attempts to set forth poetry in scientific forms, and thereby strikes a path which is as far from the true appreciation of the Bible as poetry as it is from the right understanding of its original meaning and of the facts of history which it records.

It is in the gospels that we find the greatest difficulty in distinguishing between fact and truth, between the rights of science and those of religion. It is commonly urged by scholars that our four gospels are all products of Christian faith and devotion, and that if we would recover the historical Jesus it must be in part by detecting and eliminating from the gospel narratives

just those traits and that coloring which betray the idealizing influence of reverence and love. That this critical effort is inevitable we must confess. That some of its results remove obstacles which stand in the way of a spiritual appreciation of Jesus is beyond doubt. But two things must be evident to the most ardent critic: that the historical problems presented by the gospels are so complex that differences and uncertainties must always remain as to many important matters of fact in the life and teaching of Jesus; and that no synopsis of the gospels, no reconstruction of sources, no critical life of Jesus, no exposition of his teachings has, or can ever have, the religious power that the gospels themselves possess. Is it impossible, then, that these books should be read for their religious greatness even by those who study them also as historical documents? Is it necessary to lose the value of the books as they are, even though we are assured that in searching out the facts beneath the records we are making our way down from great to still greater treasures? May not a part of the help here so urgently needed come from a freer recognition of the character and worth of these books as literature, that is, from a fuller and more confessed, a less apologetic and more grateful sense of the value of the faith and feeling, the reverence and love, that shaped and that inspire the gospel pictures of Christ? This does not mean that religious feeling or faith is to pronounce at will upon matters of outward fact as to the deeds and words of Jesus, least of all that in so doing it may take advantage of insufficient evidence and the consequent hesitations or disagreements of historians. The things about which as facts faith can decide are things which our eyes could not have seen nor our scientific observations have verified, however near we had stood to them. Faith has now the same rights and responsibilities that it had then with reference to questions of truth and of fact. It has now the right and the duty to determine those realities which, if we had been present, we could have perceived only upon religious conditions, not by sight but by reverence and love. In reference, for example, to the resurrection of our Lord,—the empty tomb, the fortunes of the body of Jesus, the number and order of the appearances, and even their nature are matters which belong to historical research

and to psychological interpretation. In all these matters there is more danger of our being misled by religious presumptions and wishes than likelihood of our being helpfully guided by religious insight and experience. But on the other hand the reality of a life after death is not, and in spite of the assurances of some men of science I should wish to affirm that it never will be, a matter for science to determine, never a matter that we can either experience by means of our senses or demonstrate by reasoning. This was as true when Peter and Paul saw the risen Christ as it is today. What belongs to religious experience now belonged to it then. The fact that historical evidences are conflicting or obscure does not justify religious interests in attempting to close questions which the evidence leaves open.

Questions of the authorship of books and the authenticity of sayings are also, of course, primarily questions for historical study to decide. These are questions to which, if we had been present, our senses could have given answer. They are questions of this world, not of that other world the consciousness of which is religion. The eternal beauty and truth of a saying religion can attest, but not any outward fact about it, not when or by whom it was spoken or written. Yet this is a point at which a certain effect of religious faith may be inevitable and within faith's proper sphere. If we had heard Jesus speak, as his disciples heard him, our ability to repeat his words would have been partly limited, as theirs was, by our understanding of his meaning; and this would have been conditioned by the closeness of our sympathy with his character and purposes, by our reverence and our love. But these conditions are the very substance of that other world in which religion has the first place. If a religious condition would then, in a measure, have determined the truth of our memory and report of the words of Jesus, a religious condition may now, in the same measure, influence our judgment as to the truth of the report of his words in the gospels. The influence of the total impression of the accounts of Jesus upon our decision of matters of detail as to what he did or said is of course perfectly valid in a purely historical study; but one would hardly venture to say that a sharing in some measure of the religious experience of Jesus, or an attitude of religious

reverence toward him, cannot deepen a man's appreciation of his character and increase the purity and truth of that total impression by which even questions of fact are affected. Even here, however, the difference between truth and fact must be kept clear. The saying, "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest," may be fully true as an expression of the mind of Christ toward men even if it was not spoken by Jesus himself. The Fourth Gospel need not be by a personal follower of Jesus, and need not be, as a whole, a record of words which he actually spoke, in order to justify us in the feeling that this book brings to light, in some directions, greater depths of the actual consciousness of Jesus than the other three, or gives on certain matters a more adequate account of what his life and words actually signified in human experience. If the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians had come to us not in a letter of Paul but in a gospel, no one would have doubted that it truly expressed the mind of Christ, whatever judgment may have been passed as to its origin. Standing as it does in Paul's epistle, Christ is nevertheless its author; it is a genuine utterance of the spirit of Christ, as Paul would be the first to affirm.

The greatness of the Bible as a book among books has been proved by the only tests that determine the greatness of any book, by the quality and extent and permanence of its influence, by the kind and degree of joy that it has produced in men. It is natural therefore to suppose that it possesses the qualities that make other books great. But the greatness of great books depends little upon their accuracy as records of facts. It depends chiefly on the universal human truth which has transfigured the facts, on the ideals and inner experiences of which, through the power of a great spirit, the facts have become symbols and embodiments. The Bible is surely in its greater parts, and indeed as a whole, no mere record of historical facts. It is already, throughout, a religious transfiguration of facts, and has in this its power and value. When as historians we pursue our task of removing the interpretations with which the facts are overlaid, we are often sacrificing the greater for the less. It is better to see the facts as prophets and apostles saw them, trans-

figured by faith and vitalized by passion, than to see them just as they happened. It is indeed only because they were so transformed that the facts had their permanence and power in human history. We must get behind the transformation and set the facts again in the light of common day if we would understand how they came to pass; but we must let them be reclothed again in the bright garments of passion and reverence if we would even understand their influence upon the course of events, still more if we would make our own their spiritual value. Whenever, then, in the Bible this inner light is of more importance than the facts it illumines, religion may rightly claim the first place, before historical study, in the reading of the book.

The order of change in our religious use of the Bible may then prove to be something like this. In the first place is the stage out of which we have come, at which the past as the book records it is imposed upon the present as an external authority, the assumption being that this past, these facts and this record and interpretation of them, belong not to this world but to the other, not to the world of science but to that of faith. Then comes the stage through which we are passing, when science, and particularly historical science, brings forcible deliverance from that bondage, and teaches us to view the past as past. Here the assumption is that this history is like other histories and this book like other books. Then should follow a further stage, at which, while the rights and achievements of historical criticism are freely accepted, the power that lives in the book itself is once more felt. Then religious feeling and imagination will make the past again present, and we become able to make our own the faith and vision of the writers of the book, and in their spirit, though in our own way, to conquer our own world by faith. We shall then, in a sense, return from the study of sources and facts to the enjoyment of the book as it is, and read it with that union of transport and reverence with which the greatest products of the human spirit should be read; with transport as if the words were our own, and with reverent wonder because of their divine excellence and power.

JESUS THE SON OF GOD

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I. THE LOGION MT. 11 25-27, LK. 10 21-22, AND ITS PARALLELS.

No passage of the Synoptic Gospels throws so much light upon Jesus' sense of his own mission as that which deals with Knowing the Father and Being Known of Him in Mt. 11 25-27, Lk. 10 21-22. It belongs to the common element of Matthew and Luke unknown in Mark, and in the judgment of the great majority of critics must therefore be referred to a common source of high antiquity. In short, as respects attestation, its claims to authenticity are unexcelled. As respects content, it deals with the all-important matter of Jesus' doctrine of divine sonship, and yet it seems to stand alone among Synoptic sayings, and to be paralleled only by utterances ascribed to Jesus by the fourth evangelist. But the Johannine discourses give every indication of having been composed by the evangelist himself in order to expound in dialogue form his own deutero-pauline Christology. The only instance in all Synoptic tradition of anything comparable to this apposition of "the Son . . . the Father," is Mk. 13 32, Mt. 24 36.

Of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father.

But this Markan saying cannot be employed to prove the super-human consciousness of Jesus; for in the Lukan version of the same saying, Acts 1 7,

It is not for you to know times or seasons, which the Father hath set within his own authority,

the apposition disappears, and, in view of Mark's freedom in the composition of the eschatological chapter (Mk. 13), and of his individual Christology as reflected at the beginning and end of his gospel (Mk. 1 1 and 15 39),¹ it is more reasonable to attribute to the evangelist the reference to "the Son" in Mk. 13 32. The

¹ The paraphrase of Is. 5 1-7 in Mk. 12 1-9 reflects the same standpoint and is better understood as an allegorical composition of the evangelist than as an authentic parable of Jesus, though a parable somewhat resembling this is inserted by Mt. just before it (Mt. 21 28-32).

original saying was, then, no parallel to our logion, and the latter remains unique. It is the sole unshakable utterance of Jesus to which the doctrine of his divine sonship can be referred. And yet, even after the most drastic application of both textual and higher criticism, it does remain unshaken; and it well deserves its description as "the Johannine passage," for it forms, however interpreted, a true link of connection between Synoptic and Johannine Christology.

We are bound, nevertheless, by all sane principles of criticism, and of exegesis as well, to prefer that form of text and that interpretation which leave the saying in harmony with the rest of Synoptic tradition rather than a text and interpretation whose affinities are all with the Fourth Gospel. Such a form and interpretation may reveal a root from which the later developed Christology might spring; any other could give us no more than an erratic block, in which the geologist must see violent displacement from its original bed.

Harnack² has recently submitted the textual evidence to a searching examination. Since it is not our present object to test his results, but to present an interpretation applicable whether these results be accepted or not, it will suffice merely to indicate by square brackets the material he omits, and by marks of parenthesis the altered readings which he introduces.

Mt. 11 25-27

25 At that season Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding, and didst reveal them unto babes: 26 yea, Father, for so it was well-pleasing in thy sight. 27 All things have been delivered unto me of [my] Father: and no one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him.

Lk. 10 21-22

21 In that same hour he rejoiced in the Holy Spirit and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding, and didst reveal them unto babes: yea, Father, for so it was well-pleasing in thy sight. 22 All things have been delivered unto me of [my] Father: and no one (hath recognized) [who the Son is save the Father; and] who the Father is, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son [willeth to] reveal (eth) him.³

² Sprüche und Reden Jesu, 1907, Exkurs I, pp. 189-211.

³ In the extract only Harnack's positive results are exhibited. He leaves it doubtful, for example, whether the order in Mt. 11 27 should not be "the Father . . .

From a comparison of these emended texts of Mt. and Lk. Harnack concludes that the common source (Q) represented by their coincident material read as follows:

At that season Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding, and didst reveal them to babes; yea Father, for such was thy good pleasure. All things were delivered to me by the Father, and no one hath known the Father [or who the Father is] save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son maketh the revelation.

We ourselves are not so much concerned with the sense given to the passage by our first and third evangelists, as with the sense it bore in their common source, now commonly designated Q.⁴ It may well be, as has recently been declared by no less weighty and unprejudiced an authority than Jülicher, that

The evangelist who makes Jesus exclaim, No one knoweth the Son save the Father and likewise no one knoweth the Father save the Son (Mt. 11 27; cf. Lk. 10 22), surely presupposes in him a consciousness derived from another world and period.⁵

An evangelist demonstrably dependent on Mark, one who takes over and improves upon the "high" Christology of his predecessor, and who seems even to have adapted this very logion to the form of a post-resurrection commission to the apostles to make converts of all the nations (Mt. 28 18), may well have accepted a Pauline Christology with all its implications of pre-existence. But the inquirer into the pre-pauline conceptions, the historian of the doctrine, who would know what Jesus himself felt to be

the Son . . . the Son . . . the Father," and whether in the last clause we should not read "revealeth," as in the emended Lk., instead of "willeth to reveal." As these are merely possible changes and make no practical difference to the sense, they are not indicated.

⁴ So the Germans generally and Salmon (*The Human Element in the Gospels*, 1907). The designation is better than L (W. C. Allen, *International Critical Comm.*, 1907) or A (H. J. Holtzmann, *Synoptische Evangelien*, 1863), for it does not prejudge the question of the relation of this Mt.-Lk. source to the Matthaean "Logia of the Lord" mentioned by Papias. Burton and Sharman of Chicago University employ the letters G (Galilean document) and P (Perean document) for the respective intercalations of Lk. 6 20-8 8 and 9 51-18 14, which other critics designate together as Q.

⁵ Paulus und Jesus, 1907, p. 31.

implied in his own "sonship," will not delay over secondary and derived information when primary sources are accessible. Mark and the first evangelist show the form of the tradition current in the period 70-90 A.D.; for the period 40-60 A.D. we are able to use as a standard of comparison the Pauline epistles and the reported utterances of Jesus himself in the material drawn from Q and common to Matthew and Luke.⁶

In this earlier material we are fortunately not devoid of parallels for either portion of the logion. Even if we grant the cogency of Harnack's textual argument for attributing to our first evangelist, and not to Q, the clause "no one knoweth the Son save the Father," yet the Pauline epistles will furnish evidence, as we hope to show, that this supposed addition is no invention of the evangelist, but is itself an expression of the spirit of Jesus. Besides Q and the Pauline epistles we have a further resource in the contemporary Jewish literature. Of all these aids we must avail ourselves in order to determine in what sense utterances concerning "the Son," "the Father," would be understood by Jesus' auditors, and must therefore, since he had no purpose to mislead, have been intended by himself.

Harnack⁷ very justly indorses the judgment of Pfeiderer in finding in 1 Cor. 1 19 21 a Pauline parallel to our logion so close in thought and to some extent even in language as to suggest direct literary dependence:

For it is written,

I will destroy the wisdom of the wise,
And the prudence of the prudent will I reject.

... For seeing that in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom knew not God, it was God's good pleasure through the foolishness of the preaching to save them that believe.

⁶ That this common Mt.-Lk. discourse material (Q) is not derived by one of these evangelists directly from the other has been conclusively demonstrated by Wernle (*Synoptische Frage*, 1899, pp. 40-80), and is an accepted result of New Testament science. Even Allen pleads only for an "influence" of Matthew upon Luke. Advocates of oral tradition (A. Wright) make their oral source the equivalent of a document, since its form is so stereotyped as to make the resemblance of Mt. to Lk. closer in the portions not shared by Mk. than in the parts taken by each from this admittedly written source.

⁷ *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, p. 210, note 1.

On the question whether Paul is dependent on the logion or Q influenced by Paul, there is disagreement. Harnack rejects Pfleiderer's decision in favor of the latter alternative, on the ground that "babes" (νήπιοι) "is not Pauline."⁸ And yet in the same context, scarcely more than a score of verses further on (1 Cor. 3 1) Paul applies this very term "babes" (νήπιοι) to his Corinthian converts as recipients of the revelation.

Important as this matter of the relation of Paul to Q undoubtedly is, we may still leave the question of priority undecided. The essential point for the interpreter is the existence of the relation, and this becomes the more apparent the more closely we scrutinize the two contexts.

As regards the setting of the logion in Q, accepting Harnack's textual results, we can go no further than the coincidence of Matthew and Luke allows. As this comprises, however, all the evidence we have, and as all bears in one direction, there is no likelihood of contradiction for Harnack's conclusion⁹ that in the source it stood between the Woes on the Unrepentant Cities of Galilee and the Denunciation of the Scribes who Blasphemed the Spirit and demanded a sign from Heaven. Pursuing the sequence a little further back it would appear that the Woes against the Unrepentant Cities followed upon the Complaint against the Generation which was satisfied neither with the "wailing" of the Baptist's disciples nor the "piping" of the followers of Jesus, and this in turn came after the Mission of the Twelve, which itself was preceded by the incident of the Centurion whose faith put to shame the unbelief of Israel. Certainly one cannot fail to perceive the dominant motive in this sequence, particularly as it reappears so strongly both in Paul (Rom. 9-11) and in all our canonical evangelists (Mt. 4 1-25, 12 1-12, 13 1-23, 21 33-43, Lk. 4 16-30, 24 44-49, Acts *passim*, Jn. 12 20-43). The author of Q treated the logion as a rebuke of the dull ears and blind eyes of unbelieving Israel, in this respect following the lead of Paul, and being followed by all our evangelists.

⁸ Yet our passage furnishes the only occurrence of the word in the gospels (save the quotation from Ps. 8 3 in Mt. 21 16) against eleven occurrences in the Pauline epistles.

⁹ Sprüche und Reden Jesu, p. 126.

In 1 Cor. 1 18, 2 16 the flesh which "glories before God (1 29) is not indeed, as in Rom. 2 17-20, the Jew who claims to "know God" and to be "a teacher of babes," but the wise in their own esteem generally. In the logion as originally intended it is of course "the wise and understanding" of Israel, the scribes, who are meant, and their oppressive yoke is contrasted with that of Jesus in the invitation framed by Matthew as an appendix to it from Eccus. 6 28, 51 26 ff.¹⁰ Only the compiler, to whom is due the context of Q's sequence, seems to have had in mind the peculiar pretensions and the signal rejection of Israel as a whole. With the evangelists and Paul alike we have here an application, now wider, now narrower, of the passage Is. 29 9-24, a favorite passage of Paul¹¹ and also used more than once in Q.¹² In representing the "babes" as the choice of God's "good pleasure" to receive revelation, Paul is only extending to the spiritually disinherited of the gentile world the assurance which Jesus had given to his "little flock" of repentant sinners and synagogue outcasts. He bases it explicitly on the Isaian passage which tacitly underlies the logion.

II. THE REVELATION GIVEN TO THE LOWLY.

The comparison of Paul's rhapsody over "the word of the cross," "the foolishness of the preaching," with Jesus' exultation over the revelation given to his "little ones," and the connection of both with their common Old Testament basis, is much more than a mere vindication of the authenticity of the saying. It already goes far toward determining its sense; and this in turn, as it becomes clearer, will enable us to detect parallels perhaps hitherto unsuspected.

The fundamental point of agreement of all three witnesses, the logion, the Isaian passage, and the Pauline, is the vindication of

¹⁰ Mt. 11 28-30, which fails to appear in Luke, seems, beautiful as it is, to be of the evangelist's composition from phrases derived from the Wisdom-literature. See W. C. Allen, *ad loc.*, in *Internat. Crit. Commentary*, 1907, and Bousset, *Religion des Judentums*, p. 338, for the parallels.

¹¹ Rom. 11 8, Col. 2 2, 1 Cor. 1 29 30, 3 19, Rom. 9 20 21, 2 Tim. 2 20 21, 2 Cor. 1 3 4, 7 6, 1 Thess. 3 7, 4 18, 5 14.

¹² Cf. besides the present passage Mt. 11 5, Lk. 4 18, 7 22.

the revelation given to the unlearned, the lowly, the plain people, against the usurpations of ecclesiastical authority. In the time of Amos God had been free to choose as the bearer of his message a herdsman, a dresser of sycamore trees, in preference to the prophet by avocation, if it so pleased him (Am. 7 14 15). Isaiah already felt the pressure of hierocratic usurpation, and followed the lead of Amos in pouring scorn upon the prophets "whose eyes are closed," the seers "whose heads are covered," the learned to whom "all vision is become as the words of a book that is sealed," so that God turns to "the meek" and "the poor," making the children to sanctify his name, and erring spirits and "stammering lips to utter peace."¹³ Since the extinction of the voice of prophecy, and the establishment of the exclusive authority of the synagogue and the written law, the usurpations of the professional religionist had become in Jesus' time immeasurably more intolerable still. A coterie of scribes with a few thousand Pharisaic followers had arrogated to themselves alone the spiritual inheritance of Israel. Sitting in Moses' seat with their prerogative of the interpretation of the written law, they held the keys of the kingdom of heaven. They entered not in themselves, and the masses that would enter in by the broad door of the baptism of John and the proclamation of forgiveness and adoption by Jesus they hindered. They had made it impossible for the average son or daughter of Abraham to expect any "part in the world to come"; for this phrase had come to be the current expression for a share in the common national inheritance, the birthright of the sons of Abraham, the messianic hope. As the Gracchi in Rome became the champions of the lowly against the usurpation of the common domain by the aristocracy, so John the Baptist and Jesus resisted the usurpation of the common spiritual inheritance in Israel. To Jesus the baptism of John had been a sign from heaven (Mt. 21 23-25). John himself had been an Elias, the "restorer of the tribes" (Ecclus. 48 10), having as his mission not merely the "great repentance" (Mal. 4 5 6), but the turning of fathers to children and children to their fathers, in the sense of restoring those who had been excluded by violence and wrongfully, and excluding those who had usurped the place of

¹³ Is. 29 9-24 (LXX).

the sons and daughters of Abraham.¹⁴ As such a sign the Baptist's warning of "wrath to come" had been "a greater matter" than the preaching of Jonah to the Ninevites, and the generation which rejected it were bringing on themselves greater condemnation (Mt. 12 41).¹⁵

The Isaian basis of our logion, the Pauline parallel, the gospel affinities, the context and internal evidence of the logion itself, all combine to show that we must interpret it in the light of this championship by Jesus of the cause of the lost sheep, and of the lost son against the grudging elder brother. The "weary and heavy laden" to whom is given the invitation, "Take my yoke upon you and learn of me," which Matthew appropriately appends, are those that have been learning of the scribes in Moses' seat, those scribes who make the yoke of the law more and more grievous and intolerable, "binding heavy burdens and grievous to be borne, which they themselves did not touch with one of their fingers." The "revelation to babes" for which the supreme Lord is thanked, is the sight and knowledge granted to the pure in heart (Mt. 5 8), more than offsetting the unused "key of knowledge" in the hand of the professional exponent of Mosaism (Mt. 23 13, Lk. 11 52). The spirit of the context is that of the promise of Jer. 31 34 of the days of the new covenant, when

They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying, Know the LORD: for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them, saith the LORD: for I will forgive their iniquity, and their sin will I remember no more.

In the light of these connected passages it is manifest that those expositors are right who point out that the word here ren-

¹⁴ Mt. 11 12-15. This obscure passage is illuminated by the rabbinic tradition, Edujoth viii, 7, where on the authority of Johanan ben Zakkai the function of Elijah as restorer of the tribes is declared to be, "not to pronounce clean or unclean, to exclude or receive in general, but only to receive those who had been excluded by violence, and to exclude those who had been received by violence." See Bacon, "Elias and the Men of Violence," Expositor, sixth series, xxxi (July, 1902), and W. C. Allen, Intern. Crit. Comm. on Mt., *ad loc.*

¹⁵ On the reference to "the baptism of John" in this answer of Jesus to the demand for a sign from heaven, which Matthew and Luke in contradictory ways endeavor to apply to Jesus himself, see Bacon, Sermon on the Mount, p. 232, and cf. the parallel demand for a sign and its answer, Mt. 21 23-25; also the combination of the two in Jn. 2 18-21.

dered "delivered" (*παρεδόθη*) is not the same as that used in the utterance of Mt. 28 18, "All authority hath been given (*ἐδόθη*) unto me in heaven and on earth," but is the technical term for the conveyance of authoritative doctrine (*παράδοσις*). If the post-resurrection commission (Mt. 28 18) is framed, as seems probable, on our logion, the evangelist has extended the sense beyond the original intention. In reality the logion is more justly paralleled in Jn. 7 16 17, "My teaching is not mine, but his that sent me." Against the "traditions (*παραδόσεις*) of the scribes" Jesus sets the tradition of his Father, which is "hidden from the wise and understanding, but revealed (by the Father) to babes." We are reminded how in a closely connected Lukan passage, denouncing as blind leaders of the blind the scribes and Pharisees who had demanded of him a sign from heaven, he had referred his hearers to "the light that is in thee" as a guide which no other can replace (Lk. 11 34-35). If we penetrate through the setting to the intrinsic sense of the parable of the Good Samaritan, we shall perceive there too a vindication of the inner law against the written. The Samaritan stands contrasted with priest and Levite because in his simple obedience to "the righteousness of God" he puts to shame the professional expounders of Mosaism. It is in the name of himself and his "little ones," then, that Jesus "rejoices in the Holy Spirit," when he thanks the "Lord of heaven and earth" that the scribe has no monopoly of the knowledge of God. The title "Lord of heaven and earth" is chosen, as Amos had chosen equivalent titles (Am. 9 5 6), in protest against a clique of ecclesiastics who imagined themselves able to monopolize knowledge of the Infinite One. Paul delineates for us this would-be monopolizer of the "Lord of heaven and earth." For Paul it is of course not merely the scribe, but the Jew generally in contrast with the untaught gentile, who

rests upon the law and glories in God, having the knowledge of his will, discriminating in matters of casuistry, being instructed out of the law, confident that he himself is a guide of the blind, a light of them that are in darkness, an instructor of the foolish, a teacher of "babes," having in the law the pattern of knowledge and of the truth.

But Paul's expressions belong to a time when the issue regarding inheritance of the kingdom had widened. Jesus' exultation is the

declaration of independence of the old prophetic spirit so long enslaved. It is a reassertion of the rights of the spiritually disinherited of Israel. Paul is the champion of the gentiles, who without the law are a law unto themselves. Both rest ultimately on the same basis. In both cases the appeal is to the awakening Spirit of adoption that witnesseth with our spirit that we are born of God, teaching us to cry, Abba, Father.

III. RELATION OF THE SAYING TO MARK 4 11.

With this recognition of the bearing of the earlier part of our logion must follow a recognition of certain hitherto unsuspected affinities.

On the surface there is little to indicate the affinity of this saying with that attributed to Jesus in Mk. 4 11,

To you is given the mystery of the kingdom of God, but for them that are without all things are done in parables.

We believe this Markan saying, however, to be a genuine variant of our logion. Our second evangelist is notably free in his citations of logia, adapting them to his own purposes, and frequently, as in Mk. 1 15, giving them a tincture of Pauline phraseology. The use here of the Pauline term "the mystery" for "the revelation," and the adaptation of the logion to a theory of the teaching in parables which is obviously the evangelist's own creation, though also based on Paul,¹⁶ has obscured the relation. But Clement of Alexandria has fortunately preserved for us from an

¹⁶ Mk. 4 11 12 is an editorial insertion quite out of harmony with the context, which presupposes that not merely the parable of the sower, but "all the parables" have preceded (vs. 13), and expresses surprise that explanation should be needed (vs. 13). In vss. 10 and 13 the sense of the question about the parables is not, as assumed in vss. 11 and 12, "Why use this method?" but "What is the meaning of the symbolism?" Vss. 11 12 with their Isaian proof-text apply the Pauline doctrine of the hardening of Israel (Rom. 11 7 8) to the fact that Jesus had taught in "parables," the "parable" being erroneously regarded as an enigma, riddle, or dark saying. Mark doubtless applied the parable of the sower to the hardening of Israel much as Ep. Barn. 9 5 (cf. Heb. 6 8) applies the common prototype of Jer. 4 3, "Sow not upon thorns, break up the fallow ground." But Mark did not *invent* a logion to justify his theory of the parables as a preaching of judgment. He adapted that now under consideration to suit his Pauline theory.

unknown gospel a middle link. In his *Stromata*, v. 10, 69, he declares that he found "in a certain gospel" the saying,

My mystery belongs to me and to the sons of my household.

In the Clementine Homilies xix, 20 the same logion is quoted in a form reminding us of the exclusive spirit of Mt. 7 6,

Keep the mysteries for me and for the sons (*uiols*) of my household.

In these agrapha we are manifestly dealing with the same logion that appears in Mk. 4 11 in a form adapted to Mark's theory of the parabolic method. The reservation of "my mystery" is an unmistakable point of connection with Mark; but the reversion in the latter half of the agraphon to "me and the sons of my household" as the antithesis to "outsiders" shows equally close connection with our logion, indicating that Mark has merely adapted it, after the example of Paul, to the wider issue of his own time, and embodied in it the protest of the spiritual seed of Abraham against Jewish pretensions. Mark has paved the way for this adaptation by introducing immediately before the Teaching in Parables, and between it and the Choosing of the Twelve, the saying in which Jesus declares these to be the "sons of his household,"

And looking round about upon those who were sitting in a circle about him he saith, Behold my mother and my brethren; for whosoever doeth the will of God, he is my brother and sister and mother.

It is a matter of no small significance that our second gospel, in striking contrast to the other two synoptists, entirely excludes the great exhibition of Jesus' teaching delivered to the masses, the Sermon on the Mount, and at the corresponding point introduces a deliverance of "the mystery of the kingdom of God" to the inner circle of Jesus' spiritual kindred, while "to those who are without all things are done in enigmas." We should greatly mistake the intention of this most democratic of all the evangelists if we conceived him to suggest a new spiritual aristocracy, with the apostles as trustees of "the mystery." We must understand the inner circle just as he defines it (Mk. 3 31-35). The "mystery" is given to the believing and obedient (cf. Jn. 7 3-5 17

with Mk. 3 31-35); the preaching to the Jewish people generally is to him a mere "sowing upon thorns."¹⁷

On the other hand Mark does not wholly neglect to justify his drastic theory of the hiding of the revelation from the unbelieving Jewish "outsiders" whom he refuses to call "wise and understanding." At the close of his parenthetical discussion of the reason for Jesus' teaching in parables, he resumes the saying at which he turned aside, "If anyone hath ears to hear, he is the one that shall hear" (Mk. 4 9 and 23), and introduces another logion¹⁸ to qualify the seeming harshness of his doctrine,

For it (the mystery) is not hid but only that it might become known; nor was it concealed but only that it might come to light.

In fact this whole paragraph, Mk. 4 21-25, beginning with the comparison of the lamp that "comes" not to be hidden, but to be lifted up,¹⁹ and ending with the warning to the unreceptive that they will be deprived of their prerogative, can only be appreciated when it is read with reference to this great issue of the first century between Jewish particularism and Christian universalism. Whatever the original sense, to Mark the parable of the good and bad soil and the appended sayings constitute a protest against Jewish claims to monopolize the knowledge of God and the messianic hope.

There can be little doubt in view of these various lines of connection that our second (Roman) evangelist, in his section on the Choosing and Training of the Twelve, extending from Mk. 3 7 to 6 13, has adapted our logion on the Hiding of the Revelation from the wise and understanding and the delivering of it to babes to the special case of the hardening of Israel, the case so vividly brought into the foreground in Paul's great epistle to the Romans. Fortunately we have in 1 Cor. 1 18-3 1, and especially in the

¹⁷ For Mark's estimate of the Jewish people generally and their religious character see Mk. 7 3 4 6 7.

¹⁸ Mk. 4 22 is given twice in Luke. Lk. 8 17=Mk. 4 22; Lk. 12 2=Mt. 10 26.

¹⁹ Commentators differ as to whether in the evangelist's application "the lamp" stands for the Messiah, who is destined to occupy the throne of glory (cf. Rev. 21 23), or, as originally intended, for the gospel message. Either interpretation would suit our contention.

common Isaian basis, Is. 29 9-24, a standard by which to measure the degree of departure from the original sense.

As a guide to the original occasion of the utterance, Mark's setting has but little value. It is true that Matthew also places in the same relation to the parables a saying which Luke sub-joins to our logion as part of the congratulation addressed "to the disciples privately":

Blessed are the eyes which see the things which ye see. For I say unto you that many prophets and kings (*Mt.* righteous men) desired to see the things which ye see, and saw them not, and to hear the things which ye hear, and heard them not.

In *Mt.* 13 16-17 this utterance is separated from the logion on the Hiding of the Revelation and appended to the Markan digression on the Parables as a Hiding of the Mystery. It illustrates the saying, "He that hath ears let him hear" (*Mt.* 13 9, *Mk.* 4 9). But this displacement is almost certainly due to the influence of Mark. Probably, then, the full content of the saying as it stood in the common source of Matthew and Luke (*Q*) was as given in *Lk.* 10 21-24, which we give again in Harnack's reconstruction:

At that season he said, I praise thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding, and didst reveal them unto babes. Yea, Father, for such was the good pleasure before thee. All things (matters of revelation) were delivered to me by the Father, and no one hath recognized (*ἐγνων*) [the son save the Father, nor hath any recognized] the Father save the son, and he to whomsoever the son willeth to give the revelation. Blessed are your eyes for they see, and [your] ears for they hear; [for verily] I say unto you, many prophets [and kings] desired to see the things which ye see, and saw them not, and to hear the things which ye hear, and heard them not.

Our previous discussion of the context in *Q* has indicated a tendency already apparent even in this primitive compilation to apply the saying to the wider issue between Jew and gentile.

IV. KNOWING AND BEING KNOWN OF GOD.

That which mainly interests the modern student in this so-called "Johannine" saying is its bearing on the messianic consciousness of Jesus, and it is highly significant that all the affinities of the passage, whether in the Old Testament or the New,

make it a protest against the spiritual disinheritance of the common people at the hands of the professional religionist. In the light of this circumstance it is impossible to suppose that Jesus is speaking either of a "revelation" or of a "sonship" which is his in an exclusive sense. He speaks of himself simply as the leader and champion of those who have no claim to sonship but the ethical, whose only pretension to be "sons of the Father in heaven" and "children of the Highest" rests on their exhibition of that divine spirit of unlimited, disinterested goodness, which "is kind even to the unthankful and the evil" (Mt. 5 43-48, Lk. 6 27-36), who "know the will" as the Good Samaritan knew it. But it was the ancient prerogative of Israel as a people to be "the beloved son" of God, "the first born and only-begotten"; whereas God had said of "the other nations which also come of Adam, that they are nothing," and had "likened them to a drop that falleth from a vessel."²⁰ According to the rabbis the evidence of Israel's special prerogative was that Israel had "knowledge of the law."²¹ Whom indeed of mankind does the Creator destine to inherit his world, if not those to whom he has made the revelation of how and why he created it,²² and of how he wills that men should live in it? No wonder if in the eyes of scribes and Pharisees the people of the land who "knew not the law," and did not so much as lend themselves to the guidance of its authoritative expounders, were "accursed" and worthy of no "share in the world to come." The privilege of the "publicans and sinners" could only be that which Paul later ascribed to the "sinners of the gentiles," not "a righteousness of their own, even that of the law," but the right to "become imitators of God as beloved children and walk in love, even as Christ had loved them and given himself for them" (Eph. 5 1).

But if such be the general bearing of the passage, we may well ask by what right the English versions write "Son" with a capital letter. The true parallel to the use which our logion makes of the term "the son" is Jn. 8 35,

²⁰ 2 Esdr. 6 55-59, referring to Gen. 1 26 27 and Is. 40 15. Cf. Psalms of Solomon 17 30, "He shall take knowledge of them that they be all the sons of their God."

²¹ Cf. Deut. 4 6-8.

²² Ass. Mos. 1 14.

The bondservant abideth not in the house forever; the son abideth forever.

Here no one thinks of writing with a capital, because the sense is obviously, "Any one who is a son." The fourth evangelist is reproducing Gal. 4 30, and we have only to turn to that passage to find Paul using both elements of the saying about Knowing God and Being Known (recognized, acknowledged as a son) of God, and then a little further on referring to the law as a "yoke of bondage." If in addition we find this use of the term "the son" to be justified by contemporary Jewish application of these complementary ideas of knowing God and being known of him, it will appear that such is certainly the intention of the logion itself, whatever later evangelists may have made of it.

If we accept the fuller Matthaean form, which is also the Lukan in all forms of the text except Codex Vercellensis,²³ the combination of the reciprocal sayings is paralleled by Paul in his own vindication of the sonship and heirship of the "sinners of the gentiles" without the "yoke of bondage." The disposition of his Galatian converts to take up the yoke of Mosaic ordinances is met with a passionate adjuration to remember the Spirit of adoption which they had received,

Because ye are sons, God sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father. So that thou art no longer a slave but a son; and if a son, an heir also through God. . . . But now, having come to know God, or rather to be known (acknowledged, recognized as sons) by God, how turn ye back into bondage. . . . Be not held again in a yoke of bondage.

Knowing and being known come into the same antithesis again in 1 Cor. 13 12,

Then shall I know (have the gift of gnosis) even as also I have been known (acknowledged).

We may leave the question unsettled whether it is Paul who has set the example of this antithesis to our canonical Matthew, or the logion which suggests it to Paul. The decision will depend upon the solution of the problem of the text. More important

²³ Cod. Vercell. gives in Lk. (not Mt.), *Omnia mihi tradita sunt a patre, et nemo nobis quis est pater nisi filius, et cuicumque voluerit filius revelavit.*

than the question whether the saying about Being Known (i.e. recognized, acknowledged as a son) by God, was or was not originally connected with the one on the Knowledge of God, is the question of the meaning the former saying was intended to convey. What was the current application of the phrase "to be known (*γνωθῆναι*) by God"?

On this point we have the testimony of a collection of logia still older, apparently, than that referred to by Papias. The Pastoral Epistles, attributed to Paul, and in some parts admittedly Pauline, make repeated reference to "faithful sayings," and especially to "the wholesome words (*λόγοι*), even the words of our Lord Jesus Christ," as the standard of doctrine (1 Tim. 6 3). Among the quoted sayings of these epistles are two which together are said to constitute the "seal" of God's foundation, the Church,

The Lord hath acknowledged (*ἔγνω*) those that are his own, and, Let every one that nameth the name of the Lord depart from iniquity (2 Tim. 2 19, cf. Mt. 7 21-23).

The context shows that the writer has in mind the same complementary principles as are illustrated in the parable of the great supper with its Matthaean appendix of the guest unprovided with the wedding garment.²⁴ God's spiritual building has this twofold basis; on the one side no exclusion of those whom God himself accredits, "as many as are led by the Spirit of God are sons"; on the other no inclusion of the morally discredited, "by their fruits ye shall know them." Because

God said, I will dwell in them and walk in them, . . . therefore
Come ye out from among them, and be ye separate, saith the Lord,
And touch no unclean thing,
And I will receive you,
And be to you a Father,
And ye shall be to me sons and daughters, saith the Lord Almighty
(2 Cor. 6 16-18).

These complementary principles of the older Paulinism are now embodied in the "seal" of the "foundation of God," just quoted.

The foregoing examples from the Pauline writings, which show

²⁴ Cf. the two kindred parables, also peculiar to Matthew, of the tares and the net full of fishes, Mt. 13 24-30 36-43 47-50.

what was the primitive treatment of the complementary principles of "knowing" and "being known of" God, should be our guide to the historic sense of the logion, or logia, of Mt. 11 25-27, 13 16-17 = Lk. 10 21-24. To the scribes' contention that no man can claim to be a son who does not "know" the God whom he claims as his Father, and who has no revelation of his will (Rom. 2 18), reply is made by Jesus, in words which rest on Is. 29 14, that the little ones, whom he welcomes as his brother, sister, and mother because they hear the will of God and do it, have a better, fuller "knowledge" than "the wise and understanding." This is the good pleasure (*εὐδοκία*) of the "Lord of heaven and earth," and it behooves us to be glad and rejoice that the deepest knowledge of God is not intellectually but morally conditioned. Those "know his will" who perceive and imitate his spirit of unstinted, universal goodness "even to the unthankful and the evil." These, and not scribes, nor priests and Levites, official custodians and interpreters of the law, are qualified to "make revelation" to others as widely as they will. Jesus expresses this in the pregnant, epigrammatic phrase so characteristic of him,

It is the son who is competent to give revelation of the Father; but this knowledge is not that of the wise and understanding, it is such as is given to those who are simple-hearted as babes.

V. RELATION OF THE SAYING TO THAT ON THE KEYS OF THE KINGDOM, MT. 16 19.

Since the complementary idea of being known of God is not certainly found in both gospels, we cannot be sure that it is not a reflection of that great experience of the Church for which Paul has given us the term "the witness of the Spirit of adoption." From the stammering lips of those who prayed as the Spirit gave them utterance Paul takes down the cry *Abba, Abba*,²⁵ appealing to it as a superhuman testimony that through faith we are made

²⁵ The parallel to the above-quoted passage (Gal. 4 6 7) in Rom. 8 14-16 26-27 shows that the reference is to the charisma of tongues. Those who "prayed in a tongue," amid their inarticulate groanings and utterances intelligible only to God (Rom. 8 26, 1 Cor. 14 14-17), stammered forth the infant's cry, *Abba, Abba*.

sons and heirs of God. This one thing only need be known, if any arise to dispute the right of gentiles to be reckoned heirs of the promise. Received they the Spirit? If God have recognized as a son, who dare dispute the title? In this sense of recognition the principle was admitted as decisive in all branches of the Church. Since Pentecost it had been a "seal of the foundation," for "the Lord accrediteth them that are his." But the earliest struggle against the Jewish spirit of exclusiveness was earlier than Pentecost. To Jesus also the very essence of his mission had been to break down the artificial barriers which excluded publicans and sinners from the inheritance of sons, to resist the usurped prerogative of the "power of the keys." The scribes claimed authority to "bind and loose." By virtue of their occupation of Moses' seat they held "the key of knowledge," and used it to hinder the entrance of the repentant masses into the kingdom. Though preserved in late and variant form, the utterance attributed to Jesus which bestows this usurped power of the keys on the brotherhood of his disciples, or on their leader and representative, is a genuine echo of his championship of the people's cause, and similar parallels to the saying, "The Lord hath accredited them that are his," are to be found in Mt. 18 18,

Verily I say unto you, What things soever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and what things soever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.

and in Mt. 16 17-19,

On this rock I will build my Church. . . .

I will give unto thee (Peter) the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.

These reported sayings of Jesus, before they were perverted into the decretals of a new ecclesiastical despotism, were themselves a declaration of the liberty and independence of the "little flock." Instead of suffering the little ones to be excluded from the synagogue by those who held the keys, claiming power to bind and loose, making the son or daughter of Abraham who resisted their tyranny "as the gentile and the publican," he that hath the key of David restores it to his own. The key of knowledge, the key

of authority, the key of admission or exclusion, the keys of the kingdom of heaven, are given to the Church itself or to the Church in the person of Peter as its leader. Alas that the Church only repeated under the name of Peter the old-time tyranny of the scribes! These several appeals to a saying of Jesus of this type show that he was understood to have protested against the scribes' usurpation of this power, and that the references in the Pauline writings to God as the sole accreditor of his own sons have an authentic basis. Even were the reference to the son's being known of the Father held to be borrowed from Paul, yet Jesus himself had in substance established it as a "seal of the foundation of God" that not man but the Lord accrediteth them that are his.

In fact the commission of Peter in Mt. 16 17-19, with its significant reference to "the gates of Hades" which had closed upon the crucified Leader, is closely related to the commission to "Peter and the twelve" which forms the central feature in all forms of the resurrection story. God gave him to be made manifest unto them in order that *forgiveness of sins* through repentance and faith in his name might be preached unto all the gentiles, beginning from Jerusalem (Lk. 24 47-49). The authority of their commission is the authority to "loose" from sins. Its token is baptism. Its seal is the outpoured Spirit. Cf. Mt. 28 18 19, Jn. 20 21-23.

VI. BEARING OF THE SAYING ON THE MESSIANIC CONSCIOUSNESS OF JESUS.

But we are more concerned with that portion of the logion which is certainly attested by both Matthew and Luke, and which vindicated the claim of the "babes" to have that true knowledge of God without which one cannot be deemed a son. Here if anywhere we can discover the secret of the messianic consciousness of Jesus. The title "Son of man" which has been called his "favorite self-designation," and to which many turn as the principal source of first-hand knowledge on this vital point, is doubly open to question. On philological grounds it is doubtful if the phrase could have existence in the Aramaic spoken by

Jesus. If it did, that very existence was owing to connotations most foreign to the sane and well-poised quality of Jesus' character and teaching. His fundamental conception of his calling is not the apocalyptic, and appears not in the eschatological sayings but in the Sermon on the Mount. The apocalyptic notions of his mission and destiny may easily have been superimposed upon his own conception in the superheated atmosphere of the primitive Church, while the reverse is inconceivable. Jesus was not a visionary. The Danielic figure looms large to the vision of post-resurrection prophets and seers, but not on the mental and spiritual horizon of the Carpenter of Nazareth, least of all as offering a career for himself. The phrase which is really and demonstrably characteristic of him, the title which in the oldest documents of Christianity is universally pervasive, as against not one single occurrence of the term Son of man, is that of Son of God. In any case we may say that as certainly as the conception of Exodus and Hosea that Israel is God's son (to say nothing of the as yet unethicized common Semitic idea) is antecedent to the apocalyptic figure of Daniel, Enoch, and 2 Esdras, just so certainly is the conception of sonship to God in Jesus' mind antecedent to that of Son of man, whatever may have been the apocalyptic dreams to which he turned under the growing certainty of martyrdom. It is true that we give small notice to this humble title "son of God" except when the translators assist our vision with a capital letter, or when in some way its simple ethical sense is transcended; but that which really concerns Jesus and Paul is "the inheritance of sons," by which they both mean "sons of the Highest," "sons and daughters of the Lord Almighty."²⁶ It is also true that a Roman gospel, admittedly of the second generation, gives something more than an ethical meaning to this designation "the son of God," which in our logion Jesus applies to himself only as representative, leader, and champion of those whose sonship required to be vindicated. In Mark the title "the Son of God" has already a special and peculiar sense allied to the Pauline metaphysics. The outcome of this process of apocalyptic transcendentalizing appears in the vision-story of the Transfiguration, a typical apocalypse, wherein the rabbinic device of

²⁶ Mt. 5 45 = Lk. 6 35, 2 Cor. 6 18.

the *bath qol*, or voice from heaven, is employed to set forth along with the characteristic imagery of this type of literature the author's Pauline or quasi-Pauline Christology. For the author of this vision-story the real being of Jesus was revealed when the eyes of his intimates had been enlightened to pierce the veil of his flesh and to behold the Son of God, not in the ethical, but in the apocalyptic sense, even the Beloved, of pre-existent glory. The same device of the voice from heaven and the same phraseology are employed in the preliminary narrative which Mark prefixes to his gospel. His doctrine of Jesus the pre-existent Son of God is intelligible to us, and was acceptable to his own and later generations. The Gospel of Mark became the very framework of gospel tradition. But if we look at the references to divine sonship which pervade that other source, which nearly all critics admit to be an older and better authority, we shall find the term "son of God" to bear a far different sense. Jesus is still "the son," but only as "the first-born of many brethren." This sense is as little "theocratic" as it is metaphysical. It is historic, ethical, and religious. It finds its affiliations not with the crude metaphysics of the Roman gospel, nor with the profounder and subtler speculations of the Ephesian, but in the familiar subject of dispute in the Pauline epistles, the demand for the admission to the Abrahamic inheritance of those who have no title under the law, the question whether our inspired cry of Abba, Father, is or is not a sufficient earnest of our sonship. Most of all it finds its attestation in the common background of current Jewish interpretation of the messianic hope.

VII. THE MESSIANIC HOPE FROM THE PROPHETS TO THE PHARISEES.

It is an utter misapprehension of this national expectation in its origin to regard it as having had primarily to do with royalty. The passage which in modern times is commonly taken as its very foundation, the promise to David of a successor to his throne,²⁷ finds scarcely an echo in the entire New Testament. In reality the hope is far older, far broader, far more fundamental. Not

²⁷ 2 Sam. 7 13, Ps. 132 11, referred to in Acts 2 30.

David's successor primarily, but Israel itself is God's son. The fundamental passage is Ex. 4 22,

Thou shalt say unto Pharaoh, Thus saith the Lord, Israel is my son, my first-born; and I have said unto thee, Let my son go, that he may serve me; and thou hast refused to let him go: behold I will slay thy son, thy first-born.

God first adopted the people,

When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt (Hos. 11 1).

If in later times he became a Father to their king, it was for the people's sake.

Professor F. C. Porter has very properly reminded us that the prophets represent themselves not as creators, but as critics of the messianic hope. The hope itself was as old as Israel. It partook in its earliest form of the crudity of the common Semitic conception of the divinity of a land as the progenitor of its population. Jahveh, however, unlike neighboring divinities, had not begotten Israel, but "adopted" him, when he was a bond-slave in Egypt. This made the relation ethical and spiritual.²⁸ "You only have I known (acknowledged)" is Jahveh's word through Amos, but this acknowledgment was the free choice of a "Lord of heaven and earth," who directs all the nations and rules them under a law of righteousness. Amos became the first great critic of this national hope by subjecting it to ethical conditions. He ethicized the doctrine of election.

In the time of Jesus the messianic hope, in spite of all its transformations and refinements, had by no means lost its fundamental significance. The experiences of the monarchy had caused it to crystallize around the theocratic figure of the son of David; the experiences of national disintegration and admixture with the world had clothed this figure with mythological attributes and widened the programme of his activity. Most of all, life under the law had profoundly modified the conception of its conditions. But even in Jesus' time the messianic hope remained fundamentally what it had always been. Israel is God's son and heir, Israel must possess God's land, that is the world. The destruction of

²⁸ Budde, *Israel before the Exile*, 1897.

Jerusalem by Titus only elicits from a groaning patriot and believer the cry,

O Lord, thou hast said that for our sakes thou madest this world. . . . And now, O Lord, behold these nations which are reputed as nothing be lords over us and devour us. But we thy people, whom thou hast called thy first-born, thy only-begotten and thy fervent lover (beloved?), are given into their hands. If the world now be made for our sakes, why do we not possess for an inheritance our world? How long shall this endure? (2 Esdr. 6 56-59).

Many were the forms under which the old belief in the adoption and the inheritance survived, from the cry of the Zealot for national hegemony to the philosopher's academic demonstration that the truly wise man is the "heir of the things belonging to God."²⁹ Of these many developments we are concerned with but one, the religious. Pharisaism had withdrawn from the nationalistic movement against the forcible hellenization of Antiochus Epiphanes, as soon as that movement degenerated into a mere struggle for self-aggrandizement on the part of the successors of Simon the Maccabee. The Pharisees became the Puritans of the first century B.C. by eliminating worldly ambition from the messianic programme. Israel's calling was to be the people of the law. Righteousness, "even that which is of the law," was to be its work and ambition in the world. Its reward was to be in a new heaven and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness. This was the deepest and most fruitful movement of the times in the bosom of a people whose genius had ever been religious. Its purest expression appears in the so-called Psalms of the Pharisees, nearest in sentiment of all uncanonical writings to the canticles of Luke.

In true Pharisaism, of the type which produced the noblest and greatest of the followers of Jesus, sonship in the religious sense became the very essence of the messianic hope and the true prerogative of Israel. To be the son of God by knowing and doing his will is the Pharisee's ideal for his people. The Christ, when he comes, "shall take knowledge of them that they be all the sons of their God." (Ps. Sol. 17 30). Many generations earlier we have the same ideal in the same phraseology

²⁹ Philo, *Quis rerum divinarum heres?*

from the son of Sirach. The Great Repentance of Mal. 4 6 here became a turning in mutual reconciliation not of mere earthly families, but "of the Father (God) to the son (Israel) and of the son to the Father," thus restoring the tribes of Israel (Ecclus. 48 10). A century later than Sirach the author of the Wisdom of Solomon delineates "the righteous man" in traits that acknowledge no ethnic limitation, but he has in reality Israel—a Pharisaic Israel—to sit for the portrait.

Let us lie in wait for the righteous man,
 Because he is of disservice to us,
 And is contrary to our works,
 And upbraideth us with sins against the law.
 He profeseth to have knowledge of God,
 And nameth himself son (*παῖς*) of the Lord.
 And he abstaineth from our ways as from uncleannesses.
 The latter end of the righteous he calleth happy,
 And vaunteth that God is his Father.
 Let us see if his words be true,
 Let us try what shall befall in the ending of his life;
 For if the righteous man is God's son, he will uphold him (Wisdom of Solomon 2 12-18).

An earlier contemporary of the same Alexandrian school claims it as a testimony of the wise Egyptian priests that the Jews are

men of God, a name which belongs not to others, but only to him who worships the true God. For these others are men of food and drink and clothing; for all their thought is taken for these things. But those who are of our faith give no heed to these things, but their whole life long they are concerned with searching out the works of God (Aristeas 140, *ca.* 90 B.C.).

These Alexandrian Jewish writers of the first century B.C. seem indeed "not far from the kingdom of God," with their ideal of Israel's destiny and prerogative. But we must come down to the writing of a Palestinian Pharisee almost contemporary with Jesus himself for the nearest approximation to the Sermon on the Mount in an expression of the messianic hope. He hopes for nothing less than the outpouring of a spirit of righteousness, God's Spirit, who by communicating his nature makes Israel indeed his son, and thereby exalted, as in the Pauline writings, "over every angel and spirit."

And Moses fell upon his face and prayed, and said: O Lord, my God, forsake not thy people and thy heritage, that it should walk in the error of its own heart, and deliver them not over into the hands of the gentiles, that these may not rule over them and compel them to sin against thee. Let thy mercy be exalted over thy people, and create in them a right disposition and let not the spirit of Belchor (Belial) rule in them, to accuse them before thee and to seduce them from all paths of righteousness, that they should perish far away from thy countenance. For they are thy people and thine heir, whom thou didst save by thy great might out of the hand of the Egyptians. Create in them a clean heart and a holy spirit and let them not be entangled in their sin henceforth and forever.

And God said unto Moses, I know their contrariness and their (evil) disposition and their stiff neck, and they will not hearken until they acknowledge their sin and the sins of their fathers. After that they will return unto me in all uprightness, with all their heart and all their soul. And I will circumcise the foreskin of the hearts of their children, and will create in them a holy spirit and make them pure, so that they shall no more turn away from me from that day to all eternity. And their soul shall follow me and all my law, and they shall do according to my commandment, and I will be a father to them, and they shall be my children. And they shall be called the children of the living God. And all angels and all spirits shall know that they are my children and that I am their Father in truth and righteousness and that I love them (Jubilees 1 19-25).

It is a Puritanism of this noble type which is represented in its degeneracy by the synagogue-system of scribe and Pharisee in the time of Jesus. After the downfall of the Maccabees reaction against Zealot nationalistic fanaticism on the one side and Sadducean worldliness on the other had thrown back the religious-minded upon the orthodoxy of the written law. The Pharisee became a blind follower of the scribe, his blind guide. Insistence on the letter of a deified law, whose ideal was separation from the ceremonially unclean,³⁰ carried exclusiveness to a degree unmatched even by the Puritanism of Scotland or New England. For the "people of the land," the "publicans and sinners," the ordinary peasant or fisherman or handicraftsman of half-heathen Galilee, the Mosaic ideal of separation was utterly impracticable, its prescriptions "a yoke which neither we nor our fathers were able to bear" (Acts 15 10), the scribes' interpretations of its requirements were a "binding of heavy burdens and grievous to be borne which they themselves touched not with one of their

³⁰ Ex. 33 16, Jer. 51 45, Ez. 20 34, 41 Is. 52 11, 2 Cor. 6 17.

fingers." The poor man, the unlettered, the ordinary artisan and father of a family saw himself under this odious and hypocritical tyranny gradually excluded from all share in the world to come. He too was a son of Abraham, but by decree of the scribes he saw himself deprived of his Abrahamic inheritance in favor of the little coterie of the Pharisees (the "separated"), whose legalistic righteousness was only too often mercenary and external. There were but two classes, the *chaberim*, or consistent devotees of the law, a religious caste withdrawing from the defiling contact even of their kindred and coreligionists of less strict observance, and the *am ha-aretz*, the out-caste who had "no share in the world to come."

The religious centre of gravity cannot be permanently swung to this social extreme. The reaction, when it came, was correspondingly sweeping and profound. John the Baptist and Jesus revived the old prophetic spirit of religious democracy. They led a rebellion of the simple Israelite against the usurpation of the Abrahamic inheritance by the scribes and Pharisees. Like another Elijah John led a "great repentance,"³¹ the token of which was the new rite of baptism, self-evident in meaning, unknown to legal prescription. The publicans and sinners flocked to him; the scribes and Pharisees held aloof. His martyrdom could not check the movement. In the Carpenter of Nazareth it found a new and greater leader, who himself sought out the lost sheep of the house of Israel in Galilee, and defended the lost son against the grudging elder brother. His fisherman followers he taught to cast nets for the scattered wanderers from the kingdom.³² Like a trustee for an orphan defrauded of his inheritance, Jesus demanded restoration to the "little ones" of their rightful part in Israel's spiritual inheritance. He insisted upon the full content of this inheritance, and on that which is of primary importance, the spiritualities, before the temporalities. The conflict with the entrenched power of scribes and Pharisees was a war to the knife. Since the days of John the Baptist—the

³¹ This was the function of Elias redivivus in contemporary legend, cf. Mal. 4 6 resting on 1 Kings 18 37. See Bacon, "Elias and the Men of Violence," *Expositor*, sixth series, xxxi (July, 1902).

³² Mk. 1 17, resting on Jer. 16 16.

Elias who should come as a "restorer of the tribes" to "admit those who had been wrongfully excluded and to exclude those wrongfully admitted" to Israel's inheritance³³—the kingdom of heaven had suffered violence, and men of violence were now prepared to take it by force. Jesus was unsparing in his invective against this one class, and this only; and he has not neglected to tell us why. He told them to their faces that the law and the prophets, as the charter of their monopoly, could endure only "until John." He predicted (Mt. 23) that they would not spare him; and they did not.

It was his championship in this conflict which first gave to Jesus his right to be called the Son of God. It was for the sake of his little flock that he demanded it, and for them that he defended it with his life. Sonship to God was the vital element of that religious inheritance of which the synagogue-system, the legalism of scribe and Pharisee, sought to rob the simple Israelite by its usurpation of the key of knowledge and its pretence of doing the will of the Father. Therefore it is that Jesus thanks the infinite Lord of heaven and earth that the knowledge of him is no monopoly of the wise and understanding, that it is not the learned in the law that know him, but the little ones, the babes, if so be that they have the spirit of sons in kindness even to the unthankful and the evil. Such knowledge, such inward light, he claims to have in his own person, the tradition not of dead authorities, but of his Father, and he maintains that they who are qualified to give "revelation" are those who are sons in this sense. A good Samaritan is a better teacher than a selfish and cowardly priest or Levite.

More than this, he disputes also the scribal usurpation of the power to "bind and loose," to admit and to exclude. Who is the son? John the Baptist had said, "God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham," and the publicans and sinners had repented at his word. None denied the Pharisees' right to the name. But Jesus had promised salvation to the repentant publican, "forasmuch as he also is a son of Abraham." Which has the better title to the inheritance of the sons of God? Jesus puts the question in the form of the parable of the two sons.

³³ So Edujoth viii, 7, resting on Eccclus. 48 10.

Whether of these twain did the will of the Father, he that said, I go, sir, and went not; or he that afterward repented and went? . . . Therefore the publicans and harlots go into the kingdom of heaven before you.

When Paul lays it down as the token of sonship that one be "led by the Spirit of God" (Rom. 8 14), he is adapting the ancient principle of the foundation of the Church, that "the Lord (by the 'seal' of the Spirit) acknowledgeth them that are his," to Jesus' more strictly ethical test, "Whosoever doeth the will of my Father, the same is my brother and sister and mother." In an earlier writing he enunciates his principle in a more primary form. In the Galatian parallel to Rom. 8 15³⁴ he defines the divine "acknowledgement" to be the sending forth into our hearts of the Spirit of his Son teaching us as sons the cry *Abba*, Father. Whosoever receiveth the Spirit is a son. According to Jesus, "whosoever doeth the will," were it publican, harlot, or Samaritan, is "known of God," and "doing the will" is exemplified, not in the Pharisees with their yoke of bondage, but in those whose inward disposition is akin to the Father's. Paul is not original, but only a follower of Jesus, as he claimed to be, in meeting the pretensions of intrenched and traditional authority by the self-evidencing testimony of the Spirit, which makes foolish the wisdom of the wise and gives its revelation to babes. By no other conceivable course was it possible to meet the authority of the scribes; for with them in pre-eminent degree knowledge was indeed power. Unless he were ready to abandon the cause of the disinherited "little ones," whose leader and champion he had become since John was shut up in prison, Jesus had no alternative but to maintain, "No man knoweth the Father save the son." In opposition to the "violence" which made the key of knowledge an instrument for excluding from the kingdom the repentant "publicans and harlots," while none but submissive bearers of the yoke of the law as interpreted by themselves were recognized as sons, Jesus had no alternative but to appeal to a binding and loosing that has validity in heaven. This is the principle implied, if not directly expressed, in the saying,

No man knoweth who the son is (who is a son) save the Father.

³⁴ Gal. 4 6.

VIII. LATER DEVELOPMENT.

Our oldest and most trustworthy source has but this single instance in which Jesus seems to claim messianic honors for himself. We have agreed that it may well be called "the Johannean passage," for it forms a manifest point of departure for the later theological and metaphysical interpretations of the title Son of God which reach their culmination in the Fourth Gospel. But the metaphysics is not from Jesus. In the passage from Q, historically interpreted, there is not one trace of this. There is not even the exclusive sense in which our second evangelist in two or three instances has employed the title. Jesus is simply championing the cause of the disinherited sons and daughters of Abraham, when he maintains that if any

Professeth to have knowledge of God,
And nameth himself son (*παις*) of the Lord, . . .
And vaunteth that God is his father,

he must be a "son of the Highest," because he has that kind of spirit which the Father manifests. He is continuing the work of him who had said, "God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham," as John himself was consciously continuing the message of Amos, the prophet of ethical election. Jesus speaks simply as leader, defender, and representative of the "babes," when he thanks the "Lord of heaven and earth" for the revelation that is "delivered" to those that have eyes to see and ears to hear, though it be "hid from the wise and understanding." There is no pretension in this to superhuman, or even to messianic, dignity for his own person; and the utterance was not so understood by his hearers. Nevertheless it would logically lead to this if the conflict with the oligarchy of scribes and Pharisees were maintained. And so it was.

IX. RELATION TO THE CLAIM OF MESSIAHSHIP.

A pivotal point of the Petrine tradition embodied in our second gospel (Mk. 8 29) is the tendering to Jesus by Peter, with the support of the eleven disciples, of the title "the Christ." This

was during a temporary lull in the conflict. The great collision in Capernaum with "the scribes who came down from Jerusalem" had issued in Jesus' exile from the scene of his early popularity, and in the permanent interruption of his public teaching in Galilee. There remained, besides Samaria, which he felt no call to evangelize, only Judaea beyond Jordan, and Jerusalem. Toward these he set his face, with Jerusalem as his goal. The odds against him and his little flock would now be doubled. If he proposed to reclaim for them full rights in the temple as well as the synagogue, he would have to issue his challenge to an alliance of the priestly hierarchy with the already hostile scribal oligarchy. No wonder he predicted for himself a fate like John's. But consistency allowed no other alternative. He had either to desert the cause of the disinherited sons, or else to present their claims at the doors of the temple itself, protest against the abuses of the high-priestly clique, and demand a restoration of the temple to the uses of a house of prayer for all the people.

Under what other rôle could one become the champion of the lost sheep of the house of Israel against the faithless shepherds who had served themselves of the flock, than as the true Shepherd of Ezekiel's vision?

He shall feed them, even my servant David; he shall feed them, and he shall be their shepherd. And I, the Lord, will be their God, and my servant David prince among them (Ez. 34 23-24).

If the Pharisees had not themselves led the way in cancelling all political significance from the messianic hope, Jesus could never have consented to be called the Christ. As it was, the title is to him the least acceptable of all possible descriptions of his mission. In spite of his utmost endeavor to prevent being forced into the false position of a leader of Zealot nationalistic agitation, it furnished to his enemies their best opportunity for misrepresentation, nay, the very snare by which they actually compassed his death. Palpably, manifestly, it was a crown of thorns that Peter was ignorantly offering him at Caesarea Philippi. And yet in some sense he must take it, or be recreant to the trust that the God of these lost sheep and lost sons had imposed upon him. Their inheritance was the full inheritance of sons. He was not at lib-

erty to compound with the usurpers for a part. They had no other leader or representative. The knowledge of sonship had been delivered to him. Now to these "babes" also had come something more than that revelation of the Father, and of their own sonship which he had awakened in them. They had received now a revelation on their own account. It came not from flesh and blood but from the Father himself when they now perceived that vindication of their sonship depended upon him as "the Son," the Christ.

The movement of Pharisaism had had this great merit, that it had changed the perspective of the messianic hope. Israel was first to become God's son by knowing and doing his revealed will. Afterwards it should receive its inheritance. The spirit of censorious exclusiveness, admitting to participation in the inheritance not those whose sonship was evinced by a spirit kindred to the Father's, but those only who submitted to the yoke of legal prescriptions, had shown the fatal unfitness of the Pharisees' method of attaining the messianic hope, but had left the ideal itself in broader, distincter outline and nobler proportions than ever before. The Pharisees' method was that of the Puritans of all ages.

Come ye out from among them and be ye separate, saith the Lord,
And touch no unclean thing.

Their ideal was:

And I will receive you,
And will be to you a Father,
And ye shall be to me sons and daughters, saith the Lord Almighty.

For this ideal of the messianic hope there is but one title which can appropriately be applied to the personality which becomes its leader. Such a leader must designate himself "the Christ, the Son of the living God."

R. H. Charles has called our attention to a phenomenon which confirms Professor Porter's far-reaching observation that the prophets are not creators but critics of the messianic hope. It is that the manifold titles applied to the Messiah in the literature of this period, particularly the apocalyptic literature, wherein the

figure of the Messiah plays so large a part, such titles as "the Elect," "the Just," "the Saint," "the Beloved," "the Servant," "the Heir," are in almost every instance derived from the titles bestowed on Israel as the people of God. The Messiah is "the Elect" as representative and head of the elect people, "the Just" as head and representative of "the just," "the Saint" as representing "the people of the saints of the Most High," "the Beloved"—and we may rightfully add in view of the passage cited above from Second Esdras, "the Only-begotten"—as representing the people whom God had "called his beloved, his only-begotten," "the Heir" as representing their claim to the inheritance of God's creation. It is so also with the title "the Son." For one whose ideal of the messianic hope is that of the passages quoted from Ecclesiasticus, Aristeeas, Wisdom, the Psalter of Solomon, and Jubilees, who shares the prophetic ideal as enlarged and refined by the experiences of the exile, the return, the Maccabean revolt, and the Pharisean reaction against the later Hasmonaeans, there is no title so expressive of the work to be achieved by this Friend of publicans and sinners as "the Son." Not because in some peculiar and metaphysical sense he taketh hold upon the nature of God, but because "he taketh hold on the seed of Abraham" to bring them to their inheritance, because he is "made in all points like unto his brethren," because he is "the first-born of many brethren." It is in this sense that Jesus the Son of God was willing also to become the Christ for his brethren and companions' sakes. When we go back to his own words, his claim appears in its true historical light as a sacrifice of his life to win back for the disinherited "little ones" of Israel their "right to be called the sons of God." Paul's invincible logic applied the principle to the disinherited sons of all humanity, and made Jesus known as "the Saviour of the world." When, a generation later, the Roman disciple of a disciple undertakes to relate "the gospel of Jesus, the Christ, the Son of God," he manifests the disposition we should expect. What he is eager to prove is that Jesus was endowed with this distinction in his own right by a voice from heaven, that he contended for it and was vindicated in it by a life of wonder-working power and goodness, and by a supernatural resurrection from the dead. Fortunately even Paul,

eager as he is to exalt the divinity of his Redeemer, and ready with a doctrine of his descent from pre-existent messianic glory, does not pervert the doctrine of "sonship" into something which appertains to Christ in distinction from us, but loyally presents it as that which he possesses on our behalf, and as our representative;

When the fulness of the time came God sent forth his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, that he might redeem them which were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because ye are sons, God sent forth the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying Abba, Father. So that thou art no longer a bond-servant but a son; and if a son, then an heir, through God. Howbeit, at that time, not knowing God, ye were in bondage. . . . But now that ye have come to know God, or rather to be known of God, how turn ye back again? . . . For freedom did Christ set you free. Be not entangled again in a yoke of bondage (Gal. 4 4-9, 5 1).

A BASIC PRINCIPLE FOR THEOLOGY

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There have been times in the history of architecture when style was inevitable. In the classic period of Greece or in the Gothic period of northern Europe no architect raised the question as to the style in which he should construct a building. That was decreed for him. And we shall perhaps not go astray if we suggest that the inevitableness of that decree was determined by two factors. One was the purpose to be served by the building, the other was the control over the materials. The one factor determined the contents, the other the form in which those contents were to be expressed. The contents depended on the social and spiritual ideals of the time. The form depended on the nature of the building material and on the mechanical ability to use it.

Now in the great building periods mentioned, both these elements, contents and form, were comparatively simple. Both the Greek and the mediaeval mind had something definite to express. And the form of expression was dictated by the building material and by the knowledge of mechanics. And even in the marvellous product of Gothic art, the principle of construction and support in all its variety was simplicity itself.

At present no such state of things prevails. An architect for a cathedral, a bank, a State capitol, looks about for a style. There is nothing inevitable. And the reason is not far to seek. Both in contents and in form, variety and complexity rule in the place of simplicity. The modern world has grown with a rapidity that staggers us. It is infinitely complex. Whether in social life or in spiritual aspiration there is no clear norm. And with the progress of science a whole new set of materials has come to hand. New methods of building, new forms of construction, have arisen. There are no limits to the possibilities of mechanical control. And the result is that we are in an age which at present has not given itself architectural expression. The Parthenon and the

cathedral of Amiens owe their greatness to their inevitableness. Who shall find inevitableness in architecture today?

Nevertheless the problem is pressing, and is no doubt being solved. Some day the modern world will find itself, both in contents and in form. Some day the architect will arise who will express the twentieth, or it may be the twenty-first, century as logically as the cathedral of Amiens expresses the thirteenth, or the Parthenon the age of Pericles. There are already signs of such a consistent modern architecture. But the problem waits for anything like a full solution.

The above is an allegory. *De theologia fabula*. I speak concerning theology. The system of theology is today in much the same condition as architecture. It is not inevitable. There is no controlling principle. There have been times when Systematic Divinity had the stamp of inevitableness. We need only suggest Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin. In all three the conditions were present out of which the body of doctrine reared itself in self-consistent form. But that situation exists no longer. Neither in the contents nor in the form of present-day theology is there given the simplicity that can inevitably express itself in a system of Christian doctrine. In contents the moral and spiritual world is many-sided and complex. Social problems have become vastly enriched in content. There is a deeper demand for the rights of the individual. Democracy is coming into its own. The moral outlook includes the whole race, giving a much greater sweep in extent to the moral problem. All this moral material demands theological expression. Into our theology there must be carried the full demands of moral and personal life. The contents for a theology are indefinitely complex.

Again, as to a formal principle of theology, the difficulty is as great. The authority of infallible Scripture has given way before criticism. The infallible Church has yielded to the belief in development. Moreover, there is the whole new world of modern science, to which theology must be brought into relation. The supplanting of Ptolemy by Copernicus was the beginning of a radical change in the concept of the universe, a change to which theology is still being called on to adjust itself. And this great new universe is ruled by Law, unvarying, absolute, and including

in its sway both man and the farthest realm of the distant stars. It is not surprising that, with such changes both in contents and in form, theology like architecture waits in vain for a systematic expression that shall be inevitable.

Some of the theological results of this situation are easily seen. There is but little interest in a system of theology. There is indeed interest in theological questions, an interest that is widespread, if not always deep. But it is piecemeal. It must needs be so. For example it is noticeable that while a large part of present theology is concerned with apologetic problems, yet there is little systematic "Apologetics" that is worthy of the name. The world has moved so fast that the systematic apologete is left behind. He may indulge in guerilla warfare, but he knows not how to marshal an army. So it is with theology itself. We have an enormous amount of theological material. Biblical criticism, the history of dogma, the social and psychological nature of religion, all these arouse interest, and good results are being achieved. Yet when the attempt is made to put this material into a distinct systematic form, we feel at once a lack of the clearness and definiteness and convincing character that attend the allied work of the critic, the historian, or the psychologist.

Doubtless it is for this reason that ever since Schleiermacher almost the dominant question in theology has been that of method. Men are afraid to theologize until they are sure they know the proper way to do it. I need only mention the names of Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Ritschl to suggest the manifold attitudes towards the question of method. And in the attempt to find a method that shall benefit by all these attempts, one is reminded of the German school-boy, who, when his teacher after a prolonged mathematical explanation turned to him with the question, "Is it now clear?" answered, "Es ist noch nicht ganz dunkel," "It is not yet entirely obscure."

Yet such a condition cannot be permanent if theology is to hold its own. Indeed it cannot be permanent if Christian belief is to hold its own. For the world is a unity, and we must needs think it as a unity. The sense of law dominates our thinking. No department of thought or life can maintain itself in isolation. Christian belief demands the assent of the intellect as well as of

the will. And a mere congeries of theological data will not satisfy the intellectual demand. There must be a systematic theology if Christian thinking is to command the allegiance of intellectual men.

Doubtless the accomplishment of such a task is far off. But the first step to it is the winning of a basic principle. If theology is to express itself in systematic form there must be some legitimate starting-point for its construction. What is the proper starting-point for a system of theology today?

I mean by such a principle a truth or idea that lies within the contents of Christian faith or Christian experience. Out of the discussion as to proper methods, this much seems clear, that the approach to Christian doctrine cannot be by a principle that itself lies outside the realm of Christian faith. The contents of the system of belief are not to be intellectually demonstrated by a process of speculation. The fall of systems constructed on that basis is sufficient warning not to renew the attempt. Of course I do not mean that Christian belief is to refuse intellectual test, or to fail to bring itself into relation with the general contents of man's intellectual life today. To do so would be to turn one's back on the intellectual life altogether. But what I do mean is that any such vindication must start from within the field of Christian experience and not outside. This demand is simply in the line of all scientific procedure. The science of geology does not rest on a speculative theory derived from *a priori* reasoning. That was the method of mediaevalism. The modern science of geology begins with knowledge of the earth derived through observation, experience. On the basis of that experience the science of geology is formed and is brought into relation with other fields of experience, thus forming a part of the whole body of scientific truth. The systematic study of Christian doctrine must use the same method. It must begin within the field of Christian experience, and must systematize that experience. Then and not till then can it bring that field into relation with other experience, and thus give a sound vindication of Christian truth. The basic principle which we seek must then be a Christian concept, one that shall be fertile; that is, one that stands in essential relation to the body of Christian

truth. What part of Christian doctrine can best serve as such a basic principle?

I suggest two requirements for such a principle. In the first place it must be true; that is, it must form an integral part of Christian belief. It must not be extraneous or forced. It must be an essential element of the Christian faith. Indeed this requirement is perhaps the only one that is absolutely imperative. For various starting-points are possible, and from any concept which is an integral part of Christian truth the whole truth might conceivably be developed. It was said that Agassiz from one bone could reconstruct the entire fish; it mattered not what bone it was. Thus the primary and only absolutely imperative requirement for a basic principle is that it should be true.

Yet another requirement is practically necessary. In order that the construction should be effective it must be based on a principle that is in close accord with present methods of thought. It must be in the terms of the present day. While it is conceivable that a logical system should be built upon nearly any principle that is itself true, yet it will lack strategic value for the task of theology unless that principle be truly contemporaneous. We may call this second requirement adaptability.

I need only mention in passing several principles that have been or may be suggested. The doctrine of the fatherhood of God has been emphasized in such a way as almost to reconstruct our present theology. In England through Robertson and Maurice and in America through Bushnell and Phillips Brooks it was almost a new gospel in its contrast to Calvinism. Nevertheless we can hardly find in it our needed principle. In itself the doctrine is liable to be ambiguous. Much depends upon the concept of fatherhood. And the modern thought of parentage with its tendency to weak indulgence and good-natured indifference is too often put in place of the New Testament thought of the Father, which includes the concept of authority and power as well as the moral element of creative love. Perhaps it is on account of this possible degeneration that there are signs that the preaching of the divine fatherhood is beginning to lose power. There is a demand for the sterner elements of righteousness and law. And while these elements are strictly included in the Chris-

tian doctrine of fatherhood, yet they are not strategically arrived at in the best way on the basis of that concept.

The same may be said of the doctrine of divine love. With all the completeness that may and should be given to the doctrine, it yet tends to degenerate, in popular use, into undue softness. Love that is self-consistent must itself have the elements of righteousness and law, but these elements will not be well guaranteed by the popular idea as to what love is.

I have from time to time been much attracted to the doctrine of creation as the starting-point. There is much to be said for it. Historically it carries us deep into the Old Testament, and to the radical distinction between the religion of Israel and that of the pagan world in general. It serves as a basis for a true concept of the transcendence and the immanence of God. In the New Testament the belief in God as Father finds its roots in the Old Testament belief in the creator, a belief now carried into the moral sphere. Thus God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is the Creator God of Hebrew prophecy completely moralized. Christ himself is the expression of that moral creatorship as the founder of the kingdom of God. The doctrines of atonement, and of justification, lend themselves readily to treatment as vitally related to the belief in the creative love. And the very beginnings of the development of Christian dogma after New Testament times are closely connected with the relation between such a belief in creation, and the Greek concept of the relation between God and the world. For many reasons, genetically and logically, the concept of creation commends itself as the basic principle of Christian theology.

Nevertheless this principle hardly meets the strategic requirement. The word "creation" carries with it today a heavy load. We may clearly recognize that evolution is not identical with an unconscious emanation, but may and indeed must be treated as the expression of the divine will. Nevertheless the concept of evolution is so all-dominating that even the appearance of opposition to it must be avoided at any cost. The relation to evolution of the creative concept of God can best be arrived at as a result. To make it the starting-point requires too much explanation. And although that explanation may be very clear and

simple to the theologian, yet theology must today come from the closet into the street. It must not handicap itself with a concept that to the ordinary modern man seems at any rate uninteresting and of little importance, even if not contradictory to his scientific thought. With reluctance then the concept of creation must be abandoned as the basic principle for a theology today. It lacks the second requirement, adaptability.

What does this test of adaptability demand? I suggest two elements of our thought today, both of which are demanded by this requirement. The first is the overwhelming importance put on the social problem. This is perhaps the dominant interest of our time. It is so many-sided that to describe it is to describe the modern world. From the period of Kant's *Critique* and from the French Revolution the social question has pressed ever more to the front. The outburst of philanthropy, the overthrow of the slave trade, the destruction of slavery, above all, the growth of democracy, these were characteristic of the nineteenth century. And throughout that movement a deepened sense of the value of the individual and a stronger emphasis on the organic forms of social life went hand in hand. As the undermost man demands to be recognized at his full worth, so also is a social fabric demanded in which righteousness shall rule. The State as the guardian of justice is more and more looked on as the final guarantee of the rights of the individual. Our interests then are dominantly ethical. They are concerned with the upbuilding of a society in which righteousness is the law, and in which the individual can enter fully into his heritage.

And a second characteristic of our thought today is what the Germans call *Wirklichkeitssinn*, a sense of reality. All truth must be brought to the hard test of fact. Men are not interested in speculation or fancies. Truth is to be got not through metaphysical speculation but through the experience that comes from actual contact with reality. Science finds its teacher in the given world which it is to explore. The scientific imagination differs widely from speculative metaphysics. The latter finds its truth within itself by the test of self-consistency. The former finds its truth in its relation to fact and in its ability to interpret that fact. Induction has set aside speculation. Neither religion nor

theology nor philosophy will interest the man of today unless it has vital relation to the world of fact.

We can then lay down the following criteria for the basic principle that we seek. First, it must be true; it must be a genuine, constituent, integral part of Christian belief. Secondly, it must be adaptable; it must be in touch with the conditions of life today. And this requirement itself has two sides; the principle must be primarily social, ethical, rather than metaphysical, and it must meet the test of reality, it must be in immediate contact with the facts of life.

In suggesting the Christian doctrine of the kingdom of God as a basic principle for theology calculated to meet these requirements, of course I make no new suggestion. The fundamental importance of the kingdom of God as a Christian concept is widely recognized, and ever since Ritschl there has been a tendency to make it the leading principle in theology. Yet its importance is far from being fully perceived, and its value as a constructive principle of theology is certainly not fully appreciated. And we are far from having a system of theology worked out with any inevitableness from this concept. It seems therefore in place to direct attention to it as a concept of which much more use will be made in the future than has been made in the past.

First of all, this concept meets the test of being an integral part of Christian belief. Genetically it is the starting-point of our Lord's preaching. And it forms the immediate connection of his teaching with its Old Testament foundation. In both Old and New Testament it is vitally connected with the Christ. Moreover, and here we come to the most important point, the further consideration of this concept as an integral part of Christian faith immediately brings us to our second requirement, that of the adaptability of our basal principle to present problems. Those present problems we saw to be primarily social, ethical. And the kingdom of God is essentially a condition of society ruled by the divine will, and therefore revealing and manifesting the divine character. In that kingdom is therefore revealed both the nature of God as its ruler, and also the nature of men as members of a society founded on the divine Name. The kingdom of God as an ethical society is at once the heart of Christian

belief, and also the means of bringing that Christian belief into vital relation with our social problems.

I am aware that here I touch a question that is now the subject of heated discussion. It is maintained by some that the kingdom of God in the New Testament is not ethical but eschatological, that the concept is not that of a society manifesting the divine will in righteousness, but is a condition of things to be brought about by a purely divine, supernatural act. Man cannot hasten it by his action. All that he can do is to fit himself and others for entrance into it when it comes. In reference to this contention I can make here only two suggestions. In the first place it is impossible to overestimate the social emphasis of the teaching of Christ and of the New Testament in general. The relation to the neighbor, the manifestation of the divine spirit of forgiveness and love to him, is set on an equal basis with the relation to God. Indeed it is just in and through the one that the other is expressed. Whoever minimizes the ethical element in the fundamental teaching of Jesus leaves out its essential contents.

But it is contended that this ethical teaching does not set forth the ethics of the kingdom but only a condition for entrance to the kingdom. It is an *Interimsethik*, an ethic for the short time before the coming of the supernatural event. It is a condition, like that of repentance, required for acceptance when the kingdom comes. But this leads us to the second suggestion. It is inconceivable that to the mind of Jesus the morality demanded as a preparation for the kingdom should be different from the law of the kingdom itself. Jesus knows no arbitrary rewards and punishments. The judgment will come in exact relation to the inner life of the man to be judged and in relation to his conduct to his neighbor. Therefore it follows necessarily that the ethics taught by Jesus are essentially the ethical laws of the kingdom of God. And this is all we need for the contention that, whatever the original use of the phrase "kingdom of God," "kingdom of heaven," the laws of that kingdom are at the heart of true human society. I need hardly add to this the evidence of St. Paul, to whom, with all his eschatology, the life of justification cannot be separated from present membership in the body of Christ, nor that of St. John, who says in most unequivocal

cal language that if a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar. Throughout the New Testament the relation of a man to God is expressed in and mediated by his relation to his fellows. And that is the essential principle of the kingdom of God.

The concept of the kingdom of God as the expression of a true moral society commends itself then in its adaptability to the present social problems. And it commends itself no less in its relation to the sense of reality, the demand for facts, that is characteristic of our time. For a theology built on this concept as a basic principle stands firmly on the earth. It claims that the revelation of God is to be found in and through the principles that rule society. We need not say, "Who shall ascend into heaven? (that is, to bring Christ down:) or, Who shall descend into the abyss? (that is, to bring Christ up from the dead.)" The word is nigh, for the word of faith is the principle of society itself. He who will find God must perforce find him through the social life of man. To the question of Nathanael, Can any good thing come out of Nazareth? we answer, Come and see. We do not ask the modern man to go out of the city in which he dwells. Rather we try to show him that in order to understand that city he must seek its Maker and Builder in God.

The concept of the kingdom of God meets our requirements for a basal principle in that it is true, an integral part of the Christian faith, and in that it is adaptable to present needs; it rests on the ethical foundation and it appeals for verification to the facts of life.

There remains to suggest by way of example the application of this basal principle to some definite theological problems. And first let us point out the double-sidedness of the concept. The kingdom of God is on one side the gift of God. Therein is the eschatological element and its permanent value. It is on the other side the moral task of men, to be brought about in the conduct of human life. That is its ethical contents. But these two are the same. For us the coming of Christ to usher in the kingdom cannot be separated from the work of the Holy Spirit in the life of man. The kingdom of God is the unity of religion and morality. It is the religious principle itself, revealed

in the life of man as the constituent force of human society. Religion and morality have always been closely connected. The individualistic view of religion misses its historical essence. From its earliest beginnings religion has been a social fact, entering as a building-force into the social fabric. Yet the union of religion and morality has never been complete or free from aberrations except in Christianity. If one were forced to give an abstract definition of the Christian religion apart from its historic contents, he would not go far astray to say that it is the absolute union of religion and morality. The relation to God and the relation to the neighbor meet together. God is to be found not in abstraction from the world but in immediate contact with human life. The Christ has authority to execute the divine judgment because he is the Son of Man. And "inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren ye have done it unto me." There is no other test.

I propose therefore the following thesis. No doctrine about God belongs to Christian theology unless it is capable of application to and expression in the life of man. Every truth about God is also a truth for human society. Every theological doctrine is capable of being translated into life. That is the difference between theology and metaphysics. Metaphysics may conceivably hold theories about God that have no bearing on human life. I say "conceivably," for in these days of Pragmatism such theories have even in metaphysics a somewhat doubtful validity. Whatever we may think of Pragmatism, Christian theology at any rate is pragmatic in essence; that is, its truth about God can be expressed in society, and indeed is drawn from society. God is known in and through the kingdom of God. To stand apart from that kingdom is *ipso facto* to stand apart from the Christian knowledge of God. Theology and ethics meet hand in hand. Theology is essentially ethical, for all truth about God must be revealed in and through society alone. The laws of human life are the laws of God its creator and source.

Let us glance very briefly at the application of this thought to the Christian doctrines of the Incarnation, the Trinity, and the Atonement. The doctrine of the Incarnation starts from the

truth that God has revealed himself in Jesus as the founder of the kingdom of God. The kingdom of God is a moral society. But as a moral society it is founded by the divine will. And therefore its founder in history must be looked at under a double aspect, as divine and human. As the revealer and founder of the kingdom of God he is divine. For that revelation and founding is a divine act, a divine act accomplished in him. He is God manifested to men. "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." But also he is himself the full expression of that kingdom. He perfectly lives its life and manifests its laws. Therefore he is the Son of Man, the full expression of true humanity. The belief in the Incarnation is the belief that God is to be known in and through his society on earth established in Jesus Christ.

Take the doctrine of the Trinity. A sharp distinction is often drawn between the economical and the ontological Trinity, the Trinity of revelation and the Trinity of being. The former is concerned with belief in the divine Fatherhood revealed in Christ and communicated by the Spirit. The latter is the attempt to apply these elements of Christian experience to the life and being of God himself. Now I submit that the distinction has been overdrawn, and that the concept of the kingdom of God suggests the means by which it can be bridged. If the ontological Trinity means the attempt to interpret God in terms that are out of all relation to humanity, then it is not a part of Christian theology. It is at best a piece of philosophical metaphysics. But that is not to say that the Trinity of revelation cannot be truly ontological, that it is not concerned with the actual being of God. For the Trinity of revelation rests on the witness to God given through human society. God is the creative will, energizing in Jesus and giving himself in the society of men bound together by his Spirit. Through these social experiences we know God, for therein is the will of God revealed. But to know the divine will is to know the divine being, for will and being can be separated only by a false abstraction, an abstraction utterly impossible so long as we are dealing with ethical terms. The doctrine of the Trinity is the interpretation of God in the social, the ethical, terms that belong to human life. It is the interpretation of the King by means of his kingdom. If there be

the experience of trinitarian elements in the kingdom of God, we must ascribe these elements to him who is its King. The law of the kingdom is the law of its Master.

One other suggestion must suffice, the application to the doctrine of the Atonement. The Atonement is the expression of divine forgiveness through suffering. As such it becomes the law of the kingdom of God. The atoning work of Christ is carried on by his Spirit in the Church. "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ." The law of vicarious suffering, of forgiving love, is the law of the society founded on the divine Name. "Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us." To be forgiven is to be a member of that society whose law is the law of forgiveness. To be forgiven is to have the law of forgiveness in our hearts. He who ceases to be a forgiving member of the kingdom ceases to have the forgiveness of God.

These are but suggestions. They are not intended to be of value in themselves. They are intended to suggest some of the applications of the concept of the kingdom of God as a basic principle for Christian theology.

*THE MARROW OF CALVIN'S THEOLOGY*¹

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As every man has both generic and specific characteristics which are common to him with his kind and group, and also certain traits which constitute his individuality, so likewise every thoughtful man has ideas which are the intellectual staple of his age and race and also others which are in a peculiar sense his own. It does not therefore follow that these common ideas are untrue: on the contrary, they may be nearer the truth than those which are relatively unshared; or that they are unimportant, for, even if erroneous, they may furnish points of contact through which his more distinctive opinion finds its way into the popular mind; nevertheless, they may be disregarded in estimating his contribution to the history of thought. Accordingly, nothing will be said here of doctrines, those pertaining to Christ and the Trinity for instance, which Calvin held in substantial agreement with contemporary and traditional Christianity; nor shall we refer to theories concerning the Church, its officers and sacraments, which, although highly significant both at the time and as shaping subsequent ecclesiastical history, have but slight connection with the ideas which make up the distinctively Calvinistic system of theology. We shall restrict ourselves therefore to Calvin's system within his system, to a definite, consistent nexus of ideas, relating principally to sin and salvation, which are, so to speak, the marrow of his body of divinity. And with reference to these, we shall undertake to present them as they appear in the definitive edition of the *Institutes*, without attempting to trace their relations, of dependence, resemblance, or difference, to ideas of his theological predecessors, like Augustine and Gottschalk, or contemporaries like Luther, Zwingli, Melancthon, or Bucer; still less shall we essay to follow a possible process of his own

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thought through the successive editions and enlargements of the *Institutes*. These are fascinating and fruitful fields of inquiry but they are outside our present task. It should go without saying that Calvin's system, or even the marrow of it, was not his own in the sense that he invented it: on the contrary, he simply made more explicit, and carried more consistently to their logical conclusions, ideas which had been practically universal in Christian theology since the days of Paul. The system was his not by origination, but by vital and organic appropriation. Nor are we concerned here with criticism: it would indeed be profitable to trace the course of the inner dialectic of the system, particularly in its development by the New England theologians, and mark its "collapse" because of inability to answer its own questions and fulfil the ethical ideal itself had nourished, but at present we have to do neither with criticism nor with appreciation, but solely with exposition, and—since Calvinism is now almost everywhere spoken against—with sympathetic exposition, which shall at least attempt to indicate why the system proved persuasive with so many successive generations of right-minded and right-hearted men.

It is always necessary, however, if we would justly comprehend a man's thought to see what interests prompted it and what purposes sought fulfilment in it. Calvin's supreme task was to consolidate the sentiment of the Reformation into an intellectual system as firm and coherent as that of the Roman Catholicism against which it was arrayed. Manifestly, the strategic point of this controversy was the doctrine of redemption. Luther preached justification by faith as a saving power; Calvin taught salvation by grace as a cardinal doctrine. The former emphasized a human experience, the latter the divine efficiency, but both were presenting the same truth, viewed in the one case on the manward, in the other on the Godward side. Under Luther, it might have been held that the agencies of the Church were effectual, perhaps indispensable, to the production of faith or as mediating the saving grace, but Calvin sought to prove that since salvation is wholly and exclusively the effect of God's grace, exercised in accordance with his eternal decree and directly upon the souls of the elect, the Church has no direct and effective

function with respect to salvation, nor has the individual man any co-operative part therein. Manifestly, if this could be proved, the Church would be put permanently out of commission as a means of salvation. But, while Romanism was Calvin's foe in front, there was an enemy on the left flank which menaced the Reformed churches quite as seriously—the Anabaptists. With these outlaws, as they were then deemed, the Romanists sought to identify all the Reformed,—an identification which was not difficult because they actually did maintain many of the unacknowledged conclusions of Reformation principles logically developed, and consequently attracted many thorough-going Protestants to their guerilla-like band. Such identification was, however, pre-eminently dangerous because of the abhorrence in which Anabaptists were held by civil rulers without whose strong and continued support the whole Reformation movement would have been endangered. Indeed, the letter to King Francis which introduced the first edition of the *Institutes*, expressly declared that one object of the treatise was to demonstrate that the identification of Protestants with Anabaptists, which had already given occasion for persecution, was false and malicious. Hence, in opposing the Papacy, Calvin was obliged most carefully to ward off all suspicion of Anabaptism, and at several points it is plain that his doctrinal line of battle was refused against this ever-present menace.

This appears, for example, in his treatment of the Bible, the authority of which was accepted by Romanist and Protestant alike. The argument of the former, however, was that the Bible was the Church's book, produced and made canonical by it, and therefore resting ultimately upon its authority, and dependent upon it for true interpretation. Of course, Calvin could not accept this view, but it obliged him to establish the authority of Scripture apart from the Church. Calvin adduces the antiquity of the Bible, its dignity in substance and style as contrasted with the humble character of its reputed authors, its frankness, the miracles and prophecies attesting its divine origin, its endurance of the assaults of enemies, and its fitness to the needs of Christendom, but he openly acknowledges that these considerations alone can never establish the convincing author-

ity of Scripture. There is indeed a congruity between the Word and the works of God which confirms faith in the identity of authorship—but the revelation of God in his works is dim and obscure, to be read only by those who use his revelation in the Word as spectacles through which alone the revelations of nature become legible. Ultimately, therefore, Calvin rests his assurance of the authority of Scripture upon the secret testimony of the Holy Spirit in the heart of the believer. The Word, he affirms, will never gain full credit in the hearts of men, unless it be confirmed by the internal testimony of the Spirit. To those in whom the Spirit abides, the Scripture exhibits as clear evidence of its truth as white and black things do of their color, or sweet and bitter things of their taste. Plainly, with this emphasis upon the Spirit, Calvin came dangerously near Anabaptism, and therefore he guards himself against the manifest peril by emphatically declaring that the voice of the Spirit in the Word must be the decisive test of all alleged private revelations. The Anabaptists claim direct communications from the Spirit:—To the law and the testimony!—if they speak not according to this rule there is no light in them. “He [the Spirit] is the author of the Scriptures: he cannot be mutable and inconsistent with himself. He must therefore perpetually remain such as he has there discovered himself to be” (*Inst.* i, 9. 2). Hence “the office of the Spirit . . . is not to feign new and unheard of revelations, or to coin a new system of doctrine . . . but to seal to our minds the same doctrine which the Gospel delivers” (*Inst.* i, 9. 1). The function of the Spirit, then, is not to continue a progressive revelation, but solely to give inner witness to the divine certainty of one already given in the Word, final and complete. That is to say, the Spirit is invoked to prove the Scripture and then the Scripture becomes the criterion of the Spirit. But it should be observed that on this ground Calvin accepts the decisive authority of Scripture. It is true that we do not find in him the extravagances of post-reformation Scholasticism—he was too sane and knew his Bible too well for that. He is no stickler for absolute infallibility, but, while he acknowledges historical slips, he never permits minor inaccuracies to shake his faith in the substantial ethical and religious finality of the Bible. Yet it must be borne

in mind that only the regenerate, in whom the Spirit dwells, can have this first-hand vital assurance: the Bible does not engender faith; faith attests the Bible; and faith is the fruit of the Spirit in the heart of man. Belief in the Bible cannot contribute to a man's salvation, since only the regenerate man can really and heartily have this belief.

Notwithstanding the preference which Calvin has for the Word over the works of God, we shall find it better to approach his system by what, undoubtedly, he would have deemed a meaner way. Whether we look out upon the world or within upon our own hearts nothing is more certain and impressive than the universality of sin. Literature bears witness to the appalling fact, observation of contemporary life and the struggles of our own souls alike confess it. So far, then, as knowledge, observation, and experience establish anything, it is the world-wide and age-long presence and power of sin. What, then, is the explanation of this fact? For so universal an effect an equally universal cause must be sought. No cause operating solely upon individuals as such could produce so constant and uniform a result. If it be said that universal sin is due to the exercise of man's own will, the question arises why man's will universally and invariably determines itself in this particular way. Edwards puts the argument strikingly in his *Doctrine of Original Sin* (Pt. 1, ch. 1, sect. ix):

If their wills are in the first place as free to Good as Evil, what is it to be ascribed to, that the world of mankind, consisting of so many millions, in so many successive generations, without consultation, all agree to exercise their freedom in favor of evil? . . . How comes it to pass, that the free will of mankind has been determined to evil, in like manner before the Flood, and after the Flood; under the Law and under the Gospel; among both Jews and Gentiles, under the Old Testament; and since that, among Christians, Jews, Mahometans; among Papists and Protestants; in those nations where civility, politeness, arts, and learning most prevail, and among the negroes and Hottentots in Africa, the Tartars in Asia, and Indians in America, towards both the poles and on every side of the Globe; in greatest cities, and obscurest villages; in palaces, and in huts, wigwams, and cells under ground? Is it enough to reply, It happens so, that men everywhere and at all times choose thus to determine their own wills and so to make themselves sinful, as soon as ever they are capable of it, and to sin constantly as long as they live, and universally to choose never to come up half-way to their duty?

A similar indictment is found in a well-known and often quoted passage in Newman's *Apologia*, and as Edwards infers that there must be a steady cause to account for so steady an effect, so Newman argues that the human race must be implicated in some terrible aboriginal calamity which has put it out of joint with the purposes of its Creator. To Calvin also, this conclusion seemed quite inevitable. For did not the Bible also testify to this frightful and universal fact? "All have sinned . . . there is none that doeth good; no, not so much as one." And the Bible thus recognizing the condition offers also its explanation: "Through one man sin entered into the world." Here, then, in the fall of Adam, from whom all men are descended, is the explanation of the universal fact. By his sin he lost certain gifts with which he had been endowed, lost them not only for himself but for his posterity, even as a father who squanders his estate robs his children of their rightful patrimony. And there was not only deprivation but also depravity, since, having lost his original divine endowment, Adam went ever deeper into sin, thus vitiating his nature, which in its corrupt and depraved state was transmitted to his offspring. If a father weakens himself by vice, does not his son inherit the consequences in a defiled body and an enfeebled will?

Here then is the doctrine of original sin, or of depravity, based on facts of observation and experience, recognized by the Bible, and accounted for in a perfectly intelligible way by the sin of our first ancestor which resulted in the loss of godlike powers and in the acquisition of a corrupt nature, both of which consequences passed through to his posterity. Calvin would have agreed with Newman—"The doctrine of what is theologically called original sin becomes to me almost as certain as that the world exists and as the existence of God" (*Apol.* c. 5). In his own emphatic words, "Let us hold this, then, as an undoubted truth, which no opposition can ever shake—that the mind of man is so completely alienated from the righteousness of God, that it conceives, desires, and undertakes everything that is impious, perverse, base, impure, and flagitious; that his heart is so thoroughly infected by the poison of sin, that it cannot produce anything but what is corrupt; and that if at any time men do anything apparently good,

yet the mind always remains involved in hypocrisy and fallacious obliquity, and the heart enslaved by its inward perverseness" (*Inst.* ii, 5. 19).

Since, then, all men are sinners, all are under the wrath of God and liable to the penalty which he has decreed against sin. That penalty is death—physical and spiritual, temporal and eternal. Since, within the sphere of our observation, the temporal punishment is universally inflicted, we have every reason to believe that the invisible and eternal penalty also follows. And this indeed is inevitable, since all men come into life sinful and hence exposed to the just punishment of sin. The universality of physical death is valid symbol and sign of the universality of spiritual doom. It should be observed, however, that we are not punished as the penalty of Adam's sin: the punishment is solely for our own personal pollution of nature, made ours because of connection with our first ancestor. Unless, therefore, some way of salvation can be found, the sin of Adam will have plunged all mankind in utter and awful destruction.

It is manifest, however, that such salvation cannot be wrought out by man. "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Not one." Upon the tree of a corrupt and depraved nature no good fruit can grow. On account of the depraved condition of man, it is impossible that he should produce any works well-pleasing to God. If any are to be saved, therefore, the saving influence must come from without. This, which is the plain teaching of reason, is again amply confirmed by Scripture, which teaches unmistakably that God has provided a way by which alone some out of the ruined mass of mankind are to be saved through the operation of his regenerating spirit. In this work of regeneration, God alone is active, man is wholly passive. As this is for Calvin the vital point of the whole discussion, he uses his utmost endeavors to rule out man's possible activity, even by way of co-operation, in the saving process. Church-membership does not avail, for, while the present work of the Spirit is restricted to those who are within the circle of the visible Church, it by no means follows that because one belongs to the external and visible Church he is therefore numbered among those who make up the Church invisible, composed only of the regenerate. Nor can

what are usually called good works profit; for, if they proceed not from a heart purified by faith, they are not good in the sight of God. But surely faith is man's act and his faith co-operates with God's grace, making it individually effective: by no means, for faith is not merely an intellectual acceptance—the devils so believe and tremble, and remain devils still—but consists in a fixed reliance upon God's promises, arising from union with Christ which is due to the operation of the Spirit alone. Only the regenerate, then, can exercise true faith, which is therefore the effect and not the cause of regeneration. Hence "the Scripture uniformly proclaims it [faith] to be the gratuitous gift of God" (*Inst.* ii, 3. 8). and, inasmuch as without faith it is impossible to please God, it follows that, without that which his grace supplies, nothing,—no works, however good to outward seeming,—can win his approval. But man's repentance is surely his own: not at all, for true repentance is wrought only by the activity of the Holy Spirit. It is not a single event antecedent to regeneration: it is a process continued through life, wrought by the Spirit in the souls of the regenerate. With scrupulous care Calvin closes every loophole through which man's activity could by any chance, or in even the slightest degree, enter into the work of salvation. God's grace alone, manifest in the operation of his Spirit, is the sole agency of salvation. Man in his sinfulness is doomed and absolutely helpless. Salvation is only by God's grace.

Inasmuch, however, as God alone is the effective cause of salvation, if some men are not saved must it not be solely because upon these God does not exert his saving influence? This certainly follows, and its plain statement is Calvin's doctrine of election and reprobation. For it is manifest that not all men are saved. The Christian Church, within which alone the redemptive forces play, comprises but an infinitesimal part of the great multitudes who have lived upon the earth or who are living now. The untold millions of heathendom, men, women, children, one and all have swept down into hell, necessarily, since they could not have believed in him of whom they had not heard. Calvin openly commits himself to the traditional doctrine that "the Church is the mother of all those who have Him for their Father"

(*Inst.* iv, 1. 1), saying in terms, "There is no other way of entrance into life unless we are conceived by her, born of her, nourished at her breast, and continually preserved under her care and government"; "Out of her bosom there can be no hope of remission of sins, or any salvation" (*Inst.* iv, 1. 4). Moreover, even in Christian lands the great majority die without giving evidence of regeneration, and these too are irremediably lost. This also is the testimony of Scripture, which beyond cavil speaks of an eternal punishment for human souls. Since, therefore, salvation is from God alone, and not all are saved, it follows that there are some upon whom he is pleased to exert his saving power, and others whom he simply leaves to their merited doom. And the reason for this discrimination cannot lie at all in the characters of those who belong to the one or the other class, for in that case the ultimate ground of salvation would be in man, not in God. Consequently the discrimination must be due to God's will alone. And this again the Bible teaches: "The children being not yet born, neither having done anything good or bad, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works but of him that calleth, it was said . . . Jacob have I loved, but Esau I hated. . . . For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion, on whom I will have compassion. So then it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that hath mercy. . . . So then he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth" (Rom. 9 11-18).

Could anything be plainer or more explicit? Before even the creation of the world, out of the innumerable multitudes of men yet to be born, all of whom were to fall under the penalty of eternal death, God arbitrarily selected some whom he determined, in course of time, to visit with his Spirit unto regeneration and life, and, by choosing these, simply passed over the rest, leaving them to their just deserts. "*Quos deus praeterit reprobant.*" The choice was perfectly arbitrary; it was not determined by merit, else man would have a share in his own salvation, and furthermore is it not written that man is called *unto* holiness, not *because of* holiness? Nor is God's decree based upon his foreknowledge, for, since nothing can happen except by his will, his foreknowledge must be foreknowledge of his will. Conse-

quently foreknowledge rests on decrees, decrees do not rest on foreknowledge.

Let us then put in a single paragraph this part of his system. All men come into the world sinful because of their race-connection with Adam; and because sinful, exposed to eternal death. On account of their utterly base and undone condition not one of them can by any striving of his own win approval of God and deliverance unto life. Out of this helpless and hopeless state, therefore, none can escape save by the direct and irresistible act of God in regeneration, and, since it is evident that not all men are saved, it logically follows that it is not his will to visit all with his redeeming grace. What is the inevitable conclusion therefore but that, before the creation of the world, God chose out of the hosts of mankind yet to be born some whom he fore-ordained to eternal bliss. To these in the fulness of time he sends his prevailing grace with regenerating power. And the grace which is irresistible in regeneration is equally irresistible for maintenance: hence these cannot perish, and the perseverance of the saints logically follows. But those who are not thus elected, being involved in the guilt of Adam's sin and consequently totally without holiness or ability to help themselves, are never visited by the Spirit and hence go down to hell. This is the nerve of Calvinism.

We shall understand this better if we consider certain objections which have been urged against the system.

1. Is it true that all men are alike depraved and deserving of eternal punishment? Is it true that no men are better than others? Surely there are differences of character even among the unregenerate: surely Epictetus was a better man than Nero, and yet neither was aided by grace, if grace be restricted within the limits of the Church. Yes, Calvin acknowledges the difference but declares that it is due solely to the working of the restraining grace of God. There is common grace, which is manifest in the affairs of men in all ages and lands, but this is not the same as saving grace, which operates only within the limits of Christendom. And in order to carry out the divine purposes this common grace restrains men from the full exhibition of the utter depravity which lies at the heart of all. In the sight of

God, who seeth not as man seeth but looketh into the hearts of all, Epictetus was not a whit better than Nero. Their hearts were equally vile and corrupt, but for his own purposes God saw fit to restrain the expression of that wickedness in the former and not to restrain it in the latter. Hence in so far as the one appears better than the other it is mere appearance, and an appearance due to no merit in Epictetus, since it is solely the effect of God's restraining grace.

2. Does not this doctrine impeach the sincerity of God in giving to all men a law which it now appears only the regenerate can obey, and in offering to all men promises which only a few can accept? A crazy Methodist evangelist, somewhat notorious in his day, Lorenzo Dow by name, used to refer to contemporary Calvinists as the All-Part men and explained the epithet as meaning that, where the Bible spells *All*, they pronounce it *Part*. How can God sincerely demand an obedience to law which cannot be rendered, or hold out promises of salvation which only here and there one can embrace? Nevertheless, with reference to the Law, is it not the teaching of Paul himself that it was given to reveal sin, and even to increase sin, so that through his conscious helplessness man may be brought to the salvation of Christ? He himself had been unable to keep the Law; he therefore concluded that no man could, and hence that it was not given to be kept, but was intended only as a tutor to bring us to Christ. So Calvin teaches that the law "was placed far beyond our ability, in order to convince us of our impotence." How can one who holds Paul's teaching true find fault with Calvin? Moreover, if the Law cannot be kept by the unregenerate, it can by the regenerate, and is therefore of utmost service to them as revealing a way of life well-pleasing to God. And as for the promises, they could not be limited without revealing the elect, who exist only in the undisclosed purpose of God. There is a distinction to be drawn between the secret and the preceptive will of God; his will and grace are declared to all, although it is his secret will that only some should obey and accept. "Whosoever will, let him come": yes, whosoever will, may come, but no man can will to come except the Spirit draw him. The promises, that is, are always made conditionally, and the conditions are of such a nature that none can fulfil them apart from saving grace.

3. But is it not unjust in God thus to elect some and pass over others? Does not such a doctrine as this make God an infinitely unjust being? To this there are several replies, of which three may be presented.

(a) No one who believes in the divine government of the world can fail to see that in all its essential features this doctrine is true to the facts of human life. One child is born in squalor and sin, another in surroundings of comfort and to influences of goodness. Walk through the slums of a city and compare the deformed, diseased, doomed children sprawling on the door-steps and the sidewalks with the children of our own homes: is there not a difference? What chance of good and happy life have these children compared with ours? Is it the fault of these children of the slums that they are what they are? Did they choose the sin and wretchedness into which they are born? Are they responsible for being there? Yet they are there. And if God governs the world, if his will is revealed in the order of things, is it not in accordance with his will that they are there? Unless therefore one is ready to deny out of hand God's will in the world, he cannot deny the arbitrary discriminations of God. Furthermore, are not the separations of God recorded in sacred history? Did not God choose Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in succession, not because of their desert but because of his own sovereign will? Did he not choose Israel out of all the nations of the earth? Did not Christ say to his disciples, "Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you"? In nature and in grace therefore the same principle is displayed. The differences of earth and time are but manifestations of the differences in eternal destiny,—expressions of the same principle. Beware lest, in protesting against election, you turn atheist.

(b) Wherein is the injustice of such discrimination? Is it not true, as matter of common observation and experience, that a spendthrift father deprives his son of his rightful patrimony, and do we complain of that law as unjust? Is it not true that a diseased father transmits the taint to his son,—is such inheritance unjust? But, whether it seem unjust or not, the fact is indubitable. And if we accept the principle in things visible and temporal, can we deny it in things invisible and eternal?

Are not both worlds under the one divine law? Is it, then, unjust that God should punish sin? If not, then men who are sinful in nature, and all men are, must be the deserving objects of God's wrath and hatred of sin. And, if all men are thus doomed and God wills to spare some, have those who are passed over any just cause for complaint? They get their deserts. If, for example, a conspiracy is discovered in a nation and all those implicated in it are condemned to death, to death justly deserved, is injustice done to others if the monarch wills to show clemency to a few? If indeed the discrimination were on the basis of previous good behavior, if the question of desert or ill desert were once raised, then those who go to their merited doom might justly complain, perhaps, that they were no less deserving of mercy than those who have been pardoned, but it has already been shown that in God's election the choice is absolutely without regard to merit and proceeds from arbitrary will alone. All men are justly doomed; but in God is mercy as well as justice, and how can mercy be shown save in the salvation of some under just condemnation, and arbitrarily selected, since, if merit enters, mercy is cancelled. God's justice is revealed in the condemnation of all, his clemency in the salvation of some; but those who justly die cannot charge God with injustice because they are passed over while others likewise under sentence of death are mercifully spared. With this plea Calvin might well have been content, for the logic is inexorable and the alternatives are unavoidable. Is it unjust that all Adam's posterity should suffer loss and incur corruption because of his sin? The same principle operates before our very eyes in the processes of human life, and are not those processes in accordance with the will of God? To deny God's responsibility for the facts of human life is atheism. If, on the other hand, the principle is justified here, it cannot be pronounced unjust with reference to spiritual concerns. Calvinist or atheist, which? Is there discrimination here in the case of children born in favorable or unfavorable conditions? Then there are but two alternatives—either God has naught to do with temporal discriminations or the principle justified here cannot be denied in things eternal. Again, atheist or Calvinist? Furthermore, does not the Bible distinctly teach that all men are

sinner because of Adam's sin, that all are under condemnation, that God foreknows and calls whom he wills, and that the rest go down to hell; and do you believe the Bible? Here the alternatives are Calvinism or infidelity. And it does not avail to say that the Bible teaches also an opposite doctrine, for even if that were granted, the reply would be that it unmistakably teaches this, and it is for man to accept what God plainly declares and leave Him to do the reconciling. And to reject some teachings of the Bible on account of others which seem contradictory is to reject the Bible altogether as final authority, for an authority which permits one to exercise preferences among its declarations is no longer an authority in any just sense of the word.

(c) But Calvin has yet another argument in reply to the objection we are now considering, namely: God is just, his will is right; there is no higher standard of justice than his will. That this is his will is not only revealed in the facts of human life as it comes under our observation, but also declared in his unimpeachable Word; therefore it is and must be just, whether we can see it so or not. Who are we to sit in judgment on him who inhabiteth eternity? What colossal conceit and impudence to presume to set our standard of justice, born of our ignorance and depravity, over against the eternal wisdom and holiness! Nay, just because of our moral depravity, a system which should thoroughly commend itself to our unregenerate moral sense would be presumably untrue to the ethics of heaven. Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God? One cannot help feeling that here Calvin ultimately rested. He was not insensible to the awfulness of the teaching. "I inquire again," he says, arguing with his opponents, "how it came to pass that the fall of Adam, independent of any remedy, should involve so many nations with their infant children in eternal death, but because such was the will of God. It is an awful decree, I confess—"*Decretum quidem horribile, fateor*" (*Inst.* iii, 23. 7). But the facts of observation and experience religiously interpreted and the explicit affirmations of Scripture left no alternative. "If your mind is disturbed," he says, "embrace without reluctance the advice of Augustine: 'You, a man, expect an answer from me who am also a man? Let us both therefore hear him who

says, O man, who art thou? Faithful ignorance is better than presumptuous knowledge. Seek your deserts, you will find nothing but punishment. O the depth! Peter denies, the thief believes; O the depth! Do you seek a reason, I will tremble at the depth. Reason, if you will. I will wonder. Dispute, if you will, I will believe. I see the depth. I reach not the bottom. Paul was at rest because he found wonder. He calls the judgments of God unsearchable, and are you come to scrutinize them? He says, his ways are past finding out, and are you come to investigate them?' We shall do no good by proceeding further: it will not satisfy their petulance; the Lord needs no other defence than what he has employed by his Spirit speaking by the mouth of Paul: and we forget to speak well, when we cease to speak with God" (*Inst.* iii, 23. 5).

"A horrible decree, I confess," yet to it as to the counsel of God Calvin felt himself driven in fidelity to the works and the interpreting Word of God. Before the awful majesty of the Eternal, whose ways are not as our ways, whose thoughts are not as our thoughts, he laid his hand upon his mouth and in awed silence wondered at the depth. It is and must be the Lord's will, yet there is no injustice in Him: better to deny our poor human sense of justice than to impugn the justice of God. Yea, let God be true and every man a liar. So the Scripture and so Calvin.

4. But there is still one other objection which leaves Calvin face to face with a dreadful dilemma. Is God the author of sin, or, to put it otherwise, did God decree Adam's fall and by his decree effect it? Calvin earnestly protests that Adam alone of all mankind had free will, and endowments which enabled him not to sin. Did God simply fail to sustain him with the power of perseverance, so rendering him liable to sin? Then is not God, who withdraws support, responsible for the fall? Did God leave this cardinal event of all human history to chance? That were a preposterous supposition, since Calvin has argued convincingly against the presence of chance in the world, and especially since God's decrees all depended on Adam's sin, which therefore must have been itself decreed. Did then God merely foreknow that Adam would fall? It was impossible for Calvin to

take refuge in such an idea, since he had argued that knowledge depends on decrees and not the reverse. Did, then, God simply permit, by not preventing, the fall? This too is a perfectly impossible plea for one who like Calvin has argued that the will of God is influential and not merely permissive. "He declares that he creates light and darkness, that he forms good and evil, and that no evil occurs which he has not performed" (*Inst.* i, 18. 3). "Providence consists in action" (i, 16. 4). No, however Calvin may protest, his logic leads to but one issue: God decreed the fall of Adam and by his effective will became thus the ultimate cause of sin. "God not only foresaw the fall of the first man and his posterity in him, but also arranged all by the determination of his own will. . . . For the first man fell because the Lord had determined it was so expedient. The reason for this determination is unknown to us. Yet it is certain that he determined thus only because he foresaw that it would tend to the just illustration of the glory of his name" (*Inst.* iii, 23. 7-8). It is true that Calvin goes on to say that by his own wickedness Adam corrupted the nature he had received pure from the Lord, but he does not inform us whence the wickedness came into that pure nature, and his final refuge as before is in the inscrutableness of God. "To be ignorant of things which it is neither possible nor lawful to know is to be learned. An eagerness to know them is a species of madness" (*Inst.* iii, 23. 8). This then is Calvin's terrible dilemma between his ethical sense and his intellectual logic. A synthesis of thought cannot be attained by the mere juxtaposition of contradictory statements however emphatically made. It is simply impossible to follow the logic of Calvin without reaching at last the conclusion that God was the effective cause of Adam's sin and all the fearful consequences that follow from that sin. Is not this the *reductio ad absurdum* of Calvinism? Just because of its own rigorous logic it is condemned by its own inner dialectic before the judgment-seat of ethics.

It must not be forgotten, however, that this system, rigorous as it is, horrible as it seems, was rich in comfort and peace to Calvin and his contemporaries. They had come out from the ancient Church in which they had been born and bred; its traditions and ways were stamped upon their minds and hearts. Although

they had formally renounced it, feelings are more persistent than intellectual convictions. Who could be sure that after all the Church did not hold the keys to the kingdom of heaven? Perhaps salvation did depend upon sacramental grace which the Church alone could mediate. Perhaps the authority of the Church denied, the rites of the Church neglected, would sink them at last in perdition. Fear not, said Calvin's system, salvation is of God's grace alone; the Church has, and can have, nothing to do with it. You are in God's hands and salvation does not depend upon rites performed or good deeds done, upon your worthiness or merit, but upon his sovereign will alone. And, if any troubled soul inquired how he could be sure that he was numbered among the elect, the answer was ready. He had been called out of Romanism by the Spirit of God, and that fact was all-sufficient evidence that he was led by the Spirit and included among the elect whose salvation was sure. Nor need Protestant believers fear persecution, or peril of sword or stake, for God's irresistible grace would prevail to carry them through the fiery trial beyond which was the eternal and glorious bliss of the redeemed. They were in his mighty hand, subject to his will, which controlled for his greater glory and their greater bliss even the malicious fury of their foes. So they were made equal to every event, saying to potentates of church and state, with the serene confidence of their Master,—“You could have no power over me at all except it were given you from above,” and hence well assured that neither death nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come could separate them from the love of God, which through all the distresses and persecutions of the present time was leading them to certain triumph and eternal glory, while as for their merciless persecutors—well, they too were in the hands of God, and their fate had been determined before the foundation of the world.

THE ALEVIS, OR DEIFIERS OF ALI

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A religion different from Islam, centring about the person and teaching of Ali, the adopted son of Muhammed, is steadily gaining ground in certain sections of the Turkish Empire. The believers are called Alevis both by themselves and by the Muslims. The name Kuzul Bash (*u* as in "cut"), which means "Red Head" and is often used as a term of reproach, is said to have originated at the battle of Siffin. Ali said, "Tie red upon your heads, so that ye slay not your own comrades in the thick of the battle." In Persia the community is known by the name of Ali Ilâhi, and has commonly been regarded as a sect of Muhammedanism.

The object of this study is to investigate the true nature of this faith with as much accuracy as an oriental religion permits, and to consider the relations of the Alevi brotherhood with Islam and Christianity. The information has been gathered through a long series of conversations with a well-known teacher. For verification most of these statements have been independently referred to other Alevi believers, with the result that the significant features have been confirmed. The extreme reticence of most Alevis makes a free conversation possible only after long acquaintance. But the estimates of Alevi population have tallied closely with those made by a Christian physician of wide experience. This community began during the life of Ali, but has not grown to large dimensions until recent years. The teachings have always been secret, and there has been no inspired book to make known in written form what is handed on from believer to believer.

Let us then inquire as to the *Person and Mission of Ali*. There are four kinds of men in relation to him. First, those people who think Ali the worst sort of a tyrant, especially the Jews of these regions, who curse one another by him and regard him about as Muslims do Satan. Second, the orthodox Muslims, or

Ehl-i-Sunnat, who call him the fourth caliph. "Ali, the wise and virtuous among men," they say. Third, the Shi'is, who believe that Ali performed all miracles, thousands of which are narrated, and that he was appointed successor and executor to the prophet. Fourth, the Alevis, who regard Ali as the spirit existing in all prophecy and as the incarnation of God.

"Do the Alevis believe in atonement?"

"Yes, in the sense of intercession through Ali."

"Not through Jesus?"

"Yes; because Ali is essentially the same as Jesus."

"Were Hasan and Husein martyrs?"

"The Shi'is believe that atonement may be hoped for through these martyrs, especially through Husein. But the Alevis believe, directly through Ali's life. Not by his life so much, nor by his death, nor by his testimony, but by his person, his spirit. He also died a martyr's death. He had a great truth and a great hope, for which he died. There was no desire for personal renown. He was the holy incarnation of the Spirit of God."

"Have you no written life of Ali?"

"We have manuscripts of great value, which are cherished like gems, seldom sold, and are not given to any but Alevis."

"How are these procurable?"

"Only by becoming an Alevi. There are about fifteen different books, all in manuscript. The first group gives Ali's teaching, and is wholly made up of his own words. The second narrates his life as lived among his disciples. The third is composed of the praises and honors of those who came after him and loved him. These books are not trusted to every disciple. They are for the *Urefa*, those who are thoroughly acquainted with the mysteries of our religion. The books are never trusted to the publicity of any printing-press. You will understand that Ali established a new religion if you consider his definition of a Muslim: 'A Muslim is he who by his hand and tongue is true.'"¹

The genesis of this religion was with Ali, thirty years after the commencement of Islam. He did battle to defend his rights. He chose from the people the most able and suitable men. These

¹ *Almuslimu man salima-l-nāsu 'an yadihi walisānihi.* [The Muslim is one from whose hand and tongue men are safe.—A well-known tradition of Muhammed.]

he formed into the Special Council. Later he formed the General Council, consisting of all the men who followed him. There is a section of the Alevis known as Nuseiri. They are chiefly in Persia, but a great many are in the villages of Antioch. Nuseir, one of Ali's pupils, said to him, "Thou art God," and Ali accepted this avowal.

In the course of history three men rendered conspicuous service in the spread of the faith. Seyyid Jelal-ed-din, being Veli-Ullah, was of the descendants of Ali. He lived about A.H. 660 (A.D. 1262/62), and during his lifetime converted a great proportion of the Magians and many of the Shi'is. He was the founder of the order of Jelali dervishes, which has ever since continued to teach and promote his convictions.

Haji Bektash Veli was born about A.H. 730 (A.D. 1329/30) in the city of Nishabur. He was the son of Imam Riza, and a direct descendant of Ali. When he journeyed into Ottoman territory, he brought the Alevi faith for the first time into Asia Minor. He lived to see five hundred converts; and before his death, near the city of Angora, instituted the order of dervishes which is known as Bektashi. The members of this order are all of his faith, and they earnestly preach this teaching as they go about the country. Celibacy is the rule of this order.

The third historic character was neither ascetic nor preacher, but a king. Shah Sefi Sultan was the first Alevi to sit upon the throne of Persia. He brought about a renaissance of the faith after the cruel persecution by the Afghan conquerors. Four Alevi Shahs followed him, among them Shah Abbas. But since then Sunnis and Shi'is have been upon the throne. Shah Sefi Sultan sent criers out upon the highways to witness for Ali and to redeem the down-trodden cause. He succeeded in bringing great honor to the name of Ali, and throughout his reign proved himself a just and noble shah.

The Geographical Centre of this religion is in the town of Kirind, Kermanshah province, Persia. Four of Ali's male descendants now reside in Kirind. They are by name, Seyyid Berake, Seyyid Rustem, Seyyid Essed Ullah, Seyyid Farraj Ullah. Seyyid is correctly said only of Ali's descendants. These men send representatives throughout Asia Minor and northern Syria for preach-

ing and for the moral training of their followers. All gatherings are very secret, no inquirers being admitted except by the most reliable introductions.

In Arabia and Egypt this faith has scarcely made any progress. But in Persia and Mesopotamia there are from two to three million Alevis. There are about fifty thousand in the province of Aleppo, but none south of the city of Aleppo. In the Adana, Diarbekir, Smyrna, Salonica, and Caesarea provinces there are tens of thousands. Haji Bektash, where descendants of Ali live, eighteen hours from Caesarea, is an important point. Constantinople is not a centre, but in Macedonia a large portion of the population have become disciples. In the city of Aintab there are about five hundred Alevi homes and two thousand individual believers. In Antioch there are scarcely any, except for the Nuseiri villages. The villages of Marash and the town and region of Albustan should be specially mentioned. In the Surūj plain the people are Sunnis. Most of the Aintab villages are Sunni, as Burj and Kuzul Hissar. Kuchdam is chiefly Yezid. But beyond Sazghun to the south are many Alevi villages centring around Kharar. The population of the Kilis country is chiefly Arab and unfriendly to outsiders. But the tent-dwellers are Alevi. In Birejik about one hundred and fifty of the Turkish people belong to this faith. In the city and villages of Urfa there are few; in Aleppo few; in Antioch perhaps two hundred houses. The most thoroughly converted district is that of Dersim, in the Erzingan vilayet. The length of this district is fifteen days' horseback ride.

Essential Teaching concerning Prophecy. In the world there is one Truth. This Truth possesses great power. There is no power existing greater than this. The Power is in itself, not dependent upon any person. All other existing things get their light and might from this one truth. This Power "doeth what it wisheth and judgeth what it willeth."

Nothing can attack and overturn this Power. In the process of time the Power brought to light the charges and commandments that were necessary for that period. For instance, in the time of Moses what was necessary for the people was said by Ali by means of Moses.

"Then you believe in the pre-existence of Ali?"

"Yes, indeed."

"Have you considered the statements in the Gospel of John, in the first chapter, regarding the pre-existence of Christ?"

"We are aware of the similarity. Since the world began until the present day, however many prophets have invited the people to the truth, all these have taken their office from Ali, every one inviting separately, in form to himself but in meaning to Ali. The commander being one, however much the officers differ in degree, their meaning and duty² is one. Because all the prophets invite to one truth, they cannot be differentiated essentially. From the time of Adam to the time of Muhammed all the prophets must be one, though in name they are different. Each prophet teaches a new lesson by a new method, and each prophet is higher than the preceding ones. As Ali is pre-existent, so he is even now existing and manifested and known³ to his people. To those not his people he is veiled, covered.⁴

"How is he manifested to his own people?"

"By the Holy Spirit's influence. So much for the present as to the means of manifestation."

"Do the Alevis accept the Holy Spirit's personal influence?"

"Yes. But this needs a free and full discussion. If we understood the question of the Holy Spirit, other difficulties would naturally solve themselves."

The teacher illustrated his own conviction about the Holy Spirit as follows: "The Holy Spirit is as the light which shines into a room, the sun itself not being visible. But you cannot say that the light which we enjoy is the sun itself; it is only a result."

The Pre-existence and Survival of Human Personalities.
 "At every time that the First Point appeared, we like a circle came around him."

The true servants of Jesus are identical with those who came faithfully to Moses' call. Jesus rebuked the Pharisees because they had disobeyed Moses. By this rebuke he meant that they had also lived in Moses' time and had disobeyed Moses then. There is in this connection a term used only among Alevis: Active Return.⁵ If you live the life of Paul, never mind your distinct

² wazîfah.

³ makshûf, ma'lûm.

⁴ mastûr.

⁵ raj'at fi'lî.

name, you are none other than Paul. You continue his life. There are, then, hundreds of Pauls. His life has multiplied. He has many spiritual children. Observe what he says regarding Onesimus in the letter to Philemon, "I beseech thee for my son Onesimus whom I have begotten in my bonds." You are finishing the actions that others began. The action never dies. Therefore the man cannot die. Your true nature is not your bones and flesh, but the good action which is immortal.

Concerning Immortality. This world has another. This life is to the next as a drop to the ocean. But in this world whatever is gained in good deeds is not gained for this world, but for the next. Here is only the planting; there is the harvest. Man suffers no death. There is only a change of life. Heaven is not a particular place. But wherever believers live is heaven, even on this earth. And wherever godless men live is hell, here or hereafter. What mean the good deeds done in this life? As the child in his mother's womb knows not the use of eyes, ears, and mouth, but is growing stronger all the time, so there will be a use, made clear to us later, of all good actions done.

The Manifestation of God. The Muslims describe Allah by negatives, by denial of members and all human notions. Alevis describe God by positive attributes and by the great teaching of incarnation. God exists in his sovereignty (*mulk*). For this a body (*jasad*) is necessary. At no time has the face of the earth been empty of God. So now he is existent. And he will always be in the world, not in any imaginary sense, but in a literal sense. Every Alevi has seen the incarnate Ali, has talked with him in question and answer regarding the so-called "unanswerable" questions of life; has touched him, seen him, and with his every sense realized Ali's existence and presence. The object of this manifestation is to bring all men into the truth of God.

"What is the condition of thus interviewing the divine Incarnation?"

"The condition is hard, and the process of preparation takes a long time—seven or eight years of regular service and learning of the essentials. Then, if the seeker proves himself fit, he may be received as a member by the Dede from Dersim and hence by all Alevis. In this probation time he cannot have any direct

relation with Ali, that is he can never see him or learn from him."

"Can the believer meet with Ali when he wills?"

"No. Not at his own pleasure but at Ali's. The time and place are never known beforehand. The experience is sensible and self-controlled. It is not a condition of trance. It may be when a believer is alone or when he is with other disciples, but never when strangers are present. No Alevi can bring about such a vision, but Ali may will it at any time."

"Tell me more about this."

"Beyond this they would beat me if I told you."

"What is the difference between the doctrine of the Hidden Mahdi and this?"

"We believe that, although the Mahdi, Muhammed, and Messiah are different in name and body, they are one in light and truth. But we have no faith in those who, during the past century, have claimed to be the Mahdi."

Private and Public Worship. Among the Alevis prayer forms a part of both private and public worship. The prayers are not formal, nor appointed to be said at fixed times and at fixed places. Nor must they be preceded with preliminary washings.

"In the Koran are not all believers bidden to wash hands and arms to the elbows, and to anoint the head and wash the feet?"

"All Alevis are aware of that command, but it is not binding for them. Our prayer is spontaneous; we believe in intercessory prayer, and we have no ceremonial or formula."

"Does the reading of any holy book form a part of your worship?"

"We respect and study the five sacred books of Abraham, Moses, David, Jesus, and Muhammed. But we do not depend upon them. Our teaching is from believer to believer and from father to father."

"Do you believe in the confession of sin?"

"To God Most High."

"Do you believe in sacrifice?"

"Not like the sacrifice of the Month of Pilgrimage, when all Sunni Muslims must offer one animal. Our duty is once in a

lifetime, when the Dede comes on his circuit. The Pirs, or Dedes, are our honored teachers. The throat of the lamb or of the kid must be cut by the Pir himself."

"What is the object of this single sacrifice?"

"First, a remembrance of the offering of Ishmael [*sic*] by Abraham when God provided the ram. Second, to feed the poor, to whom portions are always given."

"What do you understand by self-sacrifice?"

"Suppose we are four hundred Alevis in a town. Any one will suffer, even to the death, for any other of the brotherhood or for confession of his faith. In the early days of our faith there were hundreds who suffered martyrdom."

"Do you have places of congregation corresponding to mosques and churches?"

"We have no such buildings, but groups of believers meet for worship regularly in private homes. God is more holy than the temple. He lives in the inner life of man. It is better to spend for persons in need the moneys that would go for mortar and stone. We have congregations, however, to the membership of which only those approved by the Dede from Kirind may be received."

"Who are your leaders and teachers?"

"Our Khojas have no religious function. They are the teachers of day-schools. There are local Dedes and those who travel from Kirind throughout all these countries."

"What is the form of service?"

"We gather in councils for the remembrance of Ali's teachings, for reading from the Law, the Psalms, the Gospel, and the Koran, for interpretation and prayer, and for conversation about the love of God and about brotherly love. There are no public sacrifices like those of the ancient Hebrews, but at the private sacrifice many believers are naturally present. We observe the fast of Muharram 'Āshūra, which lasts ten days. During that time one may eat lightly once in three days; if that is impossible, once in twenty-four hours; if that again proves impossible, once in twelve hours. The object of the fast is meditation and purification."

Social Conditions. "Do you differ essentially from the Sunnis regarding marriage?"

"There is no command concerning polygamy in Ali's teaching. Our custom is that a man shall have one wife. In case of a wife's becoming insane or incapable of taking care of the household, a second wife may be taken. But never more than two. We hold no slaves, and believe that that unjust practice will finally be done away with."

"Do you believe that the system of polygamy is coming to an end in Islam?"

"That would require another Muhammed."

"What is woman's position among the Alevis?"

"In spirit and love there is no distinction between man and woman. They are equal in that sense. In intellect and management, which ever is uppermost and best, the command is his or hers. For instance, it may be that a ruthless, good-for-nothing man marries a capable, noble woman. Mind manages the world today. Alevis have no purchased slaves. That is accounted wrong. But slaves that have been taken in war or raid may be so used, though this has not happened often in modern times. We believe in educating our daughters. We have not any right to command our wives, for example, about veiling. The right is wholly left to the women. But the strict usage of this country compels them to veil like other women. Ali said to Husein, 'When abroad, respect and obey the customs of the country.'"

"Do you believe in the paradise taught by the Sunnis?"

"No."

"Is that a sensual paradise, and are the houris promised to the believers by the Imams today?"

"That sort of heaven is sometimes shamelessly proclaimed by the Imams in the mosques."

"How are you taught to deal with those who rob and deceive you?"

"Forbear as far as you can, but finally retaliate rather than be crushed by your enemies."

"What shall be your answer if you are cross-questioned as to your faith?"

"If by an intelligent assembly or in the presence of a governor, confess your faith. But if by an ignorant assembly or by a small one, whose intention is mockery or despite, you may deny your

connection, because your conviction would not be respected or appreciated."

"Then is it ever right to lie, as suggested in one of the traditions of the Prophet?"

"The tradition is false, as are many others. A father once taught his son ten thousand traditions, and when the young man with infinite patience had memorized them all, the father said: 'Now these are the false ones, believe anything else you please!' But to deny among ignorant or mocking people our being Alevis is not falsehood."

"Do the Alevis ever persecute for religious reasons?"

"There is no slavery in our faith. I may become a Magian or a Christian as I please. This is natural. We have left Islam; why should we not be free?"

"How are the orphans, the sick, and the poor cared for?"

"Privately in our homes."

"Do you believe in Jihad or in any war?"

"We believe in the inner war with the kafirs (infidels) that are in our hearts. Ali said: 'It is better for you to die in trying to do my will than for you to kill any one in the attempt at coercion.' We believe in actual war only as self-defence. But we believe thoroughly in self-defence rather than in turning the cheek to him who strikes."

Relations with the Shi'is, the Babis, and the Behais. Between the Alevis and the Shi'is there is this fundamental difference. The latter know Ali as the vicegerent of Muhammed. No other caliph is to be recognized. He is the successor, the executor. The Alevis know Ali as the incarnation of God. They are agreed with the Shi'is in the following respects: they do not recognize the Sultan of Turkey as Khalifa; they do not recognize the Sheikh-ul-Islam; they do not recognize the Ulemas nor the Khojas. Again, the Alevis are entirely separate from the Babis and Behais. None of them have gone over to follow Mirza Muhammed Ali or Beha Ullah. They do not believe the claims and pretensions of these men, nor have they the notion of a hidden Imam.

Relations to Jesus Christ and the New Testament. "Do the Alevis accept the incarnation of Jesus?"

"Not in the sense that he is the only incarnation, nor in the

sense that he fully succeeded in showing forth the character and nature of God. He had this divinity, but men could not perfectly appreciate it, and cannot to this day. In the sense that the Son of God or God himself entered human life as Jesus of Nazareth and lived his divine life in Palestine, we do believe in the Christian incarnation. We frequently speak of Jesus as the Son of Man, or the perfect man; we also speak of him as the Son of God."

"Do you accept the crucifixion and the death of Christ?"

"No. Because Jesus was an immortal spirit and could never be put to death."

"But his body?"

"Yes. But that did not contain his personality. The oppression of Jesus was greater than that of the other prophets, and his humility was greater than theirs. God loves self-sacrifice, and therefore the intercession of Jesus is reckoned by God more worthy than that of the other prophets. Jesus is preferred above all who came before him, because those who preceded him could not declare the word which he declared. But in their surrender to the will of God each in some way suffered by the people. For example, Hud, Salih, and Noah."

"Do you believe in the resurrection of Jesus?"

"This is a point of great difficulty among us. The spirit after it has separated from the earthly body cannot reunite. We do not feel obliged to accept what we do not understand; but we do not deliberately deny the resurrection."

"Do you regard the New Testament as inspired of God?"

"Yes."

"Equally with the Koran?"

"We believe in five equally inspired books: Şuhuf (revealed to Abraham, and now extant in Mesopotamia), Tevrat, Zabur, Injil, Qur'an.⁶ We regard the books of Job, Samuel, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and so forth, as of a lower order."

"Do you believe in the annulling of previous revelations?"

"In fundamentals, no. In ramifications, yes."

"What is your expectation regarding Christianity? Will it yield and become Alevi?"

⁶[I.e. The Books of Abraham (Koran 87, end), the Law (Torah), Psalms, Gospels (Euangelion), Koran.]

"The two faiths will unite at the point of justice, each relinquishing extreme positions."

"What about the Sunnis?"

"They are far behind! Their affair is certainly hard. They are very far off from such a union."

"What do you understand by the words of Jesus, 'There shall be one flock and one shepherd'?"

"These words are the essence of civilization. Unity is the final desire of God for us. The world is in childhood and has not yet self-control. The world does not yet comprehend the will of God."

Regarding the System of Islam. "Do the Alevis regard the Hajj (the pilgrimage) as binding?"

"Not at all."

"Do they feel bound to give the Zekyat (the legal alms)?"

"No."

"Do they perform the Namaz (the prostration)?"

"No."

"Do they keep the fast of Ramazan?"

"No."

"Do they make the saying of the Creed a condition to faith?"

"No."

"Do not the Shi'is keep these 'five pillars' of Islam?"

"Yes, with certain modifications."

Regarding Muhammed Himself. "Do you accept any one book like the Siyer-en-Nebi as a standard for the biography of Muhammed?"

"No. But we have our own accounts of his career and prophethood. We believe in him as the last of the five great prophets. We look upon him as intercessor. And in the same way we regard all the holy prophets. But the real wisdom and justice of decision is with God."

"Is Muhammed final?"

"Yes, in the sense that he is the seal of the prophets."

"Did he predict or appoint Ali?"

"Yes, in the desert at a great assembly. After Muhammed's death, for practical reasons, the Muslim convocation agreed 'to

set aside the impetuous and high-spirited Ali for the mild and conservative Abu Bekr.'"

"What do you consider the historical relations of Ali and Muhammed?"

"Their fathers were brothers. Afterwards Ali became Muhammed's son-in-law. He was the first believer. He was appointed to become the first caliph."

"Do you regard the revelation through Ali as the last word of God to men?"

"You should not say 'first and last.' The same spirit is through all, just as in the days of the week there is really only one day, but the names are different. If you unite the lives of the prophets, then the Alevis agree with you. If you disintegrate and differentiate, then you will fall out of sympathy with us."

Conclusions. 1. Here is a religion other than Islam, recognizing and accepting Muhammed.

2. The religion has for a centre, not a shrine, but a missionary movement. And the movement is not declining but growing.

3. The intimate relation with Persian and Turkish classic poetry, especially with the Mesnevi of Mevlana Jelal-ed-din-i-Rumi, should not be overlooked. In other words, the mysticism and pantheism of the Orient are here found, not as literary theories or philosophies, but as the elements of a religion with which increasing multitudes are seeking to satisfy the yearnings and instincts of the soul.

4. A fundamental difference and separation from Islam exists in the belief in incarnation. Turkey is being stirred, notwithstanding monarchy and caliphate and Sunni traditions, by as radical a movement as Indian Islam has known.

5. The exaltation of ethics over formalism is proved by the abrogation of "the five pillars."

6. The respect and liberty which are to be accorded to women among Alevis are largely unrealized because of the powerful environment of Muhammedan law and custom. But this ideal of a wife's equal share with her husband in life and in eternal life is prophetic of the day when there shall be true homes and a pure basis for society in the Orient.

7. By their own confession Alevis are closer to Christianity than to Islam. They expect an eventual compact with Christianity but not with Sunni Muhammedanism.

8. They accept the entire present New Testament. But how can they do this and consistently hold to the Koran as equally inspired?

9. The words of our Saviour, "There shall be one flock and one shepherd," are in truth "the essence of civilization," for He is indeed "drawing all men unto Himself."

WHAT HAVE FACTS TO DO WITH FAITH?

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The question, "What have facts to do with faith?" expresses a rather widely prevalent suspicion regarding the religious value of the facts recorded in the gospels and summarized in the creeds; and it deserves consideration by every one who has religious interests at heart, since it brings up vital problems concerning the possibility of revelation and the value of the Christian faith. Two allied questions have been much debated recently in this country, although they were pretty well threshed out in Germany a decade or two ago; first, what obligations rest upon a man who subscribes to the Christian creeds; and, secondly, whether it is not desirable that the creeds should be so changed, or be given such meanings, that no one would be obliged in confessing his faith to make any assertion concerning matters of historical fact. Back of these questions lies a more fundamental and more practical one: What value have facts for our religious faith? Of what value for our religious life is it to affirm in our creeds the truth of such historical happenings as, "He suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead and buried; the third day He rose again from the dead"? Of what value is it to read or hear such Scriptures as those which tell us that Christ healed the palsied man let down through the roof, and the blind man who called to him from the wayside; or raised the widow's only son; or had compassion on the multitudes, and fed them? It must be granted, we are told, that doubts may always arise about historical events, since historical knowledge rests on human testimony with all its weaknesses; and granted, too, that events seem but a dry and cold substitute for the living faith craved by our hearts. Would it not, then, be well, we are asked, to omit from our creeds matters of fact (or alleged fact), and to reduce our gospels to "the Words of the Christ"? If not, some sound reason ought to be given for retaining the gospel narra-

tives of our Lord's marvellous deeds, which are stumbling-stones to many feet seeking the path of righteousness, and for affirming in the creeds the most notable events of his life instead of simply calling him Master.

That "the unnecessary is usually evil" is a wise saying. If facts are unnecessary and useless so far as faith is concerned, it is almost certainly harmful to insist that Christians should accept either the few great events of Christ's life mentioned in the creeds, or the many others of a wonderful sort narrated in the gospels. Even though we can establish their actual occurrence, they will inevitably be sloughed off by Christendom, unless they really have something to do with faith. We ought, then, to show plainly that there is a vital connection between faith and facts; or else lay upon the table the much discussed question what legal and moral obligation to accept the gospel facts, as summarized in the creeds, rests upon those who confess the Christian faith. In that case the problem of framing a creed free from any assertion regarding events would have to be taken up seriously. Only, before this course is adopted, we ought to be quite clear that Christendom has been wrong with an almost unanimous consistency in finding value for faith in facts.

The reason commonly urged for revising the Christian creeds is that men long for simple, spiritual truth which appeals to the heart. They long to hear, and are willing to believe, it is often said, the facts of God's fatherhood, the Saviour's love, and the power in human life of the divine Spirit; but they do not want metaphysical statements and discussions. For example, they desire to hear, and they accept, a preaching which sets forth the fact of man's immortal life; whereas they do not want, and will not attend to, metaphysical assertions concerning the reality of Christ's resurrection.

Now this suggests the need of saying what is meant properly by "fact," a word which has purposely been used so far in the rather vague, ambiguous way in which it is commonly employed. For much current discussion is inconclusive because we generally have no clear idea as to what we mean when we talk about "facts." Shall we call such statements as the following, statements of fact? God is love and is our father; Jesus of Naza-

reth is the Christ, the Saviour of men; the divine Spirit is a power for righteousness in human life; there is forgiveness for our sins; we are immortal. It is customary to call these truths "facts," in order to express the universal Christian conviction of their certainty. But, granting their certain truth, this is surely an inappropriate use of the term, especially when "metaphysical statement" is contrasted with "fact." For properly "fact" should be used to denote an occurrence, a phenomenon, that which our eyes can see and our hands handle. "Fact" (or, if any one please, alleged fact) is properly used to denote such an event as that the palsied man stood up and carried his bed home; that the widow's son who had been dead sat up and began to speak; that Jesus of Nazareth was nailed to the cross, died thereon, and was laid in Joseph's tomb; that the grave was empty on the first Easter morning. "Fact," in short, ought not to be used for "truth," but for "event" or "phenomenon."

Again, by a "metaphysical statement" we can properly mean only the statement of some truth (or alleged truth) which is above the phenomenal, the visible, audible, and tangible, some truth that is not a section of the physical world, though it may be known to us through what we see, hear, and touch, and may be a legitimate inference from some series of facts. Thus the statements that nature is a unity, working always according to unvarying laws, that man is morally free, that God exists, are metaphysical. Still more is it a metaphysical statement to assert not merely that God is, but that his nature is love; that he is the father of all, who will have all men to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth; or to say that Jesus of Nazareth is the Son of God, who by his death and resurrection has overcome sin and death; or that our impulses toward good are the result not simply of our heredity and environment but of the workings of the Holy Spirit in our hearts; or that in the life to come justice will be done to all who have not found justice here, and that it will be a life of happiness, lived in close relation to God. Such statements are to the Christian not less but more certainly true than such matters of fact as that this table is hard and this paper white; but they are, nevertheless, truths which do not belong to the sphere of the phenomenal, which we can test and be sure

of by ear, eye, and hand. Above all, forgiveness of sins and communion with God are as far removed from sense-experience, as any truths that could be named. And yet they are most necessary for religious life, joy, and peace, and should have their place in Christian teaching always. To sum up the matter, the high truth that God is love and brings us into union with himself is simple, spiritual truth, which appeals to the heart and answers the heart's deepest needs, and yet it is undoubtedly metaphysical.

Are we able, then, to grasp such truth as this? And if we are able, shall those of us who are inwardly certain of God's love and of our mystical union with him through Christ, say to the man who wishes to share in our knowledge and love of God: Our faith rests upon the authority of the Bible; or, upon the authority of the Church; or, upon an inner mysterious experience; or, upon our developing within ourselves, after the example of Jesus, a consciousness that we are sons of God? Valuable as any of these answers may be to the question how we may know God and serve him, a simpler and yet far more profound reply is given by St. John. "That which was from the beginning, that which we have heard, that which we have seen with our eyes, that which we beheld, and our hands handled, concerning the Word of life (and the life was manifested, and we have seen, and bear witness, and declare unto you the life, the eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us); that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you also, that ye also may have fellowship with us; yea, and our fellowship is with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ."

Fellowship with God—that is religion; fellowship with the Father and his Son Jesus Christ, the Word of life, the eternal life which was with the Father and was manifested unto us—that is Christianity. This fellowship is the sublime result of faith. And faith is aroused through the personal appearing among men of the Son of God in human guise, so that men heard him speak, saw him act, and could declare to the world what kind of person this was whom they knew as a man knows his friend. Seeing him, they saw the Father; knowing what Jesus Christ is, they knew what God is. In some such way as this we might

state the view regarding Christian faith and the relation to it of fact, which is given us by St. John.

When we assert the fatherhood of God and his love, man's immortality, and the operation of God's Holy Spirit in the world, it is reasonable for men to ask in regard to any one of these assertions, "Why do you make it?" If there are no facts to prove it, the only answer must be, "Because I feel like it." Now for this attitude of mind there is some justification. The felt needs of human nature make their satisfaction probable, and the antecedent probability of revelation and redemption enable us to accept testimony as to God's dealings with men. But the answer does not of itself carry conviction, or even challenge investigation. Suppose the apostles, when they went about preaching the gospel, had only been able to say in answer to inquiries, "We believe, and urge all men to believe, because we like the ideas we preach." This would never have made the deep impression upon the whole world that was made by the method they actually used. They proclaimed the righteousness and love of God, and called men to repentance and a new life. Why? "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son." Why "only-begotten Son"? Because Jesus Christ was "declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead." And when inquiry was made regarding the stupendous assertion, "On the third day he rose from the dead," their reply was, "We are witnesses of his resurrection." They staked everything on this central fact. "If Christ hath not been raised, then is our preaching vain; your faith also is vain." Their preaching could have convinced no one, had it not been based on such an appeal to facts as this: "Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God unto you by mighty works and wonders and signs, which God did by him in the midst of you, even as ye yourselves know, him, being delivered up by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye by the hand of men without the law did crucify and slay; whom God raised up, having loosed the pangs of death. . . . This Jesus did God raise up, whereof we all are witnesses." These facts were appealed to as a basis for all the inductions of faith. Precisely the same basis is needed for the inductions of

faith now. Indeed it is more needed in this age, so habituated to the methods of scientific inference from observed phenomena.

St. Paul's great sermon to the Athenians, declaring to them the unknown God, exemplifies the apostolic method. He set before them first the truth that God gives to all life and breath and all things, and has made of one every nation of men, that they should seek God, if haply they might feel after him and find him, though he is not far from each one of us. And then he declared that, while God had overlooked the times of ignorance in which he was unknown, "now he commands men that they should all everywhere repent; inasmuch as he hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness by the man whom he hath ordained; whereof he hath given assurance unto all men, in that he raised him from the dead." This is the point his sermon was intended to drive home. His theme is summed up in the simple words, "He preached Jesus and the resurrection." What was the effect of his message? "When they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some mocked; others said, we will hear thee concerning this again. But certain clave unto him and believed." Such must always be the outcome of preaching the Christian message—some will mock, some may inquire further, and perhaps only a few will believe. But the preacher of the gospel must set forth the message as St. Paul did: "I make known unto you that which also I received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures; and that he was buried; and that he hath been raised on the third day according to the scriptures; and that he appeared to Cephas, then to the twelve; then he appeared to above five hundred brethren at once, of whom the greater part remain until now, but some are fallen asleep; then he appeared to James, then to all the apostles." For we may bid men look upon nature as God's work, and upon man with his reason and conscience as the image of God, and bid them seek God, if haply they may feel after and find him who enfolds and sustains all men and the whole earth and sky; but still they will worship him, if at all, in ignorance, and declare that he is to them unknown, or even unknowable. They may see in the world of struggle and suffering no certitude of his fatherly love; and discern no evidence

that he really dwells in their hearts and brings to pass what is good in them. But if the Cross is held up before them as the witness of God's love, and the Resurrection as the manifestation of his life-giving power, some *will* believe, and have fellowship with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ.

Men need to be convinced of the Father's ever-present love and care, actually guiding all things for good, of the Saviour's redemptive work as truly freeing them from sin, and of the Holy Spirit's influencing them with such reality that purity, honesty, and loving-kindness are the actual fruits of the life he imparts. That is, a living gospel must proclaim the Father, Redeemer, and Sanctifier as working out the divine purpose for our true well-being in the sphere of present-day actuality. Consequently it must preach God as made known through events of like actuality. To take a particular instance, we can no more be sure of Christ's living existence and power now, if we are not convinced that he actually left the tomb and manifested himself as risen to his disciples, than we can affirm that he died for the sake of mankind, if we say that we do not know or care whether he actually suffered under Pontius Pilate, expired on the cross, and was buried. Let any man ask himself whether he can have an assurance of the Saviour's love, if he doubts whether Jesus Christ died willingly for men; and whether he can know God as love, unless it is true that the cross so reveals him. And if we need to have the love of God and the forgiveness of our sins set forth by the cross as a reality, we equally need the manifestation of the living power of God and of our vital union with him to be set forth by the rising of his Son from the dead.

It is a brave attitude that some would have Christians take, when they bid us hold all knowledge of truth concerning God to be impossible metaphysics, irrelevant to essential religion, and all reliance upon historical facts to be vain; it is admirably brave to say, as religious men we will disregard all else, and will take the attitude towards life that Jesus took. But the man who would be wise as well as brave must feel that he can take only such an attitude towards life as is justified by the real nature of the world, and ought to follow the example of Jesus only if he is truly the Wisdom of God and the Lord of life. If the world

we know and use is not so constituted and guided by the God of righteousness that moral worth can express itself in ultimately effective action, then the attitude of Jesus towards life may be magnificent, but it means death now and no future victory for one's self or for others.

If Christianity is to reach the man in the pew and draw to the pew the man in the street, it must hold fast to the comprehensible facts upon which its inductions are founded. The plain man must base the truth by which he is to live and die on facts that come within view of human senses; and his theology must be simply "a determined effort to think clearly" concerning data upon which the human mind can lay hold. Above all, he must not leave out of his Christianity the Christ who manifested his glory before the plain people. And so most Christians find it a privilege, not a burden, to affirm as of high value the facts stated in the gospels and the creeds, just because they cannot be satisfied with metaphysical speculations in place of faith, and because they see that God's revelation, coming through historical events, gives them not a series of philosophical generalities concerning God and immortality, but a living faith in the Father, with whom they may have fellowship.

The great, simple truths, then, which the human heart needs, and of which the appearing of Jesus Christ gives us certainty, are indeed metaphysical truths, but they are not speculative abstractions. They are made known through occurrences in time, on our earth, which were observed by plain, straightforward men who used their eyes and ears; they do not come through some occult, hypothetical means of attaining knowledge. Like scientific truths, they are based on data that have been experienced; and, like scientific principles, they are truths more general than can be given by any single experience. Only as such can they be adequate to our needs. They are, we claim, as truly inductions from facts that have been observed as the determined and successful efforts of scientists to think clearly about nature are inductions from observed phenomena; and they have been worked out by gradual steps of careful thinking, similar to those by which scientific doctrines are reached. It is beyond the scope of this paper to justify the assertion that the gospel facts

actually occurred and were correctly observed, or to defend the soundness of the conclusions drawn by Christendom from these accepted facts. To do so would require a consideration of historical problems and of biblical theology too extensive to be summarized here. Our endeavor so far has been to show the soundness of a method which aims at giving due place to facts; and it is now our purpose to suggest how facts can be a basis for spiritual faith.

In considering this point it will be well to remind ourselves of the way in which the faith of Christ's first disciples grew up. They came to believe in him as the Son of God through the experience of being with him and learning to know what manner of person they followed. He did not often declare in set words who he was, but he showed it by his life. His chosen witnesses heard his teaching, saw his mighty works, watched his every act, gesture, and expression during months of closest companionship with him. "Of the men that have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptism of John, unto the day that he was received up from us, of these must one become a witness with us of his resurrection." So St. Peter stated the qualifications of an apostle when it was necessary to fill the place from which Judas fell. The disciples had ample opportunity of knowing what their Master was. They were not held aloof by any of the formalities that sometimes give fictitious dignity and importance to eminent men. Following him as he went up and down the country, they saw him under all the circumstances in which even a man of high character and genius will show weakness, irritability, or selfishness; they saw him in great moments, when he was in the public eye; and they saw how he faced the uttermost crises of life and death. It is evident that they were profoundly impressed with the perfection of his character, and filled with reverence for him whom they knew in such intimate and constant companionship. They perceived that his teaching showed the deepest insight into human nature, and that, while it was so simple in form that the common people heard him gladly, its depth of meaning could be sounded by no one. They witnessed his mighty works, manifesting complete control over the forces

of nature and over human health and life. They saw him use his powers with wonderful self-restraint, resolutely refusing to employ them for his own advantage or fame, so that his use of them only for the highest benefit of others, for the wisest purposes of healing and help, showed forth his love no less than his power. Furthermore they beheld his perfect self-sacrifice in its culmination on the cross. And finally they were convinced that, after he had been laid in the grave, undoubtedly dead, the grave upon the third day was found empty, and that during forty days he repeatedly appeared and talked with them, and at last ascended in their sight into heaven. From the observation of these facts, visible to their eyes, tangible to their hands, audible to their ears, his disciples drew their conclusions concerning him.

Their convictions, as the gospel story shows us, were arrived at only by gradual steps. Indeed they came so slowly to understand their Master that whoever looks back now, from the standpoint of those who see his whole revelation of himself, must feel astonished at their slowness. But it is to be remembered that they had before them the most wonderful person whom the world has ever seen, and that the inference they were to draw concerning him was more stupendous and overpowering than any other that men have ever had to draw, even in the face of the most striking phenomena, the most marvellous discovery, or the highest manifestation of human wisdom and goodness.

But if their progress towards complete faith in him was gradual, they came in due course to the great conviction that he was the Son of God. The stages of this progress are indicated by the various confessions of faith to which the disciples gave utterance. When St. Andrew first met with Jesus, he confessed his belief that he would prove to be the Messiah for whom men were hoping. Later St. Peter said in the name of the twelve, "We have believed and know that thou art the Holy One of God." After the feeding of the five thousand, and the appearance of the Lord walking upon the sea, the disciples in the boat worshipped him, saying, "Of a truth thou art the Son of God." And finally, after months of living and working with him, the conviction to which they had come was voiced in the great confession of faith, spoken by St. Peter, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God."

During these months their knowledge of him had been deepened and their love for him strengthened, as his personality exerted its ever-increasing influence upon their minds and hearts, until finally there resulted this climax of faith and this solemn assertion of their full belief in him as their personal Lord Christ. Thus they began with facts, and their gradual, perhaps unconscious, induction from what they observed led naturally to the most intense spiritual faith.

It is too commonly assumed that induction belongs only to the study of nature, and the truth is overlooked that Christian thought largely follows this method. In reality the knowledge of God differs from scientific knowledge not so much in its method as in its object. And the difference between the objects of religious and of scientific knowledge consists chiefly in this: science seeks to know natural forces and laws; religion, to know a personal Being. Now there is a realm of vitally important knowledge which gives us the true point of view for understanding faith. This is the knowledge of human persons, which plays so large a part in all our practical concerns. Indeed it is as widely used and quite as indispensable as our science.

How, then, do we know other persons? We observe the face and expression, the voice and manner, the words and actions, of those with whom we are associated; and from such observations we draw, often unconsciously, our inferences as to the kind of persons they are. Then we have opportunities to see how they act in crises, face dangers, withstand temptations, and whether they live up to the highest requirements of friendship. Our judgments are built up from a large number of data, obtained by observation. This is incomplete in most cases, to be sure, and is subtle and delicate in all. Yet we do form judgments of this sort, and the universal conviction of mankind, as shown in action, is that such judgments must be made and can be reliable. Now it is to be remembered that these conclusions are based upon facts observed, even where our judgments rise to the practical certainty of love or friendship; and that even our firmest convictions regarding other persons can never be independent of facts. Thus a man's belief in the faithfulness of his wife, in his paternity, or in the fidelity of a friend, involves

a conviction that certain events have or have not occurred in the phenomenal world.

But though our judgments regarding other persons are intimately dependent upon facts in the physical order, these judgments, and the personal relations resulting from them, may rise to the highest spiritual levels. It is possible for our belief in others to be so strong, and to have such firm foundations, that not the least doubt remains in our minds, or ought to remain. A friend will be trusted with everything a man owns, or with carrying out some duty that involves a man's reputation, honor, and all he holds dearest. A soldier will trust his companion with his life. And the stories of Othello and of Elsa and Lohengrin illustrate the way in which the soundest common sense of mankind condemns lack of trust in those in whom a man ought to believe. Our judgments of others are necessarily more subtle and complex than the most difficult scientific inductions, and yet they may be profoundly reasonable and reliable.

If our knowledge of human persons is thus dependent always upon facts, and yet may be spiritual knowledge of the highest and most secure kind, surely there need be no fear that the simple, spiritual truth concerning God and our relation to him, which the human heart requires, should be lost because faith tries to make use of facts. The data observed by the chosen witnesses of our Lord's life can be employed by us, no less than they were used by them, as the basis for inferring far-reaching spiritual truths, which directly appeal to the heart and affect practically the whole life. The knowledge of God attained by faith proceeds by the method which we might call "personal induction." That is, as our everyday knowledge of men and women begins with outward manifestations, given in the body, and rises thence to the faithful trust and communion of friendship, so our religious knowledge rises from actual historical happenings in our world of human deeds to the closest spiritual union with God. Viewed from this standpoint, the events through which God's revelation has been given do not remain dry, cold facts, but become the outward, visible signs of what God is, who is made known through his Son. They become alive and warm with meaning and with the mightiest appeal to the heart.

*FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ANTICHRIST, SUPERMAN,
AND PRAGMATIST*

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One of the most striking and pathetic figures of the nineteenth century was Friedrich Nietzsche. A radical aristocrat, a radical enemy of religion, a prophet, he shared the fate of the prophet and the radical man. He was a poet rather than a philosopher, not one calmly to weigh the issues of his mind. He was a zealot with a mission, a fiery genius, whose torch, unsteady at times, flared into madness in his latter years. So great was the strain of thought that his mind was literally consumed by his zeal for a vast, a revolutionary cause.

The events of his life were few. A series of ministers' families had intermarried for two generations; Nietzsche's father was a minister, and his mother the daughter of a minister. As in the case of our own Emerson, the family of Friedrich Nietzsche was thus one in which the intellectual life had predominated for several generations. At Röcken, a little German town not far from the battlefield of Lützen, on Oct. 15, 1844, Friedrich was born. His mother took complete charge of his instruction up to the time when he was sent to the so-called Fürstenschule at Pforta in the Thuringian mountains. After graduation there he continued his studies for some years at the Universities of Bonn and Leipzig. Ritschl was the dominating factor in his life at Leipzig, as Heinze had been at Pforta. The latter, still professor of philosophy at Leipzig, told me that Friedrich Nietzsche excelled in whatever field of work he set his heart on, though there was nothing to mark him as a genius save his taciturnity, his love of the beautiful, his hatred of the vulgar.

As a student, he had already distinguished himself as a master of the ancient languages and as a musician, and by virtue of certain essays he had published while an undergraduate the University

of Basel offered him an extraordinary-professorship of philology. He was then twenty-five. But languages were not his chief interest; and the publication of his first larger work on Greek tragedy proved that he was destined to be a thinker on the ultimate problems of life. His ten years as professor at Basel (1869-1879) were a continuous inner struggle. The teaching of language militated against the will which bade him think upon subjects of life and death; ill health limited a pen which seemed inexhaustible; and among his one-time friends the feeling against his radical theories left him standing more and more alone. The students worshipped him at first, but when they learned of his revolutionary principles, left him to lecture to vacant seats. He broke with his best friends—among whom was Richard Wagner—for the sake of his theories; and finally, well-nigh alone and friendless, broken in health at thirty-five, he resigned his professorship, accepting, however, a pension from the University. From this date until his death eight years ago the story of his life is that of a wandering thinker—*fugitivus errans* he called himself—alone, save for his faithful dog; now on the heights of Swiss mountains, now among the Italian lakes, now in the misty north of Germany; indefatigable, producing work after work with a golden pen, prophetic in tone, but, alas, often philosophically illogical, contradictory, absurd.

A few of the more important of his writings may be mentioned here. First in point of significance is his *Also sprach Zarathustra; ein Buch für Alle und Keinen*. Zarathustra is, of course, Zoroaster, and the mouth-piece of the writer himself. The book is written in a style of rare beauty, very much in the tone of the Biblical prophets, only the call is to objects wholly earthly. Secondly, *Menschliches, allzu Menschliches; ein Buch für freie Geister*, which consists, as does *Zarathustra*, very largely of aphorisms. *Morgenröte* and *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* tell of the dawn of a new science and new values; while *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, the most logical and consistent of the works I have read, seeks to advance, as the title indicates, beyond the concepts of a traditional ethics. *Der Antichrist* summarizes in relatively the most connected manner his objections to the Christian religion. Theologians and metaphysicians alike are warred upon; the doctrines

of the New Testament are discussed from a cultural, biological standpoint, and found wanting. Finally, *Der Wille zur Macht*, in which is contained a kind of will-metaphysic and a Pythagorean theory of the eternal recurrence of what has been. Philosophy was to Nietzsche largely personal experience. And if our thinking, like our bodies, is subject to evolution, it must show a growth, an overcoming of the old self, a rising to a new and broader field of vision. Thus we may in a measure forgive many of the seeming inconsistencies.

Ten years, then, as a professor in Basel, ten years as a wandering thinker, impelled as it were by fate, until, in 1889, he was picked up in the streets of Turin, hopelessly insane. He had overworked his brain in ceaseless thinking night and day, and to his death, in 1900, he had to be cared for by Christian charity—Christian charity, which in health had been the object of his bitterest attack. He was buried without funeral rites, save for one German student who came from afar and made an oration at his grave.

How was it now that Nietzsche so soon became a leader, for many, indeed, a prophet? How is it that no one who now considers problems of government, morality, or religion, can escape him?

Let us examine the chief elements of his philosophy, presenting so far as we may that which was true for him throughout, and more particularly his later thought. First, let us note that, as in the case of Socrates, Nietzsche's whole philosophy centres about ethics. The adage, *γνῶθι σεαυτόν*, is again proposed, not through ethics to attain a new basis for philosophic thought, but, as it were, by ethics of a radical kind to rise superior to the ultimate problems which so trouble us. Man's concerns are of this earth; what has he to do with other worlds? Let him look to this life and make the most of it. The study of man is thus the paramount issue, to find in man himself not only the explanation of psychological fact, but a solution for all the phases of thought and action; in other words, to explain the various systems of philosophy, the religions of mankind, as well as our own ideas and ideals of morality, by a scientific, historical, and psychological method; presuming nothing, and rigidly excluding what seems improbable in our own immediate personal experience. "All that

we need is a chemistry of moral, religious, aesthetic concepts," says Nietzsche; and in an attempt to provide such an analysis he comes to the conclusion that metaphysics concerns itself with a world of dreams. Dreams are, indeed, sufficient to explain for him the origin of metaphysics. "Without dreams, one would never have found occasion to separate the real world from another world." So the division of human beings into body and soul—another dream—started the religious concepts of philosophy, and brought men from ghosts to spiritual essences, spiritual bodies, other lives than the present. Thus, as it were by inspiration, he tries to shut the gates of mercy on all metaphysics. He deliberately denies the validity and significance of the very problems and concepts of transcendental philosophy. God is dead, he boldly exclaims, there are no things in themselves, souls, world orders, *logoi*, paracletes. These are none of them given in experience; therefore they do not exist.

What concerns us, then, is man as a developing being in the present, as possibly a higher type in future generations. Thus it came that Nietzsche's first investigations, growing out of his philological studies—principally Greek—were, broadly speaking, cultural, going back almost invariably to Greek ideals. The Greeks were pre-eminently the people of freedom, each man a positive force, every life its own life, every will its own. They rose to native dignity as men, a type with which no later civilization can be compared. Rejoicing in the present, physically and intellectually free spirits, without the shackles of any presupposition or bias whatsoever, fearing nothing, with an art which assuaged the soul by true nobility and rose to Dionysiac exaltation, to intoxication of beauty and delight.

Nietzsche considers this an ideal to which we must return if the human race is to advance; and Schopenhauer, as the great exponent of dominant will, is to him the one who can teach men anew this principle of individuation, this positing of one's own will and carrying it through to the end. Schopenhauer, as is well known, found the principle at the basis of all being and action, not in intelligence and love, as the theologians maintained, but in a blind will, akin to the wills we find within ourselves. Finding all nature motivated by this stupid, unreasoning, blind force,

Schopenhauer proposed as man's best solution, in a world as miserable as a world could possibly be, the overcoming, the subjection of that force. Subjectively, Schopenhauer's solution, as we all know, was the ideal of negation, the Buddhist's Nirvana, the willing not to will. At this point Nietzsche breaks with his master. He is for overcoming a will which is blind—we can also say, a character which has no ends and aims—not for the purpose of attaining Nirvana, but, on the contrary, that we may develop our dead selves to stronger personalities by the effort and struggle to assert ourselves physically, intellectually, and morally as higher types of men.

Here we meet with the central concept, the watchword of the Nietzschean philosophy, Superman, or Overman—*Uebermensch*. It was Goethe who coined the word, but Nietzsche has made it pregnant with possibility; indeed, it might well become the object of religion if we are eventually to be reduced to a merely moral religion, the positivist's concept of a glorified humanity.

Who, now, is the Overman? He is, as the word implies, a being higher than anything to which mankind has yet attained or will attain, physically, intellectually, and morally. He is the ever retreating limit of evolution. He is the sense and salt of the earth. He is the one for whom all mankind must live and die. He is the distinguished aristocrat, of extraordinary power and ability, who moulds the destiny of men at large. He gives tone, direction, dignity, and ends to society. He is the head, we are the members; and we exist only to further that head.

But have we not leaders who give tone, direction, dignity, and ends to society? And is not mankind evolving from higher to higher planes? No, replies our philosopher, we are like sheep without a shepherd, without purposes and ends. Ask men what is the purpose of their lives, and see how many will find one there at all! Indeed, so wholly sapless and devoid of meaning seems this present life that they look to a future world to make up for the senselessness of earthly life. No, men are like sheep without a shepherd, says our philosopher; and, moreover, they will not have any shepherd. Let a man of higher type arise among them, a man physically and intellectually superior, what is the attitude of men at large toward him? Will they allow him to carry out

exalted purposes, will they recognize his leadership? No, the whole tendency of our democratic times is to make men like one another, to look upon all men as equal, to keep all on the same level, and see to it that no man obtains predominating influence or expresses his genius.

Thus Nietzsche was the arch-enemy of democratic institutions. For him, they detracted from the dignity of life, and reduced its higher values to mere commonplace, to vulgarity. One rabble beckons to another, and, though a god were to appear among them, they would still beckon one to the other, "We are all equal." They are flies in the market-place, exclaims Nietzsche, they suck the blood of him who comes from the mountains, they crucify him who speaks of higher values. There are no higher men, there can be no genius, say they who will not recognize the principle of distinguished leadership, who have lost all sense of personality and individuality. Democracy can be but a spiritless dead level, a feeble mediocrity.

It thus behooves the Superman and him who loves the Superman to leave the market-place and find himself a higher sphere. Let the Superman assert his will and carry out his ends and purposes. Thus only can the dead level of mediocrity be overcome. May those who can, rise, and in the struggle let the strongest survive; only thus can weakness be done away with! In the strongest possible words Nietzsche calls upon his followers—of whom there were none at that time—to create some high purpose, some end for human life, something that shall arouse the enthusiasm of men and make them content with an earthly destiny. He believes the rearing of supermen to be the end in which all men should find their Dionysiac delight. Then would earth have a sense, a meaning.

But how about those who are not supermen—how about us? we instinctively inquire. Nietzsche's bold response is this: Every man his own neighbor. I am not my brother's keeper. Let every man work out his own salvation. Let us have the struggle and the combat. Then the weak will die, and those who yearn for other worlds. And yet all men should seek to foster that which might enslave them. Again instinctively we ask, Should not the Superman be bullet-proof?

But perhaps we are too concrete here. It is in an ethical sense, primarily, that Nietzsche speaks to us; and his emphasis of the higher man, the man, that is, who asserts his individuality, is an attack upon traditional concepts of morality. He desires to present new tables of evolutionary law, at least to have them reckoned with, and so release mankind perhaps from the shackles of convention and mere tradition. His evolutionary law is indeed revolutionary law. For him moral sanctions become a function of will—individual will—the exact antipode of Kant's categorical imperative. Spinoza anticipates him here: "According to the highest right of Nature, it is permitted to every man unconditionally to do that which according to his judgment will result in his own benefit."¹ Again, "To attain that which will redound to our own salvation and peace, we have need of no other principle than that we consider well what redounds to our own advantage."² And yet the deductions of Spinoza are quite different, as we shall see, since to him natural law and ethical law are both phases of the divine law.³

Nietzsche reasons thus: There was a time when men were physical slaves, bodily subject to masters. And though they overcame the fleshly bondage, they remained for many centuries intellectual slaves—scholastics of the Middle Age, bearing the yoke of a traditional philosophy. The time came when men awakened to find themselves free in mind as well—that was the renaissance of free thought, the dawning anew of a Greek ideal. But the process has not yet reached its conclusion; for we are still under the bondage of moral despotism, not having learned that our moral sanctions are themselves the products of our own minds. It is we ourselves who create the concepts good and evil. Therefore, they cannot have fixed values, and there are theoretically as many concepts, good and evil, as there are individuals. What, then, can hinder the establishment of new values for the categories good, right, etc.? Why not overturn the old evaluations of men's actions and set new standards, which may be more natural, and so contribute to the advancement of the race, particularly of its higher

¹Ethica, Part iv, App. 8.

²Concerning True Freedom.

³Of Natural Right.

type? This "*Umwertung aller Werte*" is what Nietzsche then attempts to do, deliberately setting aside public opinion, and challenging every ideal whatsoever, boldly proclaiming new standards and new ideals. The development of a higher type of man, and the overturning of what he is pleased to call this rabble-life of the present age, becomes for him a sort of holy zeal, a religion.

We all know that his main object here was to overturn, if possible, what he considered the effete ethical concepts of traditional Christianity. The system, he maintains, is one which grew out of Asiatic despotism, and contrasts with Greek enlightenment and the cultivation of virtue as its own filthy Jewish rags compare with the unspotted brightness of the unclouded heavens. The fundamental fallacy of the Christian ethics is to him its negation of the individual, its denial of the essentially human. If virtue is but filthy rags, and there is no cleanliness in us, how can we exult in earth and sky and the free play of every bodily function? If we must ever deny ourselves, how can the individual evolve? If our highest moral obligation becomes service, it cannot but result in servility, limitation, degradation. Altruism is thus a disease, and all its negative virtues are held to thwart the progress of evolution. The new and higher type of man will therefore never will to pity his fellow. 'Tis charity, and weakens him who gives and him who takes. The Superman will unlearn the idea of sacrifice, which degrades both giver and recipient. He, the rich in spirit, will not impoverish himself that the weak, the halt, the blind, the poor in spirit, the aimless, may drag themselves through an aimless existence. He will be strong and demand strength, thus inciting all to rouse themselves out of lazy weakness and moral beggary. He will resist evil—that is, whatever militates against his own higher development; never for one moment will he cease to raise himself, if possible, above his own dead self. Morally, then, the Superman will be his own self-sufficient arbiter, he will express his nature to the full, he will posit his own personality. He will posit his reason, and develop to the full every mental faculty. Here, too, he will rejoice in strength, he will accept no conditions, he will find that inner life and end in itself. Physically, he will strive to become like the "*blonde Bestie*" of the old German forests, with a body undaunted

by heat and cold, at home on land or sea, exulting in every natural function, every organ of his frame ruddy with life.

Let me, at this point, quote from the *Morgenröte*, by way of anticipating perhaps a serious criticism. The Superman as the type of the egoist, the "blond beast," who travels with inevitable will, devoid of sympathy or charity, with virtues all of his own making, has in him something to inspire fear. In justice to Nietzsche, however, we must remember that as a radical thinker he sought constantly to emphasize his thoughts by striking presentation. If, for instance, instead of calling the physical side of his Superman "*die blonde Bestie*," he had, with Hegel, spoken of an "approximate degree of bodily health which should enable a man to sustain a high degree of development, with consistent co-ordination of mind and physical functions," there would have been less discussion of the subject. Before we pass judgment, therefore, let us take into consideration Nietzsche's conception of the way the Superman would come to the end of his earthly course. He is comparing him with a bird of passage flying over the Western sea:

All these keen birds that fly afar to the farthest coast, surely somewhere they will be able to go no more, and they will limp down upon a mast or some barren cliff and be thankful for the support. But who can say that ahead of them, beyond them, there is not a free, a boundless course—that they have flown as far as they can fly? All our great masters and forerunners came to a stand, and it is not the noblest nor the most gracious mien with which fatigue stands still. So it will go with me and you. But how can that concern us? Other birds will fly beyond. And this our insight, our faith, flies in a race with them upwards and onwards; this our faith rises straight above our head and above its helplessness, it gazes out from thence into the distance and sees the hosts of far mightier birds, mightier than we are, who are going to strive for the same goal whither we sought to fly, and where all is yet sea, sea, sea.

If now the question presents itself, How about the advent of a second Superman, or perhaps a confederation of weaker wills for self-protection? we shall have to make allowance for a measure of justifiable hyperbole. For Nietzsche speaks here of slaves and masters, and of a master-morality and a slave-morality.

So great was his zeal for development that to him the Superman becomes the goal to which all nature turns. As the human species, the highest exemplification of life, depends for its sustenance upon the lower creation of animal and plant life, so it becomes a necessary correlate that the lower races of mankind should become subordinate to the purposes of those who stand for exalted ideals. The masses of mankind, the rabble, can be only a means to an end. And thus the beginning of a new era will see, first of all, a greater importance placed upon the highest types of men, and the factors that make for progress will not be sacrificed for the weak-minded, the mediocre, the halt, and those who possess a mere existence without a spark of the higher life. The Christian ethics and democracy are one in this emphasis of the commonplace, the lame, the passable, the merely existing, the many-too-many. They would be, nay, they are, the masters of human destiny, servants—they whose highest aim is a beggar's paradise, who "ask, and ask anew, how can a man keep on existing best, how can he live longest and most pleasantly."⁴ Democracy has millions for reformatories, homes, asylums, and never once inquires whether its exalted spirits live or perish. Comfort, the external conveniences of life, the faint happiness of the greatest number, a mendicant mediocrity, the sacrifice of the truly distinguished for those who know not for what purpose they be, the supermen for slaves—such is for Nietzsche the spirit of our times. Yet in his prophetic exaltation he sees a better time to come. Then supermen will be the glory of the race, and the many will find their reason for existence in cherishing and sustaining the highest types of men. They will recognize the fact that they are properly slaves, without independent thought and initiative, and so properly under the direction of such as can provide form and dignity, ends and purposes, an upward and onward movement for all.

Thus a double standard of morality results, one for supermen, another for those dependent upon their guidance. Manifestly, the virtues of exalted character positing its own law are other than those of obedience to authority. And there can be no hope for supermen if one slave equals one superman. Therefore, while

⁴ Also sprach Zarathustra, p. 419.

the latter holds his intelligent will to be the only law, "everything being allowed while nothing is true" (*nichts ist wahr, alles ist erlaubt*), the dependent personality will still cherish the self-denying, sacrificing, pitying, poor-in-spirit service-morality.

Christianity, like democracy, makes the fundamental error of supposing all men to be equal. "Man is man before God, we are all alike,"⁵ says the Christian, and the principle is one which brings our philosopher to express himself as never man did before, to my knowledge, in the bitterest tones of derision and contempt for our most cherished hopes and beliefs. All religion he holds to be the fabric of dreams, even as pure philosophy arose from delusion and the failure to see distinctly. The other self appearing in dreams gave rise to the belief in souls and future existence. Cowardice and fear for moral principles started the fiction of rewards and punishments and final judgments. All religious phenomena Nietzsche believes explicable as psychological aberration and reading into experience what is not to be found there. Thus auto-suggestion produces the consciousness both of sin and deliverance from sin and of the efficacy of prayer. For Zarathustra, who is of course Nietzsche himself, God is dead; God, too, was, and is, a delusion. Our philosopher, wandering through the earth, meets in a far-off wood a holy man who is singing praises to God as in loneliness he climbs his mountain-side. He is intoning ancient psalms and muttering to himself. "Can it be," exclaimed Zarathustra, "this old saint has not yet heard in his wood that God is dead?" "Such are despisers of life," he continues, "decaying men, such as have poisoned themselves, and of whom the earth is weary." "I beseech you, my brethren, remain true to earth, and do not believe such as speak of hopes for other worlds. They are poisoners, whether they know it or not."⁶ Thus our concerns are confined entirely to earth; and bitterly does our atheist curse those who yearn for other worlds. "May they pass hence, earth is weary of these weaklings; let them have their eternal reward," he cries in derision. "We," he calls to his disciples, of whom there were none at that time, "we shall be satisfied with earth," with its seas and skies and green grass, with its struggles and joys, and, best of all, its glorious end.

⁵ Also sprach Zarathustra, p. 417.

⁶ Also sprach Zarathustra, p. 12.

Christianity is for Nietzsche the very type of Asiatic despotism, which still holds sway over the minds of men like a blight. Its fabled concepts might, as such, be quite harmless if it were not for the fact that their moral influence is degrading to the personality, inasmuch as they set forth self-denial, self-sacrifice, humiliation, dependence, the delusion of sin, depravity, and the feeble yearning for a world where there shall be a compensation for present weakness and meanness of spirit. He reviles the gentle carpenter's son who taught for the poor in spirit, the halt, the blind, babes and sucklings, and those who long for other worlds. "Strange," he exclaims, "that a crucified Jew these many centuries ago should have made so great a stir in the world." The time will come, Nietzsche maintains, when men will be brave enough to face the fact that our destiny is irretrievably bound up with earth, and that it is futile to hope for heaven, or a resurrection, or the horror of everlasting life, or the justice of a God whom mankind have themselves created. The time will come when man himself, or rather the Superman, will become an object of religion.

This is the religion of the future, of which we hear so much in Germany today. "See, I teach you the Superman," says Nietzsche. "Man is something that must be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? All beings heretofore have created something higher than themselves, and would you be the ebb of this great flood and rather go back to the beast than overcome the human? What is an ape to a man? A derision or a poignant shame. Just that a man should be to the Superman—a derision or a poignant shame." Conversion to this evolutionary religion is a sort of recognition of depravity, for "it is the hour of scorn, the hour in which your fortune becomes despicable, likewise your reason and your virtue. The hour in which you say, 'What is there in my fortune? It is poverty and filth and a beggarly complacency.' The hour in which you say, 'What is there in my reason? Does it demand knowledge as the lion its food? It is poverty and filth and a beggarly complacency.' The hour in which you say, 'What is there to my virtue? It has not yet made me to exult with ecstasy. How weary am I of my Good and my Evil. All that is poverty and filth and beggarly complacency."

cency.' Have ye thus spoken? Have ye thus cried? Ah, that I had heard you crying thus! It is not your sin: it is your self-satisfaction which clamors to the heavens. Where is the lightning that may lick you with its tongue? Where is the inner intoxication with which you may be inoculated? See, I teach you the Superman; he is this lightning, he is this inner intoxication, he is the sense of the earth!"

This is the kind of religion, this the style of its sacred book. Is it a wonder that in our age of transition both the ideas and the fervid diction should have fascinated all young Germany? Before we consider Nietzsche's influence, however, let us examine the ideas more critically, and first of all ask ourselves the question, Upon what basis does the author frame his judgments? Doubtless it will be an interesting surprise to many American and English pragmatists to learn that Nietzsche has anticipated all their principal doctrines. He argues:⁷ Formerly one asked how truth might be possible and knowledge attainable; the Sphinx's questions being meanwhile accepted as something original, absolute, and requiring no justification. He proposes to ask the Sphinx a question, namely, "Why answer your questions?" In other words, what is the cause of this desire for truth, and wherein lies the value of it? Why choose "truth" rather than "falsehood," and why not rather the latter than the former? He finds them by no means opposites, since that which makes truth valuable is a quality which may be held in common by falsehood. For the criterion of value requires us to measure judgments from the standpoint of the furtherance and maintenance of life, biologically speaking; and, psychologically, that which produces satisfaction is "true." With the knowledge of things, therefore, the "truth" has nothing to do. Indeed, Nietzsche maintains "that the falsest judgments (among which are synthetic judgments *a priori*) are most indispensable for us; that without granting the validity of logical fictions, or without measuring reality with a fancied world, the 'equal to itself,' the 'absolute,' . . . life under the present conditions would not be possible, that a surrender of false judgments would be a surrender of life, a diminution of life"; and therefore "the falsity of a judgment is no objection to it." Life provides

⁷ Vol. vii, pp. 9-22 (1884).

for itself, and chooses the form of knowing which it needs. And thus it is a biological necessity for us to accept the space-time-cause character of our surroundings and the (possibly false) axiom that appearance is correlated with the laws of thought. The concept "truth" is therefore contradictory, since truth cannot extend to the relation of knowing to being, but is necessarily restricted to the relationships of the knowers to one another and to their presentations. In the sense of a correspondence of knowing with reality, there is, then, for Nietzsche no truth. His "truth" becomes Schiller's practical value, utility, James's "what we want," Dewey's psychological satisfaction—that which furthers the life of the individual, the species, the race. What is injurious to life is false for us. And since life for Nietzsche is the "will for power," that which serves the latter is true. Similarly, the test of truth lies in the practical operation of it. "That by which I am thwarted or destroyed is not true for me. It means a false relationship of my being to other things. For there are only individual truths; an absolute relationship is nonsense."⁸ Again, he emphasizes the social, linguistic, national, racial elements, which by utility determine the relative truth or falsity of judgments. Truth is a subconscious phenomenon—nothing more.⁹ Nor is there need of an absolute truth; it will suffice for life that we believe ourselves in the possession of truth. Life requires illusions: man is not primarily a knowing being; his intellect is but a means for the maintenance of his life.¹⁰

We may say, therefore, that in so far as Nietzsche was a philosopher, he was a philosopher of culture. His judgments are largely aesthetic, biological, judgments of practical value; and concepts such as the "*Wille zur Macht*," the "*Ewige Wiederkunft*," and other distinctly metaphysical theories seem incorporated in spite of himself. And, doubtless, in questions which are properly pragmatic, the only answer is the testing. So that culture does in reality become largely a function of the will. So far, then, Nietzsche was justified in striving to inspire enthusiasm for his ideal of the Superman. Only history would tell whether or not he were in the right. And criticism, from the very nature of the case, must needs be aesthetic or historical.

⁸ Vol. xi, Aphor. 6, 208.⁹ Vol. x, p. 185.¹⁰ Vol. x, pp. 161, 186.

With reference, then, to the positing of individuality, the central doctrine in the "*Umwertung aller Werte*," and the desire of Nietzsche to inoculate modern life with more of the Greek spirit, those who are acquainted with its heritage will say that this was a laudable end. Yet he failed to see that his modification of Schopenhauer's Will is quite at variance with Greek form, poise, self-restraint. With all the hundreds of personally striking men, individuals whose influence has spread throughout the world of European culture, I know of none, except perhaps Callicles as presented in Plato's *Gorgias*, who deliberately inflicted his personality upon his times. Among Athenian citizens, where were individual initiative, the liberty of mind and body, and the most favorable conditions the world has yet seen for the free exercise of activity, exulting in physical, intellectual, and artistic pursuits, the result was not the assertion of self, but the exact opposite, the *mesotes*, the happy mean, of Aristotle. Thus we have in Attic life, with all the intensity of that life, not supermen, consciously rejoicing in their strength, every man a would-be exponent of will, determined to assert himself, but rather a constant feeling of self-restraint in conduct, of modesty with reference to knowledge and ability, of form with reference to art.

In a similar way we can prove upon historical grounds that master-and-slave morality, in the sense of license and submission, contains its own disintegrating factors. From the very nature of circumstances, our wills may no more be licensed than our heads may soar above our bodies. Nor have moral principles generally, any more than words and grammar, been the creations of strong wills who said, "Go to." Ethics, like language, is an absurdity when reduced to the individual, apart, of course, from religious presuppositions. The moral genius and the man of letters, great as their influence may be, are not the creators of language, nor of the sense of what is right. Nietzsche erred here through passionate enthusiasm for the Lord and Hero, and his moral liberty is but licensed anarchy. Grant, however, that as fellow-men we share our moral antecedents, and that if we live together we are bound to live as men, just as we communicate by means of common terms, then—stripped of hyperbole—supermen might well become saviours of society. For, spiritually interpreted, this superior man,

by positing ends and ideals, might help to overcome the rabble in the sense of mediocrity, vulgarity, and lust of material power. Dignity of life and institutions, the imperatives of evolution, all the elements which stimulate our aspirations for the higher values of thought and feeling, are largely a function of exalted leadership. That democracy stands in the way of evolution by conditioning these highest individuals is manifestly false where a free field and no favor obtains. Only a democracy in which material ends are the highest good profanes the individual. Two types of supermen should therefore be differentiated. If he whose aim is but to have and to hold is a danger in proportion to his power, he whose aristocracy consists of disinterested and pre-eminent ability is a public boon. Give us such supermen, and let them assume their proper sphere as leaders. Such are, indeed, the only hope against rabble-democracy.

Nietzsche's individual ethics thus becomes a possible school for dignity, if we distinguish rightly between license and liberty, between libertines and lovers. The passionate poet of a higher humanity, arch-foe of weaklings, dependents, and pharisees, spake his Laconian nature in fire which is dangerous to our whole social structure. And yet the fire of this gentlest and kindest of men serves a purpose, if properly directed, on the hearthstone of our inner life. For our moral judgments are as much our own as are the apples of our eyes. And, after all, we are men, not cells; persons, not colonists, without dignity, undifferentiated. Nietzsche's revolt was against the modern volvox type of life, where men are mere cells in the communal lump. He prophesied for personalities, for independent thinkers, for men who feared no law as such, each imagination with its own Atlantis. And such can but add new values to our lives.

The religion of the Superman will need no lengthy discussion. From Nietzsche's moral theory it would not be difficult to surmise that religion, in any phase whatsoever, was necessarily abhorrent to him as a form of slavery to transmitted ideas. So far did his absolute individuality carry him that, like Oscar Wilde, if he discovered his own thoughts held in common by others, he was loath to retain them. Thus arose the defiant atheism which saw in all religious experience a stupendous emotional delusion. With

his positing of the individual, pious men must needs be to him like Don Quixote, who underestimated himself because he had constantly in mind the heroic deeds of the knights of romance. Thus, too, a fabled God whose essence was love and pure altruism, held up as a foil to man's necessarily egoistic actions, gave birth to feelings of shortcomings and distress, with the pangs of conscience and need of salvation. And similarly, if men could have realized that the concept of a being purely unegoistic is absurd (how could an ego act without an ego),—could men have compared themselves one with the other, and not with a thing more fabulous than the phoenix, they would have had a greater respect for themselves. Sin would be no more. And with the elimination of responsibility could but come the philosophic conviction that every act is unconditionally necessary. Thus it was that this prophet of individualism sought to confine the interests of men to earth, and bade them boldly face extinction nor hope for other reward.

But let us for a moment inquire how a "false psychology, a fantastic explanation of motives and experiences," could have seduced and degraded even to pusillanimity a "necessarily egoistic" human nature. How came comparison with others and with the "fabled God" in a race where altruism is but a disease? A "necessarily egoistic" nature must have found it equally necessary to compare itself with others and to adjust itself accordingly, for thence arose, we are told, our altruistic motives, our craving for the higher life beyond. And since our ancestors felt this need of a higher Being for their salvation and inner satisfaction, we have to deal with psychic facts as basic as any egoism. So that the question then becomes, Is the common yearning a disease, or may the isolated self-worship possibly be a form of egomania? "If there were gods, how could I endure it not to be one? Therefore there are none!" is an individualist's argument, based upon at least an exalted opinion of one's self. It was to Nietzsche's inner satisfaction to find in whatever contributed to the "*Wille zur Macht*," to the will of the individual man, nothing but truth; and so whatever conditioned the progress of his assumed Superman must of necessity be false. We need, therefore, fear no evil from his negation of religion. For, manifestly, where fundamen-

tal concepts are not to be decided by approximation with reality, a counter-judgment of value will suffice for our satisfaction. So that we need but to render unto the pragmatist the things which are his to retain our logical self-respect.

A few words will have to suffice with reference to Nietzsche's influence. The sudden expansion of the cult was and is one which well justifies the call of conservative men for "police, colleagues, government authorities." The spread of the theories which I have attempted to describe among the educated classes in Germany and France is comparable only to that of their opposite, socialism, among the third estate. France had, indeed, anticipated the Titan man and his individuality. La Rochefoucauld, long before, deprived Nietzsche of a possible claim to originality, and Renan was as much a hater of the dead level as ever man was. The factors which explain the sudden fashion into which Nietzsche sprang about 1890 are thus very complex. Among them we may note, in the first place, Schopenhauer's fundamental pessimism, crabbed and relentless, softened, indeed, in certain quarters by von Hartmann's rose-water, but generally despairing of any good in civil, educational, religious institutions; a spirit which revolts, to quote Otto Ludwig, against "our time of levelling, when everyone fears to show himself different from the others, when in reality the law of necessity prevails, since from childhood up the passions are deadened, and there are fast-bound arrangements with police on every hand . . . when individual intentions are adjusted to those of the common average man . . . and character shows itself only in its effects." Natural enough, with such a view of affairs, that individuality should seek to avenge itself. And in Germany it had been seeking to do so, according to Karl Lamprecht,¹¹ for sixty years or more of the "*subjektivistische Periode*." The age of Bismarck, Moltke, blood-and-iron, was culminating, and giving increased zeal to both socialist and Titan-man. Both were, and are, dissatisfied with aught but radical measures. There must be revolutionary readjustments, though the state be removed for the individual (Paul Heyse), or the higher classes be despoiled for the third estate (Karl Marx). The explosive violence and passionate diction of our poet well suited such a time. I think it

¹¹ Deutsche Geschichte, xi, p. 310.

no exaggeration to say that there are hundreds of young men in Germany today who echo the sentiment of their master, "If there were gods, how could I endure it not to be one?" At the universities, courses of lectures are now devoted to this philosopher. The publications of the *Archiv* at Weimar, in large and expensive editions, are sold in very unusual numbers. In addition to the exhaustive life published by his sister, a dozen men might be named who have written biographical works concerning him. The number of those who have written about his philosophy is legion; and almost without exception these books have been published since 1895. Höffding's and Windelband's Histories of Philosophy—the former published in 1900, the latter in 1891—never so much as mention his name. Yet Friedrich Nietzsche is now the prophet of a new age; *Also sprach Zarathustra* is to be its Bible. "Young Germany" finds the Fatherland in a condition of rapid decay; the new life will be for them the basis of a new culture. A new art, a new state or none, a new faith, a rejuvenation of the native spirit of the people—all these are supposed to be a function of the development of personality. Weinberg, Langbehn, Stephen George, Scharf, Conradi—such are, in varying degrees of intensity, supermen. In the winter of 1905, I attended a series of lectures given by Dr. Ernest Horneffer in Albert Hall, Leipzig. Thousands assembled there to listen to lectures and discussions on Nietzsche, and the meetings lasted usually from eight in the evening till midnight or later. In that hall one night, as the clock was striking twelve, the lecturer sent forth the following challenge, "Let those who no longer find the idea, God, necessary, rise to their feet, and so declare their native dignity as men." The scene which followed was tragic. Perhaps two thousand declared by stamping of feet and shouting and waving of hands that they approved of the speaker's proposition.

In art it would be by no means difficult to show the relation between Richard Strauss's deliberate infliction of unmitigated perversity and Young Germany's "Express thyself unconditionally." Nor can there be another motive, it seems to me, when Max Klinger paints "*Die blaue Stunde*"—a blue seashore, blue rocks, girl-forms by no means beautiful, nude and blue, blue fire;

it is, indeed, the expression of individuality. But we cannot go afield here. Suffice it that by way of example in literature we characterize Ludwig Scharf and his *Lieder eines Menschen*. His battle is against reality; he will have his "Beyond Good and Evil" applied there. He rages against the thousand-year-old prejudice—morality—and insists that the common right of man permits him to enjoy whatever his heart desires—after us the flood! So he is determined with clenched fist to declare the evil of religion, of any cult whatsoever, of any state, of any occupation, of any civilization. He will express himself once for all, and enjoy himself. We can hear plainly enough the cause of all this bitterness and revolt. If it had been possible for him, for his pure ego and for no one else, to sit comfortably in his chariot and be drawn in triumph by his contemporaries, if his individuality could but have been recognized, all would have been otherwise. And it is not difficult to see that it is only his tragic want of energy which conditions his practical exemplification of the Superman. And Scharf feels it plainly enough, but he *will* not know it, he *will* not admit it. *Ab uno disce ceteros*.

Max Nordau considers all this one of twenty-five or more insanities; Raoul Richter, clear-headed professor of philosophy at Leipzig, finds Nietzsche the Dionysiac embodiment of a coming *Weltanschauung*; Doctor Rudolf Eisler, of Vienna, sees in him a naturalistic pantheist, who might well be the John the Baptist for a voluntaristic panentheist; Arthur Moeller-Bruck speaks of him as the *candāla* Nietzsche; Professor Karl Lamprecht recognizes in him the culmination of the Carlyle-Emerson hero-worship, the destruction of pessimism by joyful affirmation of this life and of creative will, the turning-point to a new religion of yearning for higher values and eternal life through the course of nature and will. As for us, when this age of transition is past, let us hope that there may be more religion, less individuality, greater consistency, and, if possible, greater love of the beautiful, than are found in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche.

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